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Abstract
Space debris is a growing environmental problem. Accumulation of objects
in Earth orbit threatens space systems through the possibility of collisions
and runaway debris multiplication. The amount of debris in orbit is
uncertain due to the lack of information on the population of debris between
1 and 10 centimeters diameter. Collisions with debris even smaller than 1
cm can be catastrophic due to the high orbital velocities involved. Research
efforts are under way at NASA, Unites States Space Command and the Air
Force Phillips Laboratory to detect and catalog the debris population in
near-Earth space. Current international and national laws are inadequate
to control the proliferation of space debris.
Space debris is a serious problem with large economic, military, technical
and diplomatic components. Actions need to be taken now to: determine the
full extent of the orbital debris problem; accurately predict the future
evolution of the debris population; decide the extent of the debris mitigation
procedures required; implement these policies on a global basis via an
international treaty. Action must be initiated now, before the the loss of
critical space systems such as the Space Shuttle or the Space Station.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the continued use of space for commercial, military, and scientific
purposes, the number of objects orbiting the Earth has steadily increased
over the past 33 years. There are now over 7000 objects larger than 10
centimeters1 and an estimated 30,000 to 70,000 smaller objects, 10-1
centimeters long in Earth orbit. There are an estimated 10 billion objects in
the range of 0.1 mm to 1 cm in Earth orbit. 2 The large number of objects in
orbit raises the threat of debris colliding with important functional
spacecraft. The increase in the amount of space debris is a growing
problem that has the potential to limit the future use of near Earth orbits.
Space debris is defined as any object that is in orbit around the earth not
in use, or controlled, or of any scientific or economic value (for example
objects that have been discarded and left in orbit at the end of their useful
lives). Space debris includes old, non-operational satellites, used rocket
boosters/bodies, and parts of satellites discarded during operations. It also
includes fragments of objects that have disintegrated through intentional or
accidental explosion or collision, and objects as small as paint chips that
have broken off satellites. The number of objects in orbit that are 10
centimeter or larger is growing at an average rate of 240 per year.3 The
growth rate of smaller objects is unknown due to the uncertainty of the
1 United States Space Command, Space Analysis and Data Branch, Space Surveillance
Center Catalog, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base, Colorado, 2 January 1991.
2 Space Debris: A Report from the Euronean Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
France: European Space Agency, November 1988, ESA SP-1109, p. 15.
3 Based on US Space Command Catalog
number and size of small debris produced by events such as satellite
fragmentation.
The distribution around the Earth of the largest space objects, those large
enough to be tracked by the United States Air Force Space Surveillance
System, are shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the
location of all objects tracked by the United States in near Earth orbits at an
instant in time. Figure 1.2 shows a wider view of Earth orbit that includes
the geosynchronous ring, with its high percentage of satellites clearly
visible.
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Figure 1.1
Locations of Near Earth Orbit Objects Contained
in the Space Command Satellite Catalog
at 0000 GMT, 1 January 1989
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Figure 1.2
Positions of All Objects Contained in the Space
Command Satellite Catalog at 0000 GMT, 1 January 1989
1.1 Background Environment
Space debris has been accumulating since man first started launching
objects into orbit. In fact Explorer 1, the third satellite ever launched and
the one that discovered the Van Allen radiation belts, is still in orbit and
will remain there for the next several thousand years.
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In 1988 there were an estimated 2,000,000 kg of manmade objects in
Earth orbit.4 These objects range in size from large satellites and space
stations, to wrenches dropped by astronauts, to paint chips and small solid
rocket exhaust particles. Many of these objects are in long lived orbits and
will remain in orbit for the foreseeable future.
The 30,000 to 70,000 objects in orbit that are larger than 1 centimeter are
typically metal, either aluminum, steel, or titanium, and they are found in
approximately the same proportion as each is used in building spacecraft.5
These objects typically have a high ballistic coefficient which gives them
longer lifetimes on orbit, while increasing the possibility of damaging other
space systems.
There is also a natural meteor background which poses similar threats
as space debris to space systems. An accepted estimate of the mass of near
earth meteors within a volume of 2000 km radius around the Earth is 300 kg
at any one time. These meteors are on a hyperbolic trajectory and move very
quickly through the space near Earth. Meteors can be rocks, dust, ice, or a
number of other substances. Typical velocities of meteors are on the order of
20 km/sec. At these velocities, most sub-millimeter sized meteors vaporize
on contact and do not cause significant structural damage.
Manmade objects are typically in near-Earth orbit where they circle the
Earth and remain a threat to other near-Earth space systems. While
natural meteors and micrometeors only have one chance of colliding with a
4 Space Debris: A Report from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988, p. 15.
50p cit 4
particular object as they pass by the Earth, an object in Earth orbit has two
chances of collision on every orbit.
In order to characterize the threat to space systems it is important to
know the characteristics of debris. This includes the number, size, altitude,
orbit and composition of the debris. (These details are covered in detail in
Chapter 3.) An effective method for illustrating the chances of collision with
debris is with the cumulative collision flux. The cumulative collisional flux
has units of collisions per square meter per year. It gives the expected flux
of objects with a given size or larger through a one meter square area in
near-Earth space for one year. The collisional flux along an orbit is a
function of its altitude and inclination and the debris environment. NASA
has developed a computer based model to aid in determining the
cumulative collisional flux. Figure 1.3 shows the collisional probability for
low Earth orbit as a function of size.
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Figure 1.3
Cumulative Collisional Flux per Square Meter per Year
as a Function of Size for Low Earth Orbiting Satellites 6
In order to find the collisional probability, multiply the orbital debris flux
by the projected surface area for the spacecraft and the number of years in
operation. Because of the rapidly increasing number of objects in orbit the
6 Orion International Technologies, "Program Review: Long Term Debris
Propagation Models (Space Debris)," 28 February 1991.
probability of collision between satellites and space debris has increased
dramatically over the past few decades.
One important aspect of the debris problem to consider is that the size of
the debris that is considered dangerous to space operations is very small (1
mm) due to their very high orbital velocities. Collision velocities between
two near-Earth orbiting objects can reach as high as 15 km/sec, but the
mean is on the order of 10 km/sec or 22,500 miles per hour. Collisions at
this velocity are known as hypervelocity collisions or impacts. Types of
hypervelocity impact damage include penetration, perforation, detached
spall, local deformation, erosion and fractures. Failure modes associated
with these types of collision can range from catastrophic rupture of a
pressurized module, to explosions of fuel tanks, or degradation of
performance of a solar array.
Because of the high kinetic energy associated with even very small
hypervelocity objects, objects as small as paint chips are significant.
Collisions with debris as small as 1 mm could be catastrophic for many
space systems. During the Space Shuttle Mission STS-7, a 0.2 mm paint
fleck impacted on the shuttle's side window. Although it did not puncture
the window, it did require replacing the window prior to the next flight, a
$50,000 repair. The Space Station's pressurized modules are going to be
protected by shields and bumpers to withstand collisions with objects 1
centimeter or smaller in size, but at considerable cost and additional
weight. Most other space systems are constructed to minimize weight and
are not as well-shielded for protection against space debris as the space
station or space shuttle.
All satellites are very vulnerable to the types of damage done by space
debris. Satellites rely on an extensive set of electronic components which
are double or triple redundant to ensure successful mission completion. If
a small piece of debris penetrates an electronics box of a satellite, the
system will fail and the only indication the operators may receive is loss of
communication and control of the satellite. With most deployed space
systems currently on orbit, an object smaller than one half centimeter
diameter is adequate to penetrate and destroy the satellite. Chapter 4
discusses damage scenarios and provides results from hypervelocity
impact studies. Table 1.1 lists the most likely critical types of failure for
various subsystems due to collisions with debris.
Probable Critical
Types of Failure
Catastrophic Rupture
Detached Spalling
Secondary Factures
Leakage
Shock Pulse
Vapor Flash
Deflagration
Deformation
Reduced Residual Strength
Fluid Contamination
Thermal Insulation Damage
Obscuration
Errosion
Subsystems
Pressure Special
Cabins Tanks Radiators Windows Electronics Surfaces
x x x
x x x x
x x
x x x
x x x
x
x
x x
x x x x
x x
x x
x
x x
NASA SP-8042, Meteoroid Damage Assessment, Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Structures),
May 1970, obtained from E.L. Christiansen briefing "Meteor/Debris Shielding", 2 April 1991.
Table 1.1
Critical Types of Failure for Various
Subsystems Due to Hypervelocity Impacts
1.2 Current Interest In Space Debris
Space debris is a relatively new environmental concern. The amount of
objects we leave in orbit by intentional or unintentional acts has increased
over the past thirty years. These uncontrolled and discarded objects in
space are becoming a major threat to future space systems. In fact space
debris is now considered the largest threat to the proposed International
Space Station Freedom. If the debris continues to be produced at its current
rate, the probability of the Space Station colliding with a piece of space
debris 1 cm or larger over a 30 year mission is 9-14%. 7
Other proposed large systems, such as the proposed Strategic Defense
Initiative's Brilliant Pebbles system being designed to protect the United
States from ballistic missile attack, and the Air Force's proposed Space
Based Radar system designed to provide radar data during hostile bomber
attack, will face similar threats of collision with the increasing number of
space objects.
1.3 Policy Developments
Space debris has recently gained significant attention in some space
organizations and in the media. The first significant report on space debris
was from a military perspective and was provided in the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board's report in December 1987 titled "Current and
Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space Missions from Current and
7 D. Rex, "European Investigations on Space Debris," presented at the Orbital Debris
Workshop III, ESA Space Debris Working Group, Technical University of Braunschweig,
Federal Republic of Germany.
Future Debris".8 In November 1988, the European Space Agency published
a report titled "Space Debris".9 In September 1990, the Office of Technology
Assessment published the report "Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental
Problem".10 These reports were the first official expressions of concern in
the space community on the issue of space debris. Many organizations such
as the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) have
been investigating the threat of space debris for space activities and
methods to control it. Specialized classes are now available through AIAA
to educate the aerospace community about the problems associated with
space debris. Space debris even has its own dedicated periodical, titled "The
Orbital Debris Monitor".11
While all this attention has increased the awareness of the problem, it
has not provided clear solutions. Problems exist with determining the
number, size, and distribution of existing orbital debris. Modelling efforts
are based to a great extent on broad, generalized assumptions that make
their confidence levels very low. In order to improve these models more
data is required on the amount of debris and their production rates and
mechanisms
8 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space Missions from Current and
Future Debris, December 1987.
9 Space Debris: A Report from the Euronean Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
10 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990..
11 "The Orbital Debris Monitor" is published by Darrin McKnight. Information is
available at 12624 Verny Place, Fairfax, VA 22033-4383.
Controversy exists over what effects the proposed increased launch
activities associated with such programs as the Strategic Defense
Initiative's Brilliant Pebbles or the commercial Iridium communications
satellites will have on the debris population. Other concerns include the
effects of anti-satellite weapons programs and tests.
Another major concern is the possibility of the Kessler Effect. The
Kessler Effect describes the possibility of self generation of debris due to
random collision between objects in space. The problem is that space objects
will eventually randomly collide with other space objects creating large
number of smaller but more numerous debris. This then increases the risk
of further collisions and the creation of additional debris. This self
generation of additional debris could outpace the removal mechanism due
to atmospheric drag in higher orbits, thus creating an unstable, increasing
population of space debris. This effect has the potential for rendering
certain orbits unusable for any manned or mission-essential spacecraft.
The Kessler Effect was advanced by Donald Kessler of NASA. His
research indicates that in certain altitude regimes the critical number of
objects and mass has already been exceeded and the generation of
additional debris caused by collisions between objects will outpace the
removal rate by atmospheric drag. If this is true, then the problem will get
worse even if there are no additional objects placed in orbit. This concept is
gaining wider acceptance within the scientific community. The Kessler
Effect will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Given all the unknowns, uncertainties and controversies associated with
space debris, remedial steps need to be taken in order to solve or at least
minimize the problem. These steps will require money and effort. With all
the recent publicity this issue has received, money and effort may become
available. However, as with any environmental issue, the organizations
funding the program want immediate results. While attention is focused on
this issue, it is important to develop a comprehensive program that can
survive the political and emotional arguments and proceed to develop
accurate assessments of the risk of space debris and sound
recommendations for its elimination in the future.
1.4 Areas to be Covered in This Thesis
This thesis discusses the many aspects of the space debris problem.
After this introduction, Chapter 2 will focus on the history of space debris
accumulation and the various types of debris and their sources and
available information on each. Chapter 3 will address the space debris
environment, including the distribution of debris in terms of size, altitude
and inclination.
Chapter 4 discusses the hazards associated with space debris and
assesses the risk to space systems, and Chapter 5 examines the current
space surveillance systems used for tracking large space objects and their
limitations in tracking small objects. Chapter 6 addresses existing and
proposed measurement programs designed to provide a better
understanding of the space debris environment. Chapter 7 discusses
possible mitigation efforts to limit the growth and effects of space debris.
Chapter 8 will discuss the legal implications of space debris, focusing on
both international and domestic laws and regulations. Finally, Chapter 9
will provide some recommendations for future policies to limit the growth
of the space debris population.
2. THE HISTORY OF SPACE DEBRIS ACCUMULATION
This chapter will discuss the types and sources of space debris. It begins
with a description of several launches of current satellite systems. The
gradual accumulation of debris in orbit will be discussed. An extensive
discussion of fragmentation debris -- the largest source of orbital debris --
and its causes will follow. The last part of this chapter discusses the
natural removal mechanisms for debris.
2.1 '"ypicar' Space Launches
During a typical space launch a number of objects are discarded and left
in orbit. This number depends on the specific satellite and how strictly
debris abatement policies are enforced. The core of the debris problem is
that once a spacecraft has reached orbit, any and all discarded objects will
remain in a similar orbit with similar lifetimes as the satellite.
2.1.1 Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Satellite
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite resides in
a sun-synchronous 450 nautical mile orbit inclined at 98.75 degrees to the
equator, one of the highest debris populated orbits. DMSP provides global
cloud data and other specialized meteorological data to the Department of
Defense in support of its world-wide operations.
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Figure 2.1
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Spacecraft
The DMSP satellite is launched on an Atlas E launch vehicle. Only the
satellite and the satellite kick booster are placed into orbit. All other booster
debris, such as the flaring and clamp bands, quickly falls back to Earth
prior to reaching orbit. When the satellite reaches the proper orbit the kick
motor is released and becomes debris. These types of upper stage kick
motors have become a substantial source of small debris due to explosions
that have occurred years after deployment of the satellite. This issue will be
discussed in depth later in this chapter.
During initialization of the DMSP satellite, several objects are released
into the operational orbit; these objects include bands, cords and covers.
Two bands per satellite are used to secure the solar array for launch. Each
band is made of 3/32 inch stainless steel and is 165 inches long. These bands
are cut and released as debris during deployment of the solar arrays. Two
IENr
other cords secure a glare obstructor that shields the sensors from
extraneous light. These two cords, which are 3/64 inch diameter kevlar and
18 inches long, are also released as debris. These kevlar cords are not
detectable by the current space surveillance radar systems used by the
United States.
During initialization of the DMSP spacecraft, two covers (the radiator
cover and the optical cover), intended to protect instruments and other parts
of the spacecraft during preparations and launch, are released as debris.
The radiator cover is kapton coated urethane on a metal frame and is 11 x
11 x 1 inches and weighs approximately 1/2 pound. The other cover is the
optics cover. This nickel and copper coated epoxy glass panel is
approximately 9 x 30 x 6 inches, and it weights close to 1.5 pounds.'
Deployment of a single DMSP satellite produces seven long-lived objects
besides the satellite. Because all of these objects are released once the
satellite has reached its final orbit, they will have lifetimes of 50-100 years,
close to that of the satellite itself. The exact number of DMSP satellites to be
launched is uncertain, because satellites are replaced as required.
However, the planned number of launches of the Atlas booster with either a
DMSP or a similar National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) satellite is at a rate of two per year from 1988 to 1991.2 Each
additional launch continues to add to the amount of debris in near-Earth
orbit.
1 United States Air Force, Air Force Space Division, Position Paper on Man-Made Debris
Hazards.•Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, 1 November 1988.
2 Op cit 1
Number per Expected
DMSP Satellite Size Weight Final Orbit Lifetime
Satellite 1 11 ft 6 inches 1660 Ibs 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
21 ft with solar array
Kick motor 1 N/A N/A 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
Solar array bands 2 165 inches .75 Ibs 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
Retaining cord 2 18 inches .002 Ibs 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
Radiator cover 1 11 x 11 x 1 inches .5 Ibs 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
Optics cover 1 3 x 30 x 6 inches 1.3 Ibs 450 nmi circular 50-100 yrs
Table 2.1
Typical Debris for a Defense Meteorological
Support Program Satellite Deployment
2.1.2 Mid - Earth Orbit Satellites
Other launches into medium or geosynchronous orbits are similar to the
DMSP satellite launches. Debris abatement policies have been implemented
on the more modern systems and have reduced the number of small debris
per launch. For example, a typical launch of the Navstar Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) (designed to provide very high accuracy three dimensional
navigational information to the user) produces only two pieces of debris per
satellite deployment when launched from a Delta II rocket. The Delta II
second stage booster and the Payload Assist Module (PAM) booster are left
in a 90 x 10,898 nmi orbit. A depletion burn is accomplished on the Delta II
second stage to minimize the chance of explosion. Excess propellant is also
burned off from the control system in the PAM booster to prevent explosion
and the creation of additional debris. The second stage booster is expected
to re-enter six months to a year after launch. The PAM booster is expected
to re-enter the atmosphere after 3-5 years, depending mainly on the initial
perigee altitude. The final apogee kick motor is retained inside the
satellite. 3 Other debris abatement policies on GPS ensure that retaining
pins and deployment systems are self contained and not released into
space.
There is however a major source of smaller but more numerous debris.
This source of debris is the GPS PAM booster itself. The solid rocket
propellant of the PAM booster creates a vast number of very small particles
due to the incomplete combustion of the fuel. Millions of 0.001 to 0.1 mm
sized aluminum oxide particles are released into orbit and add to the debris
environment. The effect of these very small debris will be discussed in this
section.
When the GPS system is fully operational in 1993 there will be 21
operational satellites and three on-orbit spares. The amount of debris 24
launches will produce will be significant.
Number per Expected
GPS Satellite Size Weight Final Orbit Lifetime
Satellite 1 5 ft x 17.5 ft 1855 Ibs 10,898 nmi >10000 yrs
wth arrays circular
Kick motor 0
PAM-D 1 48 inches 345 lbs 90 x 10,898 nmi 3-5 yrs
Delta II Second Stage 1 N/A N/A LEO 6-12 months
Table 2.2
Debris Caused by the Deployment of the
Global Positioning Satellite System
3 United States Air Force, Air Force Space Division, Position Paper on Man-Made Debris
HazardsL.Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, 1 November 1988.
2.1.3 Geosynchronous Satellites
An example of a geosynchronous satellite is the Defense Satellite
Communication System (DSCS). The DSCS system is designed to provide
global communications to the Department of Defense. During deployment of
the DSCS system on an Atlas II/Centaur launch vehicle, the Centaur
upperstage and the apogee kick motor are left as long-lived debris. Other
launch associated debris either re-enters quickly (such as the payload
flaring) or is captured or tethered.4 The number of objects of debris per
launch is not very high, but when you consider that there were more than
42 DSCS launches prior to 1987, the amount of debris adds up. The earlier
satellite systems did not include debris mitigation processes in their
designs. These older satellites released a number of retaining pins, straps,
and blow off covers into orbit.
Number per Expected
DSCS Satellite Size Weight Final Orbit Lifetime
Satellite 1 9 ft dia x 7 ft 2,581 lbs geosynchronous >10000 yrs
Centaur stage 1 10 ft dia x 30 ft 4,271 lbs 93 x 18,863 nmi 8-10 yrs
Apogee kick motor 1 114 in dia x 24 in 627 Ibs geosynchronous >10000 yrs
Table 2.3
Debris from a Signal Defense Satellite Communication
System (DSCS) Satellite Deployment
4 United States Air Force, Air Force Space Division, Position Paper on Man-Made Debris
Hazards. Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, 1 November 1988.
2.1.4 Scientific Satellites
The final example of current launches is a scientific satellite -- the
combined Chemical Release and Radiation Exposure Satellite, otherwise
known as CRRES. This satellite is a joint NASA/Air Force mission
designed to study the effect of space radiation on advanced electronics and
to investigate the Earth's magnetic field and the radiation it traps. During
its mission CRRES will eject 24 chemical containers into a highly elliptical
orbit. These 12 to 25 lbs canisters will release their chemicals and become
space debris. The Centaur booster that placed the CRRES satellite in its
highly elliptical orbit was supposed to use the residual fuel to lower its
perigee altitude, thus decreasing its lifetime. Unfortunately there was a
failure of the booster systems after the satellite was released and the
planned burn did not take place, leaving the booster in orbit.
Number per Expected
CRRES Satellite Size Weight Final Orbit Lifetime
Satellite 1 6 ft dia x 6 ft 2,000 lbs 204 x 18,863 nmi >50 yrs
300 ft booms
Centaur 1 10 ft dia x 30 ft 4,271 Ibs 193 x 18,863 nmi >50 yrs
Cannisters
Large 6 18 in dia x 24 in 25 Ibs >100 yrs
Small 18 9 in dia x 24 in 12 Ibs >100 yrs
Table 2.4
Chemical Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES)
Debris Created During the Course of Its Mission
2.2 The Increasing Numberof Objects in Orbit
The number of manmade objects in orbit has increased rapidly since the
early 1960's. There are now an estimated 70,000 objects 1 cm or larger and
an estimated 3.5 million objects 1 mm or larger in Earth orbit. Of these
objects, only 10 percent or about 7000 are large enough to be tracked and
observed by the United States Space Surveillance System. The Space
Surveillance System is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The Space
Surveillance Center maintains a catalog of all the space objects that are
regularly observed with their array of sensors. The catalog includes the
object's designation, origin, and orbital parameters. Due to limitations in
equipment, the catalog contains only objects larger than 10 cm in diameter.
Yet the Space Command Satellite Catalog still provides the best available
record from which to deduce the increase in the amount of objects in space.
During the early 1960's there was a rapid increase in the number of
space launches. The United States and the Soviet Union, being the only
space powers at the time, were locked in a race to see who could utilize
space during the height of the cold war. The number of launches has
leveled since the early 1970's and has remained approximately 100 to 120
per year.
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Figure 2.2
Annual Launch Rate by All Nations by Year5
While the number of launches has leveled since the rapid rise of the
decade from 1958 to 1968, the number of cataloged objects has steadily
increased at a rate of nearly 240 per year (Figure 2.3). This is due to longer
life-time orbits and fragmentation of existing objects in orbit. Figure 2.3
shows the number of objects in the space command satellite catalog for
each year from 1957 to 1989. Other lines on the chart show the number of
objects in four different categories: payloads, rocket bodies, fragmentation
debris and operational debris. These four categories will be discussed in
detail later in this section. The number of additional objects in orbit that can
5 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990.
not be observed by the Space Surveillance System is difficult to quantify
because of the lack of data.
During certain years there was a rapid decrease in the number of objects
in the catalog. This is due mainly to the effects of the 11 year solar cycle and
the associated increase in atmospheric drag. Atmospheric drag serves as a
cleansing mechanism for low-Earth orbit. The effects of atmospheric drag
are covered in the last part of this chapter.
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Figure 2.3
Number of Objects Contained in the Space
Command Catalog by Category and Year6
6 D.S. McKnight and N.L. Johnson, "Breakups and Their Effect on the Catalog
Population,"Article AIAA-90-1358 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference:
Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
2.3 Sources of Space Debris
The number of objects in orbit from each source can be approximated by
using the satellite catalog. Fragmentation debris accounts for 45% of the
trackable objects, the largest contributor. Inactive payloads account for
16%, used rocket bodies account for 16%, and operational debris accounts
for 12%. Operational satellites account for only 6% of all trackable objects.
Unfortunately this does not tell the entire story. Trackable debris is
limited to objects on the order of ten centimeters or larger. These are the
objects that the United States Space Command observes regularly and keeps
track of their current orbital parameters. Many thousands of additional
objects smaller than 10 cm are not included in this count. It is estimated
that there are between 30,000-70,000 objects larger than 1 cm and 3.5 million
objects larger than 1 mm in orbit.7 Table 2.5 and Figure 2.4 show the
breakout of the percentages from each source..
Type of Object in Orbit Approximate Percentage of
Number in Orbit Satellite Catalog
Operational Satellites 420 6%
Inactive Payloads 1470 21%
Operational Debris 840 12%
Rocket Bodies 11 20 16%
Fragmentation Debris 3150 45%
Untrackable Objects
> 1 cm 30,000 - 70,000
> 1 mm 3.5 Million
Table 2.5
Approximate Number of Objects in Earth Orbit by Category
7 Snace Debris: A Report from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988, p. 15.
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Figure 2.4
Break-out of Debris in Orbit
Looking at each of these categories individually will provide a greater
understanding of the problem.
2.3.1 Payloads
Payloads are the satellites, the experiments and the equipment used in
any space activity. They provide the communications, the observations and
the scientific data that justifies the expense of space flight. Payloads,
however, eventually become another type of debris. Once they are out of fuel
54% Operational
or deactivated, payloads for the most part are uncontrolled, useless space
objects. There have been approximately 4000 payloads launched into orbit.
Nearly 2000 payloads are still in orbit, but only 420 are operational. This
leaves approximately 1580 old, discarded payloads in orbit. Most of the
current operational payloads will remain in orbit for a long time, well
exceeding their useful lives. Even the most modern geosynchronous
communication satellites will last only 10 to 14 years. Satellites in
geosynchronous orbit will remain in orbit forever unless removed by some
means. A good example of inactive payloads are the second and sixth
satellites launched by the United States, Vanguard I and Vanguard II.
These satellites were launched by the United States in 1958. They are still in
3000 x 650 km orbits, where they will remain for the next few thousand
years.
2.3.2 Rocket Bodies
Nearly 50% of the total mass of debris on orbit consists of spent upper-
stage rocket motors and tanks. These are left in orbit after they deliver their
payloads to orbit. This is typical of most satellite launches. These boosters
number over 1100 or 16% of the objects in orbit. These boosters and rocket
bodies also provide the largest percentage of mass for another type of debris,
fragmentation debris. Fragmentation occurs mainly when these discarded
boosters explode due to a number of causes.
Rocket bodies and boosters are left in similar orbits as the payloads they
deliver. This includes most orbits, including geosynchronous and
geosynchronous transfer orbits. These tanks, boosters, and large payloads
are the primary concern when discussing the Kessler effect -- one piece of
debris colliding with another, thus forming more debris. This effect and its
potential consequences are further discussed in a later section.
2.3.3 Operational Debris
Operational debris is created during the operation of deployment of space
systems or experiments. Objects such as fairings, boosters, despin cables
and weights are used during the deployment of spacecraft into orbit and are
considered operational debris. Smaller operational debris such as bands,
pieces of squibs and bolts are also often released. The solar-array cables and
the covers released during the DMSP deployment discussed earlier are
considered operational debris. For the first quarter of 1991, the average
number of detectable debris created per successful satellite launch was
close to three. The number of smaller debris produced is uncertain.
Operational debris has been limited in recent years by the
implementation of debris abatement policies. However not all countries or
companies are doing all that is possible to limit debris.
Scientific experiments have been known to cause a significant amount of
operational debris. In order to collect the desired data or characterize some
aspect of the space environment, objects are released in orbit. One notorious
experiment which resulted in a significant amount of debris is known as
the Westford Needles Experiment. In this 1963 communications
experiment, researchers from Lincoln Laboratories in Massachusetts
attempted to create an artificial ionosphere using thousands of small
metallic needles in order to reflect radio signals.s These needles were to be
8 Carl Christol, The Modem International Law of Outer Space, New York: Pergamon
Press, Inc., 1982. p. 131.
placed in a high 2000 km X 5000 km near-polar orbit. The first experiment
failed, but a second experiment succeeded in deploying the needles. To date
Air Force Space Command has cataloged only 170 of these needles. 9 They
are extremely difficult to track because of their small radar and optical
cross sections. Several thousand additional needles are known to be in orbit.
At these altitudes the needles will remain in orbit for at least several
thousand years (because of the extremely limited atmospheric drag and
their small surface area to mass ratio).
Other sources of operational debris are the objects accidentally released
by astronauts while performing Extra Vehicular Activities (EVAs). During
the Apollo and Gemini mission astronauts left a range of items in orbit,
including a wrench. During a recent space shuttle mission an astronaut
lost a watch. In the book Diary of a Cosmonaut, Valentin Lebedev describes
the number of objects released to space when they opened the air lock to exit
the Mir space station during an EVA. He said that "tiny glitter like dust
flew away from the station. Space the gigantic vacuum cleaner, began to
suck everything out of the station. Small bolts and screws lost long ago,
drifted out along with dust from behind the compartment wall quilting; a
pencil drifted out too."''10 While the amount of this unusual type of debris is
limited, every object contributes to the danger of orbital collisions between
space debris and operational spacecraft.
9 As of 1 July 1991, based on the Space Command Satellite Catalog
10 "Debris Chip - Diary of a Cosmonaut," Orbital Debris Monitor, 1 January 1991, pp.5 -6
2.3.4 Fragmentation Debris
Fragmentation debris is the largest cause of orbital debris.
Fragmentation debris is created when a spacecraft or booster, either
intentionally or unintentionally, breaks up or explodes. To date there have
been one hundred and four breakups. Some have resulted in little or no
long-lived debris, while others have created hundreds of objects larger than
10 cm and perhaps tens of thousands of untrackable, smaller objects. This
type of space debris accounts for 45% of the cataloged objects in space.
2.&4.1 Causes of Orbital Breakups and Fragmentation
There are many causes of orbital breakups. Some are the result of
deliberate actions, while some causes are still unknown. As of July 1990
deliberate causes accounted for 42 or 40% of all on orbit breakups.
Propulsion related breakups are caused by failures in motors, tanks and
engines in either rocket bodies or satellites. Typically the failure has been in
tanks containing excess fuel that expands and ruptures the fuel tank.
Propulsion related breakups accounted for 34 or 32%. Unknown causes
accounted for 26 or 24% of all on orbit breakups. Other causes, such as
electrical failure (one incident) and command problems (one occurrence),
accounted for the remaining 2%.11
11 "Debris and Launch Watch - 1 July 1990," Orbital Debris Monitor. 1 July 1990.
Table 2.6
Percentage of Breakups Due to Different Causes
Electrical
Unknown
opulsion
Related
Command
Deliberate
Figure 2.5
Percentage of Breakups Due to Different Causes
2.3.4.1.1 Propulsion-Related Breakups
The large percentage of the breakups (33%) have been propulsion related,
caused by residual fuel that detonates and destructs the satellite or booster.
Breakups of this type were regularly observed with Delta II second stage
boosters that detonated if the residual fuel was not vented after mission
Cause of On-Orbit Breakups
from 1961 to June 1991 Number Percentage
Propulsion-Related 34 33%
Deliberate 42 40%
Unknown 26 25%
Electrical 1 1%
Command 1 1%
completion. This over-pressure caused the partition separating the
hydrazine and the oxidizer to rupture which resulted in energetic explosion
and detonation, fragmenting the booster. 12 At least eight Delta II second
stages have exploded and created 1500 pieces of long lived debris large
enough to be tracked. Heating of the tank in the sunlight forced an over-
pressure of the tanks.
About 20% of all known debris is the result of rocket body breakups that
occur after the rockets have successfully inserted their payloads into orbit. 13
By 1981, modifications were made to most U.S. boosters to eliminate this
problem. NASA has developed a design program to prevent this type of
event, and they are willing to share the information with anyone who is
interested. The Soviets have taken similar steps. Despite these efforts, at
least three breakup events of this type have occurred in the past year: an
Ariane Booster detonated while placing a French SPOT imaging spacecraft
in a 900 km sun-synchronous orbit; a Chinese Long March booster exploded
after placing a satellite in a similar sun-synchronous orbit; and an Atlas
second stage booster exploded after placing its satellite in orbit in 1975.
12 Kaman Sciences Corporation, An Assessment of Recent Satellite Breakups on the
Near-Earth Environment. Alexandria, Virginia, July 1991.
13 Nicholas Johnson, Teledyne Brown Engineering, "The Fragmentation of the
Fengyun 1-2 Rocket Body (TBE CS90-TR-JSC-013), " Orbital Debris Monitor. 1 January
1991.
23.4.1.2 Deliberate Breakups
Deliberate acts are the leading cause of satellite breakups. To date 40
breakups in orbit have been initiated deliberately. There are two major
sources of deliberate breakups -- anti-satellite tests (12 occurrences) and
Soviet Cosmos explosions (14 occurrences). The Soviets have typically
destroyed their reconnaissance satellites after they have completed their
useful lives to keep the US from learning about their capabilities by using
advanced optical systems to image older satellites. Another major source of
breakups has been anti-satellite tests conducted by both the US (2 tests) and
the USSR (10 tests). These deliberate explosions are considered high-
intensity explosions. Propulsion related explosions are considered to be a
lower intensity than deliberate explosions. These high-intensity explosions
produce more small, untrackable debris in the 1 mm to 10 cm range.14
2.3.4.12.1 Anti-Satellite Tests
Some causes of fragmentation are the result of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests
conducted both by the United States and the Soviet Union. A total of twelve
breakups have been attributed to the testing of anti-satellite weapons. This
in turn accounts for 7% of the current catalog population. 15
The Soviet anti-satellite concept places an interceptor satellite in an orbit
close to that of the target satellite. It then maneuvers close to the target
14 Space Debris: A Report from the Eurooean Space Agency Space Debris Working
Group, ESA SP-1109.,France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
15 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990.
satellite. As the interceptor approaches the target, a conventional warhead
explodes sending hundreds or perhaps thousands of small millimeter-sized
pellets, similar to BBs or buck shot, that spray the target satellite,
destroying it. The Soviets ran ten such ASAT tests that included satellite
breakups. It is unclear how many antisatellite weapons where loaded with
the smaller fragments that actually accomplish the destruction of another
satellite.
The United States' anti-satellite concept relies on a more accurate
interceptor which actually collides with the target spacecraft. These hyper-
velocity impacts create large amounts of untrackable debris. The European
Space Agency estimates that hypervelocity impacts create 10 times more
debris than an explosion event. It estimates that a collision with a 3000 kg
spacecraft will create 30,000 particles over 1 gram where an explosion will
create approximately 3,000.16 During the test of the US air launched anti-
satellite weapon, a small interceptor collided with the P-78 Solar Wind
satellite. The collision occurred at very high relative velocity (over 6 km/sec)
and created 285 objects large enough to be cataloged. It is expected that
several thousand smaller, non-catalogable objects were also created at the
same time and are still in orbit.
During the other United States test, the Delta 180 Strategic Defense
Initiative experiment, two objects again collided in orbit creating 381 objects
16 Space Debris: A Report from the Euronean Snace Agency Space Debris Working
G~rn, ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
that were detected. Of the 381 objects only 18 were cataloged because most of
the debris re-entered quickly due to the low altitude of the experiment.17
The testing of anti-satellite weapons has caused a significant amount of
orbital debris. Much of this debris is still in orbit and it now threatens
operational space systems.
SPACE WEAPONS TESTS
Class of Breakup Number Number of Number of Objects
of Events Objects Cataloged Remaining in Orbit
Phase 1
Soviet ASAT 7 545 296
Phase 2
Soviet ASAT 3 189 154
US ASAT
P-78 Breakup 1 285 38
Delta 180 Experiment 1 18 0
12 1,037 488
Table 2.7
Space Weapons Tests18
2.3.4.1.3 Unknown Causes
The third largest group of satellite breakups falls into the category of
unknown. These unexplained breakups total 26. Many of breakups probably
fall in the category of propulsion or deliberate categories but have not been
classified as such due to a lack of data. There is a chance that some of these
breakups may be the result of collisions with debris. According to the
17 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990, p. 19.
18 Op cit 17
European Space Agency's statistical analysis, the present density of debris
is large enough to have caused collisions. The leading candidate for a
hyper-velocity collision with debris is the Cosmos 1275 fragmentation in
1981 which created 281 observable pieces. 19 The velocity spread of the debris
from the breakup approximates what scientists expect from an on-orbit
collision.
2.3.4.1.4 Other Causes
Other known causes of fragmentation debris have caused on-orbit
breakups. One satellite was fragmented due to an electrical problem, and
another was fragmented by an anomalous command sent from a ground
station.
Fragmentation debris is by far the most dangerous type of debris. Larger
debris (> 10 cm) is detectable and, theoretically at least, avoidable. The effect
of smaller debris (< 1 mm) can be minimized by satellite design and
shielding. But much of the fragmentation debris falls between these two
limits.
In order to avoid collisions with large debris, Space Command can
determine the future position of space objects and provide advance warning
of a possible collision between cataloged objects. But in order to provide
advance warning the debris must be large enough to be detected by the
Space Surveillance System. This fact will be addressed in Chapter 7 in the
discussion of debris mitigation efforts since it is not currently possible to
19 Space Debris: A Report from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working
Gro=. ESA SP-1109. France: European Space Agency, November 1988, p. 17
track debris smaller than 10 cm and because of this no warning of possible
collision is available. The capabilities and limitations of the Space
Surveillance Network, the system used by United States Space Command to
track space objects is discussed in Chapter 5. Currently a majority of the
small fragmentation debris is not trackable. Yet because of its high velocity,
small debris can cause significant damage to even well-shielded spacecraft.
The risks of damage caused by space debris is covered in detail in Chapter
4.
Fragmentation debris consists mainly of aluminum, steel, titanium and
other substances used in designing rockets, satellites, and other space
systems. Most of these are dense materials so the atmospheric drag has a
lesser effect than it would on less dense paint chips or exhaust particles.
The denser materials also have a higher penetrating ability which makes
them more dangerous, even to shielded systems such as the future Space
Station.
2.3.4.2 Breakup Modeling
One of the reasons for the wide range of estimates for the number of
objects in orbit is that the dynamics of breakups is not well understood, and
no one is sure how many undetectable particles the fragmentation of a
satellite creates. Actual ground-based tests have been conducted in an
attempt to quantify the amount of debris caused by an orbital breakup of a
satellite or booster.
One test used an Atlas missile that was purposely exploded. Almost all
the mass went into fragments 10 cm or larger. Only a small percentage of
the booster broke into 1 mm to 1 cm fragments. The other test performed by
Physical Sciences, Inc in Massachusetts showed a significantly larger
proportion of the fragments falling between 1 mm and 1 cm. 20 Figure 2.6
shows the results of these tests for a sample satellite of 1400 kg. It also
shows the amount of debris that would be created if all the mass were
concentrated in a single size of fragments. The Physical Science, Inc data
has been scaled to represent the sample satellite.
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Figure 2.6
Expected Number of Fragments per Mass of a 1400 kg
Satellite Based on Fragmentation Test Results21
20 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, May - June 1991, pp. 347 - 351.
21 Op cit 20.
2.3.4.2.1 Orbital Characteristics of Fragmentation Debris
When satellites break up they form a cloud of debris. The rate of
expansion of this debris depends on the amount of energy released during
the breakup. Some energetic breakups can impart velocities of several
hundreds of meters per second in addition to the original orbital velocity.
The energetic breakup of the Delta II booster on 1 May 1991, imparted
enough velocity to the fragments to cause a 1 to 2 degree change in
inclination. It also provided the velocity required for some pieces to change
their apogee altitudes from the original 1100 km to 3500 km.22 These
differences in velocity cause the cloud of debris to disperse over time and
can cause significant differences in orbital period and inclination. Figure
2.7 graphically shows the velocity imparted during an explosion.
22 "Delta Second Stage Break Up," Orbital Debris Monitor,1 July 1991, p. 7.
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Figure 2.7
Imparted Velocity on Debris During Breakup
The initial velocity distribution is the least developed component of the
existing breakup models. The imparted velocity range on the debris
depends largely on the type of fragmentation that occurs. Explosions can
impart velocities 100 to 600 m/sec on fragments.
Initial
Orbital
Velocity
Explosion Debris
Initially, any type of fragmentation creates a dense cloud of debris as
shown in Figure 2.8(a).23 Because of the differences in imparted velocity,
some debris is thrown into higher orbits, some into lower orbits. Objects in
higher orbits have a longer period of revolution, and hence they fall behind
the faster, lower altitude objects. The initial cloud eventually spreads over
the entire orbit due to differences in the periods caused by the impulse
provided by the explosion. This is shown in Figure 2.8(b). Debris will also
spread over a narrow band, 1-3 degrees, of inclination. The effect of the
oblateness of the Earth (J2) causes the plane of the orbit to rotate around the
Earth's polar axis in the opposite direction of the motion of the satellite.
This phenomenon is known as the regression of the node.24 This will cause
the line of ascending node, the point where the object passes the equator
going north, to change for objects at a different rates for different
inclinations. Figure 2.9 shows the orbital angles discussed for a satellite
and debris.
23 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Soace
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990.
24 Richard Battin, An Introduction to the Mathematics and Methods of Astrodvnamics,
New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1987, p. 504.
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Figure 2.9
Orbital Elements25
Ix, ly and Iz are unit vectors forming a right hand coordinate system. Ix is
in the direction of the vernal equinox.In is in the direction of the ascending
node. le is in the direction of the perigee. 91 is the longitude of the ascending
node and is the angle between the Ix and In. to is the argument of periapsis.
The rate that the longitude of ascending node changes for any particular
piece of debris is given by Equation 2.1.
d- -9.9d eq) (1-e2)(5 cos2i) degrees/day
dt a Equation 2.1
25 Richard Battin, An Introduction to the Mathematics and Methods of Astrodynamics,
New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1987. p. 124
where Req is the equatorial radius of the Earth, a is half of the sum of the
apogee and perigee altitude as measured from the center of the Earth, e is
the eccentricity, and i is the inclination.
Not only will the debris spread around the globe, but it will also change
the argument of periapsis, the angle from the equatorial plane to the
perigee point measured along the orbit. The average rate of rotation of the
line of apsides, the line from the center of the Earth to the location of
perigee, is also dependent on the inclination and is given by Equation 2.2.26
3.5
d__5dt 5 9 (1-e2)'l5 cos2i-) degrees/day
dt •a Equation 2.2
Over time, the effect of the difference in inclination and period plus the
effect of the oblateness of the Earth (J2) will cause the debris to spread over
all right ascensions. Eventually this precession will spread the debris over
a torus around the Earth as shown in Figure 2.10(c).
26 Richard Battin, An Introduction to the Mathematics and Methods of Astrodynamics,
New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1987, p. 504
2.3.4.3 Breakup Example - OMICRON 1961
On 29 June 1961, less than four years into the Space Age, the first
occurrence of what would become the major cause of orbital debris took
place. On its first revolution around the Earth, a Transit 4A payload and
the Ablestar rocket that propelled it into orbit, exploded into several
hundred pieces. Post-event analysis determined that either a propulsion-
related explosion or activation of the range safety explosive system caused
the explosion. 27 This breakup is known as the 1961-Omicron event and has
been an oft-cited example to demonstrate the effects of satellite
fragmentation.
As of January 1991 a total of 297 trackable pieces of Transit 4A had been
cataloged. Approximately 230 trackable objects remain in orbits that range
from highly elliptical 2000 km X 400 km orbits to near circular 900 km
orbits.28 The wide spread of altitudes that is covered is due to the energy
released during the breakup. In addition to these trackable pieces,
hundreds or perhaps thousands of objects too small to be tracked remain in
orbit. The majority of all the pieces from the Omicron breakup are expected
to remain in orbit for over 100 years.2 9 Figure 2.10 shows the Ablestar
rocket body and the resulting debris traces from the 1961 Omicron breakup.
The traces in Figure 2.10 are viewed looking down on the North Pole.
27 "Breakup in Review: 1961 Omicron," Orbital Debris Monitor, 1 April 1988. p. 10
28 United States Space Command, Space Analysis and Data Branch, Soace Surveillance
Center Catalog, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base, Colorado, 2 January 1991.
29 Op cit 27
1961-Omicron Debris Cloud, 31 March 1988
Figure 2.10
The Resulting Debris Cloud from the Omicron Break Up
as Seen Looking Down on the North Pole30
'While the Omicron breakup was both the first orbital breakup and
perhaps the worst, it was by no means the last. Since 1961 there have been
104 orbital breakups, with as many as eight occurring in the first half of
1991.
30 "Breakup in Review: 1961 Omicron," Orbital Debris Monitor, 1 April 1988.
2.4 Smaller Debris Sources
In addition to the sources of debris previously discussed, there are
smaller particles which present different dangers to space operations.
These types of debris do not appear in the satellite catalog because it is not
currently possible to detect or track them. Small debris is known to be
created by chipped paint from operational satellites. Even smaller debris
comes from the exhaust of solid rocket motors. While these types of debris
are not as dangerous as the larger debris, they still pose significant
hazards to Extra Vehicular Activities (EVAs), such as those required for
the Space Station Freedom. Other problems include the erosion of optical
surfaces, insulators, or connections on solar arrays. The extent of this types
of small debris is very uncertain because of a lack of data.
2.4.1 Paint Chips
Paint chips are generated by a number of mechanisms. Paint is used to
control the thermal properties of spacecraft. As the spacecraft ages, paint
begins to flake off. This is caused by a number of factors, the primary one
being the effects of the sun and thermal expansion and contraction. All
satellites in low earth orbit (except some sun-synchronous orbits) constantly
move between sunlight and darkness. As the spacecraft changes
temperature, it expands and contracts. If the paint does not have the same
thermal expansion coefficient, it begins to crack and flake off. This effect is
aided by the effects of atomic oxygen and ultraviolet radiation which can
degrade the paint over time from its original characteristics. Paint chips
can also be displaced by micro-meteors and small pieces of debris. Modern
spacecraft paints are designed to overcome many of these flaking problems,
but there are a lot of older, non-operating satellites that are still in orbit that
used older paints which will begin to flake, if they haven't already done so.
Paint flecks do not have a high mass to area ratio so they will be
relatively short-lived in low-Earth orbits as compared to other forms of
debris. However paint chips in medium, or geosynchronous orbits
encounter very low or no atmospheric drag, so the particles will pose a
threat for a long time to come. To give an example of the types of effects
small paint chips can have, during the Space Shuttle Mission STS-7, a
small 0.2 mm paint fleck impacted the shuttle side window. Although it did
not puncture the window, it did require $50,000 in repairs.3 1
2.4.2 Exhaust Particles
Solid rocket exhaust particles range from .001 to 10 micrometers in
diameter. They are formed by the incomplete burning of the propellent in
solid rocket upper stages during orbital insertion or orbital boosts
maneuvers.3 2 Two such US solid rocket boosters are the Payload Assist
Module and the Inertial Upper Stage. Large exhaust particles can easily be
seen during launch of sounding rockets, and similar particles are
produced by upper stage boosters. Exhaust particles can have a variety of
lifetimes in orbit depending on the orbital parameters and operation during
31 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space Missions from Current and
Future Debris, December 1987, p. 15.
32 R. Akiba, N. Ishi, and Y Inatani, "Behavior of Alumina Particle Exhausted by Solid
Rocket Motors," Article AIAA-90-1367 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris
Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
boost. Particles from rockets used to insert a geosynchronous satellite into
orbit will remain there for 6 months to several years, depending on their
size and orbital parameters. 33 Those used to inject a satellite into a circular
low-Earth orbit will return to Earth rather rapidly. These particles have a
low mass to surface area ratio and are affected strongly by atmospheric
drag and solar radiation pressure. A 500 kg motor used to place a 1000 kg
satellite in geosynchronous orbit will produce approximately six million
particles larger than 30 micrometers, 2 billion larger than 20 micrometers
and 2 trillion larger than 10 micrometers.3 4
The effect of collisions with these particles is similar to the effect of
sandblasting. Surfaces erode and degrade slowly over time as pits and
small craters are formed. While not critical to most structural components,
optical components such as mirrors and lenses are placed at risk. This
effect on optical components could play a key role in the development of
optical surveillance systems for SDI where a long term capability is
required. Design of space based high energy laser systems or relay mirrors
must account for effects caused by this type of debris damage. Small pits or
damage to optical coating under proposed high energy laser systems (such
as Zenith Star) will render a mirror useless because the mirror could
absorb too much energy and melt or shatter.
33 R. Akiba, N. Ishi, and Y Inatani, "Behavior of Alumina Particle Exhausted by Solid
Rocket Motors," Article AIAA-90-1367 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris
Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
34 Op cit 33
Other effects that could damage all satellites include erosion of painted
surfaces and degradation of photo-voltaic cells. Connections on the solar
arrays can be damaged, decreasing their performance.
2.4.3 Natural Debris and Meteors
Space debris is a manmade hazard. There are other types of natural
hazards such as meteors that pose a similar threat. Asteroids have
cratered the Earth, the Moon, and all other celestial bodies. An accepted
estimate of the mass of near earth meteors within 2000 km of Earth is 200
kg.35 These meteors are on hyperbolic trajectories and move very quickly
through the space near Earth. Meteors can be rocks, dust, or ice. Typical
velocities of meteors are above 20 km/sec. At these velocities, most
micrometeors vaporize on contact and do not cause significant structural
damage.
Although space debris was not a large concern to the earliest space
systems, it was a concern to the Apollo program in the 1960's. During the
Apollo program, design considerations were made to ensure the command
module and the lunar lander could withstand a collision with micro-
meteors up to 0.3 mm in diameter.3 6 Since then, the threat of collisions with
manmade objects in low-Earth orbit has far exceeded the threat of collisions
with natural meteors.
35 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results,"
California: the Aerospace Corporation.
36 Don Kessler, "Orbital Debris Project Overview," Briefing presented on 22 November
1991.
2.5 Responsibility for the Growth of Space Debris
Historically, the US and the USSR have been the major space powers.
One would expect that since the Soviet Union accounts for nearly 70% of all
space launches, it would account for a majority of the space debris. This,
however, is not the case. The Soviet Union and the United States are nearly
equally responsible for the number of objects in orbit. The Soviets have
tended to use short lived low-Earth orbits for their military satellites. This
has been because of their relatively short missions. A benefit of this has
been a reduction in the amount of long-lived space debris they have
produced. The United States has tended to use higher orbits which are
practical for longer-duration satellites. This has led to a longer-lived debris
population per launch.
At this time the US and the USSR account for nearly 93% of all cataloged
objects. However, this is rapidly changing as other countries such as the
European Community, China, and Japan enter the space launch business.
Both the Europeans and the Chinese have suffered fragmentation events
which have significantly added to the debris population. The European
Space Agency lost a Spot satellite and a Viking Rocket in sun-synchronous
800 km orbit forming over 500 objects large enough to be tracked by the
Space Surveillance Network. On 4 October 1990 a Chinese rocket booster
fragmented, producing 81 long-lived trackable objects in a 900 km sun
synchronous orbit. The actual cause of the breakup of the Chinese rocket is
unknown, but the leading candidate is a propellent-induced explosion. 37
37 "Break up in Review - Fengyun 1-2 R/B," Orbital Debris Monitor, 1 January 1991, p.
6.
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2.6 Natural Debris Removal Mechanism
The only natural method for removing objects from orbit is for them to re-
enter the Earth's atmosphere. Atmospheric drag is the primary cleansing
mechanism for low-Earth orbit. All objects below 1000 kilometers are
affected by atmospheric drag. As objects are effected by atmospheric drag
they come closer to the Earth where they experience even more drag. These
objects eventually spiral in and burn up in the atmosphere. Debris above
1000 km experiences little to no effect from the atmosphere. These high
altitude objects continue in their orbits, mostly unaffected by the
atmosphere.
The effect of small changes in atmospheric drag can be seen in the
correlation of the number of objects in space and the solar cycle. At the peak
of the 11 year solar cycle, the sun is more active and emits slightly more
radiation. This causes increased heating of the Earth's atmosphere,
causing it to expand outward. This results in increased drag which
decreases the orbital lifetime of objects in low-Earth orbit. During this
period a larger amount of debris and satellites re-enter the Earth's
atmosphere. Figure 2.12 shows the average lifetime of circular orbits as a
function of altitude at the maximum and minimum levels of solar activity.
Figure 2.13 shows the corresponding solar activity and the number of
objects in orbit. Increased solar activity was blamed for causing the United
States' only orbiting laboratory, Skylab, to re-enter before NASA could boost
it to a higher, safer orbit.
Other forces on orbiting objects are the gravitational pull of the sun and
the moon, as well as solar radiation pressure. Objects in highly elliptical
orbits are significantly affected by these three forces. These forces, although
slight, can change an orbit enough to lower the altitude to the point that
atmospheric drag forces will cause them to spiral down and re-enter the
atmosphere. Solar pressure is the dominant perturbing force on high
altitude, low density, high surface area objects. These objects include paint
flecks and exhaust particles.
There are no removal mechanisms for high altitude circular orbits.
Large objects in geosynchronous orbit will remain in orbit until they are
actively removed.
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Circular Orbit Lifetimes at Maximum and Minimum Solar Activity3 8
38 Briefing by Donald Kessler,"Orbital Debris Models at JSC, Phillips Laboratory,
NASA, and Aerospace," presented at the Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 -3 April 1991.
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Figure 2.13 a,b,c
a) Solar Activity Measured by the Sunspot Number (Bottom line) and F10
Index (Top line), b) The Number of Decaying Cataloged Objects by Year,
and c) the Total Number of Low Earth Orbiting Objects below 1000 km
Contained in the Satellite Catalog by Year
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2.7 The Kessler Effect and Self-Generating Debris
The Kessler Effect is the worst case scenario of the debris problem. It
describes the effects of random collisions between objects in orbit which
produce debris faster than the natural removal mechanisms can remove it.
The probability of occurrence of the Kessler Effect increases with time due
to an ever increasing number of objects in orbit. Large objects, such as
boosters and used satellites, have large masses that can be fragmented
through collisions into thousands of smaller debris. The effects of the
atmosphere at higher altitudes are not strong enough to remove such
objects fast enough to avoid a chain-reaction with an increasing number of
objects resulting in a higher rate of collisions. The result would be a
runaway self-generating debris population that can render certain altitude
regions unusable for space activities.
The Kessler Effect defines a critical density of debris beyond which the
generation of debris from random collisions produces debris at a faster rate
than the natural rate of their removal at a given altitude. Once the critical
density is reached, the debris population will increase even without placing
any additional objects in orbit.3 9 To determine the critical density only
objects 10 cm or larger are considered because they have enough kinetic
energy to shatter large objects.
There is evidence that the critical mass and number of objects that would
induce unstable debris population growth has already been exceeded in
some altitude regions. Figure 2.14 shows the critical density and the orbital
39 Donald Kessler, "Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in Low
Earth Orbit," NASA/Johnson Space Center, Houston Texas, Paper No MB.2.2.2.
population at various altitudes corrected for inclination and size
distributions as reported by Kessler. 40 It shows that the critical density has
already been exceeded in the altitude region around 1000 km and 1400 km.
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Figure 2.14
Critical Density Assuming No Uncataloged Objects Larger Than 10
Centimeters and Adjusted for Local Size and Inclination Distributions
Spatial Density of Objects 10 cm or Larger at Various Altitudes41
A large population of uncataloged objects would widen the the unstable
regions in orbit.
40 Donald Kessler, "Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in Low
Earth Orbit," NASA/Johnson Space Center, Houston Texas, Paper No MB.2.2.2.
41Op cit 40
While the level of debris that induces as the onset of the Kessler Effect is
in doubt, the fact that the effect can occur is well accepted, since the rate
that objects are expected to break up due to random collisions is a function
of the rate of increase of the number of objects in orbit. Figure 2.15 shows
the rate that large objects such as payloads or expended rocket bodies will
breakup due to collisions at different levels of space launch activities as
predicted by the Kessler Effect.
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result of random collisions
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Figure 2.15
Rate of Catastrophic Breakups Due to Random Collisions at Various Levels
of Space Launch Activity as Determined by Kessler 42
42 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, May - June 1991, pp. 347 - 351.
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3. SPACE DEBRIS ENVIRONMENT
Determining the amount of debris in orbit is critical in assessing the
extent of the present and future space debris problem. There are two main
size domains to consider in examining the current space debris
environment: larger debris (>10 cm) as represented in the Satellite Catalog
and smaller debris (<10 cm) for which a very limited amount of data exists
today.
This chapter looks at the debris environment of low-Earth orbit and the
unique case of geosynchronous orbit. It focuses on the available data
obtained from the Satellite Catalog. The Satellite Catalog contains
information on all satellites and debris that is regularly tracked by United
States Space Command using its space surveillance equipment. (Chapter 5
takes a closer look at the space surveillance equipment and examines its
limitations for debris observation and analysis). This chapter also discusses
the available data on smaller, undetectable debris. Most measurements of
this type of debris are from in situ measurements and have been made
possible by using the Space Shuttle, which has returned several spacecraft
or parts of spacecraft from orbit. Examination of the surfaces of objects that
have been retrieved from orbit have provided a useful amount of data on the
very small but more numerous debris.
An easy measure of the amount of debris in orbit that gives an indication
of the threat it represents is the collisional flux. The collisional flux is
defined as the number of impacts per year per square meter for a given size
debris or larger. Figure 3.1 illustrates the bulk of the data available for the
range of sizes of debris, and converts the result to the collisional flux.
Available data comes from a variety of sources. For objects larger than ten
centimeters, the available data is based on the Space Command Satellite
Catalog and on specialized debris searches using high power telescopes.
Data on smaller objects was obtained from the number of impacts on objects
returned from space, and from a few specialized radar tests. These and
other sources of data will be described in detail later in this chapter. Also
included in the debris environment is the natural background meteor flux
for the near-Earth environment. In any case, Figure 3.1 shows the limited
amount of data on which estimates of the amount of space debris are based.
The uncertainties in the available data often is larger than an order of
magnitude. No significant source of data exists for objects between 1 and 10
centimeters.
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1 "Debris Chip - LDEF DATA," Orbital Debris Monitor. 1 October 1990, p. 14.
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3.1 Low Earth Orbit
The majority of available data on debris in low Earth orbit comes from
the Space Command Catalog and from several in situ measurements. In
order to characterize the debris in this region we must first examine the
Space Command Catalog.
3.1.1 Satellite Catalog Data
The most complete record for the larger debris (>10 cm) is the United
States Space Command Satellite Catalog. This catalog lists the satellites
and debris regularly detected and tracked by the United States Space
Command Space Surveillance System which consists of an array of radars
and other sensors dedicated to observing objects in space. Since the
inception of the Satellite Catalog in the early days of the space age, Space
Command has cataloged over 20,000 objects in orbit. This is the most
comprehensive database currently available to study the orbital debris
environment.
By sorting and analyzing the contents of the Satellite Catalog in different
ways, information can be extracted about the amount of debris in orbit and
the types of orbits that they occupy. A vast majority of the debris resides in
low Earth orbit. Figure 3.2 shows a breakdown of the number of objects in
each type of orbit. Low Earth orbit has been broken into two different
categories: LEO1 below 1000 km, and LEO2 between 1000 km and 2000 km
average altitude. More than 75% of all tracked objects are located below this
altitude.
Vast majority of catalog resides In LEO. I
LSOILEOW
LE02
HEO
GEO
Um
YEAR
Figure 3.2
On Orbit Population Growth by Orbital Regime
as of 8 December 19892
As discussed in Chapter 2, fragmentation debris is the major contributor
to the number of objects in orbit. Figure 3.3 details the percentage of each
different type of debris by the orbital region it occupies.
2 D.S. McKnight and N.L. Johnson, "Breakups and Their Effect on the CatalogPopulation," Article AIAA-90-1358 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference:Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
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Figure 3.3
Breakdown of Population in the Various Altitude Region
by Type of Debris as of 8 December 19893
The Satellite Catalog has been used to determine the orbits of all objects
in space. An argument exist that because a majority of the smaller debris is
created by breakups of larger objects, the larger and smaller debris should
be in roughly the same orbits. Yet a quick analysis of the objects in the
Satellite Catalog, separating them by size, shows that this is not the case.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the altitude of the large and small objects. While
some correlation exists between large spacecraft and debris, it is evident
that the smaller objects are spread over a much larger altitude range.
Much of this altitude spread is due to the radial velocity imparted during
3 D.S. McKnight and N.L. Johnson, "Breakups and Their Effect on the Catalog
Population," Article AIAA-90-1358 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference:
Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
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energetic breakups of satellites and rocket bodies. These breakups spread
debris over a wide altitude range because of the differing velocities imparted
to the different fragments.
A similar situation exists for inclination as for altitude when comparing
the orbits of large and small debris. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the
inclination of the large and small objects in the catalog. The narrow lines
indicate two things. It first shows that narrow inclination bands are used
for numerous satellite systems such as the 63 degree inclination Molniya
Orbits, and at the Polar and sun-synchronous orbits at 90 and 100 degrees.
Secondly, the transverse velocity imparted on fragments during breakups is
small when compared to the orbital velocity. This results in relatively
small changes in inclination. Energetic breakups can change the
inclination of the fragments by no more than 2-3 degrees. Again, there are
significant differences between the two distributions, and any space debris
model that assumes that the distribution of even smaller non-trackable
debris will follow the distribution of the larger trackable debris must be
questioned.
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3.1.1.1 Initial Test of the Space Command Satellite Catalog
Tests to check the completeness of the Space Command Catalog have
indicated that a significant number of objects in the 5 to 25 cm range are not
included in the catalog. There have been two well publicized tests that have
provided slightly different results. One test was done at the Perimeter
Attack Characterization Radar System (PARCS), a large phased array in
Concrete, North Dakota. In 1976 and 1978, the radar was set in a fan beam
mode in order to detect objects passing through the "fence" of radar energy
(a wide fan shaped beam pointing upwards). By correlating objects against
those contained in the satellite catalog and maintaining a count of objects
detected but not contained in the satellite catalog, these tests indicated that
the Space Command Catalog undercounts the orbital population of objects
larger than 10 cm by between 7 and 18%.4
3.1.2 GEODSS Data
The Ground Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System
(GEODSS) data contained in Figure 3.8 is optical data collected by US Space
Command for the NASA Johnson Space Flight Center. Johnson Space
Flight Center processed 81 hours of optical observations of the space debris
environment. These optical observations were made at the Ground Based
Electro-Optical Space Surveillance System (GEODSS) at Mt Haleakala,
Hawaii and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. A one meter telescope was
used observing vertically in the morning sky for 1 hour prior to morning
4 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, May - June 1991, pp. 347 - 351.
nautical twilight. 5 Solar illumination reflected off the debris and was
detected by sensitive television cameras attached to the telescope. The
results indicated that there were nearly twice as many objects in orbit
larger than 10 cm than were contained in the Satellite Catalog. 6
Results from NASA tests conducted with the Ground Based Electro-
Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system with support from Air
Force Space Command give another estimate for the completeness of the
Satellite Catalog. These tests were conducted at Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean and at the Maui GEODSS sites. When an object was detected it was
cross referenced with the Satellite Catalog in order to correlate it with a
known object. Figure 3.8 shows the reported results from that effort. In
Figure 3.8, "C"'s indicate objects that were in the satellite catalog but were
not observed; "I"'s indicated objects that were both observed and in the
satellite catalog; and "N"'s indicates those objects that were observed but
were not found in the Satellite Catalog. Although Air Force Space
Command has questioned the accuracy of the correlation program used
during this analysis, the results show a significant undercounting of the
smaller objects in orbit. The larger objects that were observed but not
cataloged could be accounted for because of classified objects in orbit that
can not be included in the regular catalog.
5 K. Henize and J. Stanley, "Optical Observations of Space Debris," Article AIAA-90-
1340 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues & Future
Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
6 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Snacecraft and RocketsMay - June 1991, pp. 347 - 351.
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Figure 3.8
Space Command Catalog Completeness as
Determined with the GEODSS Telescopes 7
(Bottom numbers in the figure are the ratio of cataloged
objects to detected objects in the size range indicated.)
7 Karl G. Henize, "Optical Debris Observations," Briefing at the Optical Debris
Measurement Technical Interchange Meeting Phillips Laboratory, New Mexico, 17
January 1991.
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During the GEODSS tests a total of 622 objects were detected, of which 255
were contained in the Satellite Catalog. These results indicated that the
completeness factor (a ratio of the objects contained in the Satellite Catalog
to the total objects detected) of the Space Command Catalog is 0.46 over all
diameters in the region between 500-1100 kilometers altitude. For objects
between 8 and 30 cm, it is reported that the completeness factor is 0.26.8
3.1.3 Smaller Debris in Low Earth Orbit
The estimate for the small (less than 10 cm) debris population in orbit is
based upon a very limited amount of data. The Space Surveillance System
can not detect these objects because of their small radar and optical cross
sections. Because of the very limited data base, wide uncertainties exist in
the estimates of debris in the range of 1 mm to 10 cm. While several
experiments are presently underway to measure this smaller sized debris,
the results have not yet been published or been made available for review.
The results of the searches that have been published are shown in Figure
3.1. The limited amount of data continues to leave large uncertainties in the
estimates of small debris in orbit.
Data on the very small (less than 0.1 mm), but more numerous objects
such as cosmic dust and micro-meteors was obtained from in situ
measurements based on objects returned from space such as the Space
Shuttle, Solar Max heat louvers and the Long Duration Exposure Facility.
These experiments will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
8 K Henize and J. Stanley, "Optical Observations of Space Debris," Article AIAA-90-
1340 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues & Future
Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
These experiments have provided adequate data for estimates of the very
small debris population with manageable error limits.
3.1.4 Arecibo and Goldstone Radar Experiments
In 1989, two tests were conducted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to
measure the presence of 0.5 cm to 2 cm sized debris and the 0.2 cm to 0.5
cm debris. The Arecibo radar in Puerto Rico collected 14.5 hours of data
observing debris between the 0.2 cm and 0.5 cm range in the 200 to 1000 km
altitude region. The Goldstone Radar collected data during 48 hours of
observations on debris between 0.5 cm and 2 cm in the altitude region of 560
to 590 km.9 The results of these radar tests indicated that there was a
significantly larger number of particles than was expected due to the
natural meteor background, indicating a large man-made debris
population in this size region. The results of these experiments presented
as a collisional flux are contained in Figure 3.1 at the beginning of this
section. The limited amount of data that was collected contribute
significantly to the size of the errors which are due to the statistics of
dealing with a low number of detections.
3.1.5 Meteor Flux
The natural meteor flux was estimated by Zook et al in 1970 and is shown
in Figure 3.1.10 This understanding of the meteor flux is a result of many
9 Thompson and Goldstien, "Arecibo and Goldstone Radar Measurements of Debris,"
AIAA Paper 90-1342, from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical
Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
10 H.A. Zook, R.E. Flaherty, and D.J. Kessler, "Meteoroid Impacts on Gemini
Windows," Planetary Space Science .Vol. 18, No 7, 1970, pp.953-964.
years of experiments during the early years of the space program.
Significant results were obtained by studying the windows from the early
Gemini Missions. These experiments were meant to provide hazard
information to spacecraft designers. Their results were that the specific
density of these particles is between 0.5 and 2 grams per cubic centimeter.
This is less dense than expected for manmade space debris. The total influx
of meteor material into the atmosphere is approximately 4000 tons per
year.11 The natural debris environment is well understood and remains
relatively constant. As shown in Figure 3.9, the flux for natural particles 1
cm and larger is very low compared to the flux of man-made particles.
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Figure 3.9
Meteoroid Flux vs Particle Diameter1 2
11 Snace Debris: A Report from the European Space Agency SDace Debris Working
Groua, ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988, p 12.
3.1.6 In situ Measurements
Measurements of smaller debris rely mainly on the analysis of objects
returned from space. The three major contributors for such information
came from the Space Shuttle windows, the parts returned during the repair
of the Solar Max satellite, and the retrieval of the Long Duration Exposure
Facility.
3.1.6.1 Shuttle Measurements
The shuttle windows are inspected after each flight to ensure an
adequate level of safety for the next flight. On one occasion the window was
replaced after being impacted by a paint chip. Other shuttle based
experiments included placing one square meter of aluminium foil in the
cargo bay and polished surfaces on the shuttle boom.
3.1.6.2 Solar Max
Solar Max was launched in February 1980 into a low inclination low-
Earth orbit. In April 1984, astronauts from the Space Shuttle repaired the
satellite after it had malfunctioned. This allowed the return of roughly 3
square meters of exposed surfaces which had spent over 4 years in orbit.
This provided a considerable amount of data on the small space debris
environment. The returned surfaces consist of the thermal control louvers
and some insulating blankets of the satellite which were removed from the
satellite during repairs. These surfaces were exposed for 4.15 years before
being returned to Earth. Sources of the craters are determined by analysis
of projectile residue left around and inside the crater by electron microscope
12 Don Kessler, "Orbital Debris Project Overview," Briefing presented on 22 November
1991.
and Energy Dispersive X-Ray (EDX) Compositional Analysis.13 Analyses
indicate that on the louvers, impacts of meteors and man-made debris in
the range of 10-9 to 10-7 grams were roughly equal in numbers. Smaller
particles were dominated by paint chips.14 Of the larger craters, 47 were of
meteoric origin, 7 were from manmade debris, and 6 were of unknown
sources. 15 A possibility exists that the unknown sources were aluminum,
because in that case then there would be no detectable trace of extra debris
left in the crater since the aluminum of the debris would be masked by the
aluminum in the louvers. If the impacts of unknown origin were caused by
aluminum particles, which are expected to make up a large part of the
small debris population, then the debris population smaller than 10-5
grams is twice that reported by Zook and McKay.
3.1.6.3 Long Duration Exposure Facility
The Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), shown in Figure 3.10, was
designed to measure the effects of atomic oxygen, space radiation and space
debris on a variety of materials. It was launched into a 478 km altitude, 28
degree inclination orbit by the Space Shuttle in April 1984 and was
recovered in January 1990. Its expected one year in orbit turned into 5.8
years in orbit due to the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion and the
grounding of the shuttle fleet.
13 Herbert A. Zook, David S. Mckay, and Ronald P. Bernhard, "Results from Returned
Spacecraft Surfaces," Article AIAA-90-1349 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris
Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
14 Op cit 13.
15 Op cit 13.
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Figure 3.10
The Long Duration Exposure Facility Configuration
Initial analysis of the LDEF surfaces indicate that it had suffered over
34,000 impacts. Of these craters, over 5,000 were found to to be in the 0.5 to 5
mm range, with the largest being 5.25 mm in diameter. 16 The analysis also
indicated that the leading edge of LDEF received approximately 20 times the
number of impacts as the trailing edge.17 This is due to the velocity of the
spacecraft in orbit causing the spacecraft to "sweep up" debris as it
traveled. Figure 3.11 shows the direction of impact of debris on the LDEF
spacecraft. Figure 3.12 shows the relative number of debris impacts per
panel.
16 V.A. Chobotov, "'The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Cooperation, El Segundo, California, 90245-2960, D:4312Q
17 Op cit 16.
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Relative Number of Impacts Greater than
0.5 mm by Panel Number (433 impacts) (The length of the
dark lines are proportional to the number of impacts per panel) 19
18 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Cooperation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
19 Op cit 18.
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While the preliminary results available from LDEF have been published, it
will take several more years to learn as much as possible from this
important test.
3.1.7 Lack of Data on Objects 1 to 10 cm
While these experiments have provided adequate data on small debris
and the Space Command Catalog is adequate for large debris, there exists a
large gap in the available data on space debris in the range between 1 mm
and 10 cm. Radars and other devices used for the Space Surveillance
Network are restricted in the size of objects they can detect, thus limiting
the value of their databases of small debris measurements. The small
radar and optical cross sections of this range of debris make them very
difficult to detect. What limited data does exist on debris between 1 cm and
10 cm is small compared to the data required to provide a full and complete
characterization of the near-Earth environment. In this range, the
probability of collisions is not high enough to provide accurate errors to
characterize the population through in situ measurements such as LDEF
or Solar Max. Significantly larger spacecraft, such as the Space Station
would have to spend many years in orbit to accumulate adequate
information.
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Orbital Debris Density vs. Altitude20
3.2 Geosynchromnous Orbit
Because of the unique property of the geosynchronous orbit, it is the
orbit of choice for communications satellites, early warning satellites and a
host of other satellites. Most of the satellites are found in a narrow altitude
and inclination band in order to keep them apparently stationary over a
single point on the Earth. As of March 1991 there were 350 objects contained
in the Satellite Catalog at geosynchronous orbit. These included 284
20 V.A. Chobotov, "'The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Cooperation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
F
spacecraft and 66 rocket bodies. Of the 284 payloads in geosynchronous
orbit, approximately 110 to 130 are still operating, and 150 are nonfunctional
or abandoned. 21 Figure 3.14 shows how these objects are distributed
around the Earth.
The main users of the geosynchronous ring are the developed nations.
The United States has ninety satellites in geostationary orbit and the Soviet
Union has 74. Other countries and the number of satellites each has in
geosynchronous orbit are shown in Table 3.1.
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GEO Population Longitude Distribution 22
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21 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Cooperation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
22 Op cit 21.
OWNER
United States
Soviet Union
Great Brittain
Italy
Canada
France
Australia
Japan
Germany
NATO
China
India
European Space Agency
France/Germany
Indonesia
ITSO
Brazil
Saudi Arabia
Mexico
Luxemburg
Total
Spacecraft
90
74
9
1
10
4
3
18
4
6
5
5
12
2
5
29
2
2
2
1
284
Rocket Bodies
11
66
66
Table 3.1
Objects in Geosynchronous Orbit by Country
What worries the space debris community about geostationary orbit is
not the present number of objects in orbit, but instead the rate of growth of
these objects. With the requirement for more communication and other
types of satellites, the population in geosynchronous orbit is expected to
continue to grow. Figure 3.15 shows the growth rate of objects with a radar
cross section larger than one square meter in geosynchronous orbit. The
growth rate of 25 per year is twice that of the low-Earth orbit on a
percentage basis.
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Geosynchronous Catalog Population Growth History23
The number of satellites in geosynchronous orbit is limited by the
amount of separation between satellites required to provide interference-
free operation. Earlier satellites required a few degrees separation to keep
radio signals and command signals from interfering with other satellites
or ground stations. With the development of higher frequency
23 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Cooperation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
· __
communication satellites, individual satellites can be positioned at the
same longitude. This is known as co-location. An example of co-location
occurred when in 1977 the World Administrative Radio Conference (which
allocates the geostationary positions) allocated the 19 degree west slot plus
or minus 0.1 degrees to several different satellites. The TDF-1, the Olympus
and the TVSAT-2 are in the area and will be joined by the TDF-2 satellite.
These four satellites in the same longitude position in geosynchronous orbit
execute uncoordinated station-keeping maneuvers, and the expected time
between close encounters of 50 m or less is 0.6 years.24
Collisions between objects in geostationary orbit are at a relatively low
velocity when compared to that of low-Earth orbit debris. Most objects are
travelling at approximately the same velocity and inclination. Controlled
satellites are kept close to zero inclination. North-south station keeping
maneuvers are required to keep the satellites in the proper inclination
orbits because of the effects of the Sun and the Moon. Drift rates for
uncontrolled objects are 0.9 degrees per year. This effect necessitates a 40-42
meter per second change in velocity per year to maintain north-south
station-keeping. Thus the amount of available fuel is typically the limiting
factor in the lifetime of a geostationary satellite.
The velocity between an object in perfect station-keeping (0 degrees
inclination) and one that has been allowed to drift for one year (0.9 degrees
inclination) as the satellite crosses the equatorial plane is nearly 120 km/hr.
Collisions between two satellites at this velocity, while not causing the
24 W. Flury, "Collision Probability and Spacecraft Disposition In Geostationary Orbit,"
European Space Operations Center, ESA Darmstadt F.G.R. XXVIII COSPAR 1990, Paper
No MB.2.2.3.
amount of debris that a hypervelocity impact would cause, would still
cause a significant amount of debris.
The major concern of the space debris community is that a collision or a
fragmentation event in geosynchronous orbit will increase significantly the
amount of space debris at that altitude. The result of a single breakup could
cause other on-orbit collisions with other satellites. Since there are no
natural removal mechanisms from geosynchronous orbit, this can result
in an unstable debris population that is self-perpetuating (the Kessler
effect). Also since there are no removal mechanisms, any debris created
will remain a threat to all future geosynchronous systems. Since
geosynchronous orbit is a non-renewable global resource, measures to
minimize this threat are of greatest importance.
32.1 Collision Probability in Geosynchronous Orbit
Because so many objects are concentrated in a narrow band near the
geostationary altitude, the collision probability in that region is orders of
magnitude higher than a few hundred kilometers higher or lower. The
threat of a single satellite colliding with another object is small at the
present time. The collision probability is given in Figure 3.16. The
inclination is included in the determination of collision probabilities
because at higher inclinations, the relative velocities between the satellite
and the objects in geosynchronous orbit are greater.
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Collision Probability for Geosynchronous Orbit 25
When all the satellites in geosynchronous orbit are considered, the
collisional risk is significantly higher. The probability of a collision between
one thousand 1 meter square objects in geosynchronous orbit orbit over 20
years is 0.021. If that number were increased to 10,000 objects the probability
of collision in 20 years is 0.16. The probability of collision at the stable points
(75 degrees East and 105 degrees West longitude) increases by a factor of 2.26
25 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
26 W. Flury, "Collision Probability and Spacecraft Disposition In Geostationary Orbit,"
European Space Operations Center, ESA Darmstadt F.G.R. XXVIII COSPAR, 1990, Paper
No MB.2.2.3.
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U3 Risk to Space Systems
A collision damage study done by Dr. Phan Dao of the Geophysics
Directorate of the Phillips Laboratory outlines the Air Force's concerns
associated with space debris.27 The Air Force is interested in five different
orbital regimes, ranging from geosynchronous orbits to low altitude polar
orbits.
Regime A:
Regime B:
Regime C:
Regime D:
Regime E:
High Altitude/Geosynchronous
0 deg < inclination < 67 deg
Altitude = 35,000 km
Mid Altitude/Mid Inclination
55 deg < inclination < 70 deg
10,360 km < Altitude < 20,350 km
Low Altitude East
28 deg < inclination < 32 deg
Altitude = 1,850 km
Low Altitude/Mid Inclination
60 deg < inclination < 80 deg
Altitude = 1,850 km
Low Altitude Polar
90 deg < inclination < 100 deg
Altitude = 7,400 km
The collisional risks associated with each regime are different due to the
varying density of the debris environment and the characteristics of the
orbits.
27 Dr Phan Dao, "Collision Hazard Study: Potential Impact of Orbital Debris on Low
Earth Orbit Satellites," Phillips Laboratory,November 1990.
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The geosynchronous regime is a particularly valuable orbit because of its
unique earth-rotation matching period and was discussed earlier. This
orbital band is a global resource used by communications, early warning
and weather monitoring satellites. It is a natural, non-renewable resource
that requires protection. Orbital slots are assigned by the United Nations,
and the United Nations determines who can use the different positions in
geosynchronous orbit while maintaining the required separation dictated
by command, control, and communications requirements. The present
collision hazard rate at geosynchronous orbit is low, approximately 10-8
impacts/sq meter/year. 28 However, some problems do exist. As discussed
earlier, co-located satellites may have up to one encounter per year with
near misses as close as 50 meters. 29 Thus, collision hazard in this orbit will
continue to grow as more objects are placed in geosynchronous orbit.
Debris resulting from collisions between objects in orbit, although at low
relative velocities, would result in a significant increase in the number of
objects in this orbit. This could have a profound effect on the collision
hazard rate, especially since at this orbit there is no natural cleansing
mechanism.
The mid-Earth orbit (MEO) is a high value orbit for military systems
such as navigation systems. Currently very little is known about the debris
population in this orbit. Because of the relatively low debris population,
collisions with space debris are not a major concern in these orbits at this
28 V.A. Chobotov, "The Space Debris Problem and Preliminary LDEF Results," The
Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California 90245-2960, D:4312Q
29 A.G. Bird, "Special Considerations for GEO-ESA," Article AIAA-90-1361 from the
AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-
19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
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time. In addition, most navigation satellites systems such as GPS,
TRANSIT and GLONASS that occupy these orbits consist of constellations
so that the failure of a single satellite will not cause a significant decrease
in capability.
The low-Earth orbits (LEO) are of primary concern with respect to space
debris. The LEO polar and LEO mid inclination orbits contain several
critical surveillance satellite systems for the Department of Defense and
other government agencies. 3 0 These are high priority, very expensive
satellites. Low-Earth orbit also contains the vast majority of the objects in
space. Yet, the actual risks are not exactly known because detailed analysis
of the collisional hazard rate is hampered by the lack of data on the amount
of debris in low-Earth orbit. This causes large uncertainties in the resulting
calculated collisional probabilities.
Looking at the characteristics of the planned Department of Defense
satellites and the results from a NASA space debris model, developed to aid
the design of the Space Station3 1, it is possible to obtain a measure of the
potential problems caused by space debris. Using a best case/worst case
scenario, it is possible to get a sense of the range of expected outcomes. The
space debris flux per unit area is found by using the NASA TM 100-471
Engineering Model. The number of predicted collisions will be the product
of the space debris flux, the area of the satellite and the number of years in
orbit. The best possible case will be characterized by using the minimum
flux predicted by NASA and a fixed launch rate of 120 satellites per year. It
30 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, New York:Penguin Books Ltd., 1983.
31 D.J. Kessler, R.C. Reynolds, and P.D. Anz-Meador, "Orbital Debris Environment
for Spacecraft Designed to Operate in Low Earth Orbit," NASA TM 100-471, April 1988.
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will also use only the main body of the satellite when determining the
effective area of the satellite. The worst case scenario will be calculated by
using the maximum flux predicted by NASA and a launch rate increase of
5% per year. In this case the main body, solar panels, booms and antennas
will all be considered when determining the effective area. These
parameters are summarized in the Table 3.2 below.
Parameter Best Case Worst Case
1) Flux (impacts/sq meter/year) Min NASA Flux Max NASA Flux
2) Surface Area Main Body Only Main Body +Solar
Panels, Antennas
and Booms.
3) Launch Rate Linear (120/yr) Increasing by
5% per year
Table 3.2
Parameters for Best Case/Worst Case Scenarios
A sample of the results obtained by running the NASA model is shown
in Figure 3.17. The dashed center line represents the predicted flux at a
given debris size or larger. The solid lines indicate the range of uncertainty
associated with the model. Any object to the right of the vertical line labeled
assumed lethal size is assumed to be lethal. This model is most accurate in
the low inclination (28.5 degrees), low-Earth orbit (>700 km) region, the
expected orbit of the Space Station. The further away the satellite of interest
is from this orbit, the higher the errors become.
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Figure 3.17
Sample Results of NASA Model Flux for
Inclination of 99 Degrees at 850 Km Altitude in 1990
The flux was set to match a range of planned Department of Defense
satellite systems. Many of the Department of Defense planned satellites are
classified, but several systems are widely known. The Space Based Radar
and the Navy's LightSat program are good examples of the types of
satellites being considered. The best case/worst case analysis, the number
of collisions per constellation with a lethal sized pieces of debris (assumed
to be 0.5 cm) are obtained for twelve future satellite systems and are
105
presented in Table 3.3. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 shows the range of collisions
per constellation as a function of altitude and inclination.
Satellite
Start/End
Dates
Number of
Satellites
Altitude
Inclination
Best *
Case
(Minimum)
Worst *
Case
(Maximum)
1
1990
2010
2
850
99
0.02
4
2
1990
2010
1
850
99
0.04
1
6
2000
2020
6-12
650
70
0.03
25
10
1990
2010
2
1500
63
0.2
53
5
2000
2020
6-12
650
70
0.03
34
8
1990
2010
2
400
90
0.2
1.6
9
1990
2010
2
400
90
0.2
2.1
11
1990
2010
2
1500
63
0.1
21
* Number of Collisions per Constellation
Over the Life of the Constellation
Table 3.3
Satellite Hazard Analysis for 12 Future
Department of Defense Satellite Systems
Figure 3.18 shows the best and worst case estimates of the number of
collisions per constellation over the life time of the constellation at the
various altitudes of the satellite systems. Figure 3.19 plots the same
information as a function of inclination.
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3
1990
2010
6
1150
63
.004
1
4
1990
2010
4
1150
63
0.3
66
7
2000
2020
6-12
1150
70
0.2
150
12
1990
2010
2
1500
63
0.1
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From these figures, it is clear that there are orders of magnitude of
uncertainties in the hazard assessment for any Department of Defense
satellite system. In the best case scenario, the damage risk is relatively
insignificant compared to the risks associated with launch and on-orbit
failures. In the worst case scenario the risk due to orbital debris is very
significant. The true answer most likely falls between these two extremes.
The driving uncertainty in the hazard analysis is the uncertainty of the
model itself. The primary uncertainty in the model is the lack of available
data to develop adequate models.
The number of objects in orbit continues to increase. The Space
Command Satellite Catalog provides the most complete information for
large objects in orbit; however, radar and optical tests of the completeness of
the Space Command Satellite Catalog indicate that a significant number of
objects are not included. Correlation between the orbits of the larger and
smaller objects contained in the Satellite Catalog indicate significant
differences, making use of the Satellite Catalog to predict the population of
small objects questionable. Debris measurements smaller than 10 cm are
limited to a few radar, optical and in situ measurements, with very little
data in the critical region between 1 and 10 centimeters The result is that
large uncertainties exist in what is known about the debris environment.
These large uncertainties in the debris environment translate directly into
uncertainties in the risk to space systems.
The conclusion is that an aggressive debris measurement effort is
required to minimize the uncertainties in the threat of debris to Department
of Defense and other space systems.
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4. COLLISION DAMAGE
This chapter analyzes the dangers of, and the possible damage caused
by, space debris. First it examines the characteristics of an orbital collision
between two objects. Then it looks at the different damage scenarios and
how they could affect different systems. The results from hypervelocity
impact tests undertaken for anti-satellite weapon development tests are
used to estimate the results of high velocity collisions. Finally the chapter
examines the results and possibilities of collisions with space debris of
several present and planned space systems.
4.1 Velocity of Collisions
Space debris is particularly dangerous to operational systems in space
due to their high relative velocities, and therefore the large kinetic energies
involved in collisions with them. This makes even small objects a hazard
for manned or critical space systems. The velocity of a collision is the
difference between the orbital velocities, as shown below in Equation 4.1.
VCol=Vs-VD Equation 4.1
Where:
Vcol = Velocity of collision
Vs = Velocity of the satellite
VD = Velocity of debris
Because orbital velocities are very large, it does not take a large angle of
intercept to cause hypervelocity collisions. High velocity collisions are
possible between objects with the same inclination because of the
differences in right ascension. Figure 4.1 shows two geometries for a
sample collision in orbit. Figure 4.2 shows the orbital velocities for circular
orbits at various altitudes. The orbital velocity for a 500 km orbit is
approximately 7.6 kilometers per second.
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Velocity Vectors for Collision
N
VCoi
= Collision Velocity
= Spacecraft Velocity approximately
= Debris Velocity 7.6 km/sec at 500 km
= Angle Between Velocity Vectors
Figure 4.1
Geometry for Orbital Collisions
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
Orbital Altitude from Surface of Earth (km)
Figure 4.2
Orbital Velocities for Circular Orbits at Various Altitudes
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The expected collisional velocity between objects is modelled by NASA as
part of their Evolve Debris Code. In this model, NASA determines the
percentage of impacts that will occur in a given velocity range. Figure 4.3
shows the normalized velocity probability distribution of a collision for
objects in a 500 km and 28.5 degree inclination orbit as found by the NASA
model.1 It shows that the majority of orbital collisions in this orbit will
occur at very high velocities between 8 and 14 kilometers per second.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Velocity (km/sec)
Figure 4.3
Normalized Collisional Probability at a Given
Velocity for a 28.5 Degree Inclined Orbit2
1 Robert A. Mog, "Spacecraft Protective Structures Design Optimization," Journal of
Spacecraft and Rockets, January -February 1991, pp. 109 - 117.
2 Op cit 1.
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The kinetic energies involved in these hypervelocity collisions are large
because of the high velocities associated with orbital collisions. For
instance, an object weighing one tenth of a milligram that travels at 1
km/sec has 0.1 joules of kinetic energy, approximately the same as a speck
of sand in a sand storm. The same object traveling at 10 km/sec has the
force of a baseball pitched from a pitcher. A 10 milligram object at 1 km/sec
has the same energy as the baseball, while the same object at 10 km/sec will
have the force of a 30.06 rifle round. A 100 gram object traveling at 10
km/sec has the same energy as a ton of TNT.
This comparison is not entirely accurate. A ton of TNT would spread its
explosive force in a spherically symmetric manner, spreading its energy in
all directions. The energy of space debris is concentrated only at the area of
impact. While it is not that difficult to design a system that can withstand
explosions in close proximity, it would be nearly impossible to design a
space system that could both withstand a collision with a large piece of
debris and still meet a reasonable launch weight.
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4.2 Damage Mechanisms
A number of different mechanisms can cause damage to space systems
in a hypervelocity collision. The damage to the spacecraft depends on the
velocity, the size and the material of the impacting debris Most damage is
in the form of craters caused by the impacting object and its fragments.
Even without penetrating a bulkhead or protective cover a collision can
cause damage by other mechanisms. Particles can be emitted because of
spalling from the inside of impacted surfaces. These particles in turn can
cause additional damage. Other damage mechanisms include shock waves
caused by an impact and carried though the spacecraft, or a possible
pressure pulse caused by the vapor created in the collision.
Debris
'I
.AI Ejected Mass
Spacecraft Skin
Debris Cloud
Figure 4.5
Initial Collision of Debris with a Spacecraft
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Figure 4.6
Secondary Collisions Within a Satellite
All hypervelocity collisions are not the same. The characteristics of
damage depend largely upon the collisional velocity and the nature of the
debris. At relatively low velocities (0-3 km/sec), the piece of debris is
deformed and stays relatively intact as it penetrates the satellite. This
allows for deep penetration at a single point and is similar to damage done
by a bullet.
At higher velocities (3-7 km/sec), the debris will fragment into a large
number of pieces so surfaces inside the skin of the satellite will be sprayed
with a large number of high velocity debris. These smaller fragments will
spread with a dispersion angle that distributes subsequent impacts over a
larger area.
At even higher velocities, (7-14 km/sec) the debris fragments and
vaporizes during the initial collision. The resulting cloud of particles and
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Skin
-- Dispersion Angle
Inner Surface
tion due to
Jal Particle
gasses spreads prior to colliding with subsequent surfaces where they
deposit the rest of their energy in an impulse-like manner. The impulsive
force can cause ripping or tearing of subsequent surfaces. During the
initial and subsequent collisions, part of the impacted surface will also be
broken off or vaporized, adding to the total amount of projectiles.
The density and boiling point of the debris, in addition to its velocity,
determine the results of its impact with a surface. Higher density objects
will have higher penetration depths because of their greater mass per unit
surface area. Debris with higher boiling or vaporization temperatures
require more time after collision to reach these temperatures. This allow
the object to penetrate further before breaking up into smaller fragments.
Figure 4.7 shows a representative curve for the relative penetrative ability of
a one centimeter aluminum projectile over a wide range of velocities. Note
that the highest penetrative ability is between 2 and 4 km/sec because in this
region the resulting fragments are relatively large as compared to higher
velocities where the debris fragments into smaller particles or vaporize.
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Figure 4.7
Relative Penetrative Ability at Different Velocities
for a 1 Centimeter Diameter Aluminum Debris3
4.2.1 Particle Impact
At best most satellite skins will not stop collisions with debris larger than
a few millimeters. The outer skin of a satellite is usually a thin piece of
sheet metal. Typically, it is not meant to act as a shield against space
debris. Damage to the skin itself by a small piece of debris would be
insignificant. However, if the debris can puncture the skin, fragments can
continue into the spacecraft and cause significant damage inside it. This
type of damage is detailed in the hypervelocity impact tests discussed later
in this section.
3 Adapted from chart "Ballistic Limit Curves" from briefing "Meteoroid/Debris
Shielding" presented by Eric Christiansen at the Phillips Laboratory Orbital Debris
Technica Interchange meeting 2-3 April 1991.
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After an initial collision, the spray of fragments continues on into the
spacecraft. Figure 4.8 describes many of the damage classifications of
particle damage after an initial collision with a light skin or shield of a
spacecraft. This information was presented in a NASA briefing at the
Phillips Laboratory Orbital Debris Technical Interchange meeting.4
RING CRATER PATTERN
PROJECTILE BREAKS UP INTO VERY FINE PARTICLES
* NO PERFORATION OR REAR SPALL
* RING CRATERS SURROUND CENTRAL SURFACE CRATER,
PITTING, OR EROSION
* NO PERFORATION
* RING CRATERS WITH SPALL PIMPLES ATTACHED AND/OR
CENTRAL SPALL ATTACHED
* CENTRAL SURFACE CRATER, PITTING, OR EROSION
* NO PERFORATION
* RING CRATERS WITH SPALL PIMPLES DETACHED AND/OR
CENTRAL SPALL DETACHED
* CENTRAL SURFACE CRATER, PITTING, OR EROSION
* LIGHT TIGHT
* PERFORATION
* HOLE(S) DUE TO CRATER(S) AND SPALL(S) MEETING
* NOT LIGHT TIGHT
* PENETRATION
* LARGE HOLE PUNCHED OUT DUE TO RING PERFORATIONS
AND IMPULSIVE LOAD
DIRECTION
Figure 4.8
Ring Crater Pattern Damage Classification for Shielded Objects
High velocity particles generated by a penetrating collision can severely
disrupt all areas of a satellite. Depending upon the area of impact, they
could wreck electronic banks, detonate fuel tanks, or destroy sensors and
4 E.L. Christiansen, "Meteor/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory Orbital Debris
Technical Interchange Meeting, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, 2-3 April 1991.
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other equipment. Because of the critical nature of each component on a
satellite they are made to be very reliable, ensuring that they work for years.
Yet debris collisions with objects as small as 3 mm diameter can cause
enough damage to make even robust systems fail completely.
4.2.2 Impulsive Loading
Impulsive loading occurs on subsequent surfaces after the debris has
significantly fragmented upon impact with the skin of the satellite. During
such an impact, the debris is fragmented and can liquify or even vaporize.
The resulting numerous small fragments, droplets, and vaporized
material generate an impulsive load on secondary surfaces. Large
amounts of energy are deposited over a relatively large area compared to
the area of the initial impact. Impulsive damage mechanisms include
buckling, ripping of surfaces, as well as flexing and bending of the satellite
components beyond their limits. Impulsive loading can accompany
cratering from individual particles thereby increasing the damage.
Spalling is a significant byproduct of impulsive loading as it was with
individual impacting particles. Figure 4.9, also taken from a NASA
briefing at the Phillips Laboratory Orbital Debris Technical Interchange
meeting, describes the types of damage caused by impulsive loading. 5
5 E.L. Christiansen, "Meteor/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory Orbital Debris
Technical Interchange Meeting, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, 2-3 April 1991.
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NON-PARTICULATE IMPULSIVE LOADING
PROJECTILE BECOMES MOLTEN LIQUID OR VAPOR
* NO PERFORATION OR REAR SPALL
* SURFACE PITTING OR MOLTEN SPLASH
* NO PERFORATION
* SPALL PRESENT. ATTACHED OR DETACHED
* SURFACE PITTING OR MOLTEN SPLASH
* NO PERFORATION
* DENTED, BUT INTACT
* SURFACE PITTING OR MOLTEN SPLASH
* UGHT TIGHT
* PERFORATION
* DENTED AND SPLIT
* SURFACE PITTING OR MOLTEN SPLASH
* NOT LIGHT TIGHT
* PENETRATION BY IMPULSIVE LOAD FAILURE
* PETALLED HOLE
" SURFACE PITTING OR MOLTEN SPLASH
DIRECTION
Figure 4.9
Impulsive Load Damage Classification for Shielded Objects
4.2.3 Spalling
In high velocity collisions spallation is an important damage mechanism.
Spallation creates debris emitted from the back side of an impacted shield
or bulkhead. They can have significant velocities and as a result cause
additional damage. Spalling is caused by the reflection of the impulsive
wave off the back surface of an impacted plate. The back side of the plate
releases particles at high velocities approaching that of the impacting
fragments as a result of momentum conservation. These fragments can
cause the same damage to internal components as the original debris
fragments. They can destroy electronic components, short circuits, and
contaminate fuel cells even if the piece of debris has not penetrated the skin
of the satellite. Contamination is a major consideration in fuel systems and
radiator cooling systems. Contamination with very small spallation pieces
120
can clog the attitude control jets, fuel lines and fuel pumps, since fuel
injectors are particularly susceptible to small debris in the fuel.
Another effect of spalling is to decrease the effective thickness of a plate.
A crater formed by a particle on the surface and a pit on the backside
formed by spalling can join, forming a hole where neither damage
mechanism alone would have created one.
4.2.4 Shock
Damage within a spacecraft can be caused without a direct impact from
fragments or an impulsive wave. A collision with a large debris deposits a
significant amount of energy in the spacecraft. Much of this energy is
distributed throughout the spacecraft by a travelling shock wave. Energy is
transmitted along support structures and other materials, reaching parts
of the spacecraft far from the point of collision. Depending on the size of the
impacting debris, this shock can cause the total destruction of the
spacecraft as it propagates though it. This phenomenon is confirmed by the
estimated and observed debris created by on-orbit collisions, such as those
done by the United States' anti-satellite weapons tests. Shock waves can
additionally cause failure of electronic components, shatter optical
components, and destroy antennas and solar arrays.
4.2.5 Secondary Effects
Secondary effects of collisions with debris include explosions of spacecraft
subsystems such as fuel tanks or pressure tanks that will then cause
failure or other damage to the remaining spacecraft systems. In the case of
a pressurized compartment, the damage may exceed a critical flaw length
and result in unstable crack growth or "unzipping". Other failures may be
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the rupture of a fuel tank or cell resulting in either a detonation or an
uncontrolled rapid maneuver that may exceed other performance limits of
the satellite.
There are other damage and system failures that can be caused by space
debris. The main failure modes for the space station are outlined below.
NASA lists the failure modes as:
* Catastrophic Rupture
* Internal Fragments
* Leakage
* Deflagration
* Detonation
* Light Flash
* Pressure Pulse
* Reduced Structural Strength
* Degraded Performance
* Electrical Short
* Long-Term Flaw Growth (Cyclical Loading)
* External Secondary Eject and Penetration Products
* Propagating Failure
Table 4.1 shows which subsystems are most susceptible to a specific type of
damage. This information is taken from a NASA briefing, but it was
originally from a 1970 NASA report on meteoroid damage assessment. The
information is still valid today.
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Probable Critical
Types of Failure
Catastrophic Rupture
Detached Spalling
Secondary Factures
Leakage
Shock Pulse
Vapor Flash
Deflagration
Deformation
Reduced Residual Strengh
Fluid Contamination
Thermal Insulation Damage
Obscuration
Errosion
Subsystems
Pressure Special
Cabins Tanks Radiator Windows Electronic Surfaces
x x x
x x x x
x x
x x x
x x x
x
x
x x
x x x x
x x
x x x
x x
NASA SP-8042, Meteoriod Damage Assessment, space vehicle Design Criteria
May 1970 obtained from E.L. Christiansen briefing, Meteor/Debris Shielding, 2
(Structures),
April 1991.
Table 4.1
Probable Critical Types of Failure for Various Subsystems.
4.3 Hypervelocity Impact Test Results
Many of the effects caused by a collision can be seen in the results of
hypervelocity impact tests McDonnell Douglas conducted at the University
of Dayton Research Institute. In these tests, pellets of various materials
were fired by a gas gun in order to study pellet impacts' effects on satellite
structural configurations. 6 The tests typically involved 1 gram pellets
impacting various shield configurations at velocities of up to 6.4 km/sec.
While originally done to study the feasibility of protecting satellites against
anti-satellite weapons, these tests also apply directly to the area of orbital
debris protection.
6 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company. "ASAT Technology -- Lethality," Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
123
In one test a 0.441 gram, 0.5 cm steel pellet impacted at 6.44 km/sec a
multiple shield made of six 0.2 cm aluminum plates shown in Figure 4.10.
The first, second, and third shield are penetrated, and the fourth shows
significant damage but no penetration. The hole in the first plate is small
and clean. The hole in the second plate is significantly larger than the first
plate because the pellet fragmented and spread over a larger area as
described earlier. The debris impacting the second plate includes the pellet
fragments and the mass of the first plate that was punched out by the
projectile. The spreading of the fragments and the dispersion angle can be
measured by using the pattern left by impacting debris on the second plate.
The third plate has a larger hole and some tearing, which is more
characteristic of lower velocities and impulsive loading.7 The fourth plate
received the combination of the fragments from the original projectile and
the particles released from the other surfaces, but because the remaining
energy was spread over a larger area, the plate was not perforated.
In a similar test, a 0.5 cm diameter, 1 gram pellet of Tantalum was fired
at 6.45 km/sec into a similar shield structure made of six 0.2 aluminum
plates. Figure 4.11 shows the results of this test. In this figure, four shields
are penetrated and a fifth is significantly damaged. Tantalum has a higher
density and boiling point and does not fragment as easily as steel. This
resulted in a smaller hole in the second plate and the deeper penetration
through the shields.
7 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company, "ASAT Technology -- Lethality," Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
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Figure 4.10
0.441 gram, 0.5
Steel Pellet Impact Test
cm Diameter Steel Pellet at 6.44 km/sec8
8 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company. "ASAT Technology -- Lethality," Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
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Figure 4.11
Tantalum Pellet Impact Test
1.018 gram Tantalum Pellet at 6.54 km/sec9
9 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company. "ASAT Technology -- Lethality," Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
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In an effort to analyze the effect of pellet mass on penetration depth, two
additional tests were run similar to the first steel pellet test, except a 1
gram, 0.635 cm diameter steel pellet and a 0.131 gram, 0.31 cm diameter
steel pellet were used. In both tests the fourth plate was penetrated and the
fifth plate had dimples and aluminum deposits which had been ejected
from earlier plates. These results are very similar to still another test using
a 0.44 gram, 0.5 cm diameter steel projectile, indicating that the pellet or
debris material is much more important than small changes in the mass of
the object when determining penetrating ability. o0 During these tests it is
difficult to distinguish between damage caused by fragments from the
impacted plates and those of the projectile.
In a further series of tests conducted to study the effects of different
impact angles, a 1 gram, 0.5 cm pellet was fired into plates at a 30 degree
incident angle (60 degrees off normal), instead of 90 degrees as in the
earlier tests. Because of the impact angle of these tests, the projectile
fragments traveled further and dispersed more prior to impacting the
subsequent plate. This resulted in a significant reduction in the penetration
of the fragments. Figure 4.12 shows the results of this test.
10 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company. "ASAT Technology -- Lethality," Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
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Figure 4.12
Tantalum Pellet Impact Test at 30 Degrees
1.013 gram Pellet at 6.45 km/sec
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On the second plate two impact areas are evident. One area is along the
angle of impact and a second is nearly perpendicular to the point of impact.
This second impact point is caused by material released from the first plate.
The results of this test also indicated that although the third plate was not
penetrated, the fourth plate did contain small craters and aluminum
deposits caused by spallation from the third plate. 11
A summary of the tests performed are given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Pellet Plate
Material Mass Diameter Velocity Seperation Thickness
(Gram) (cm) (km/sec) (cm) (cm)
Stl 0.441 0.48 6.44 7.6 0.2
Stl 1.044 0.63 6.49 7.6 0.2
Stl 0.441 0.48 6.32 7.6 0.1
Stl 1.044 0.63 6.54 15.2 0.2
Ta 1.018 0.49 6.54 7.6 0.2
Stl 0.131 0.32 6.45 3.8 0.1
Damage
Last plate penetrated
and remarks
3, small bulges in 4.
3, small bulges in 4
3, tear in 4, Aluminum
deposits on 5 but not bent
3 small bend in 4
4, Al deposits on 5 - dimpled
3 small hole and bend in 4,
5 dimpledw/Al deposits
Table 4.2
90 degree Impact Tests Results from the
University of Dayton Research Institute
11 McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Space Systems Company, Electronic Systems
Company. "ASAT Technology -- Lethality" Presented to Electronic Systems Division
Director of Intelligence, Hanscom Air Force Base, 26 July 1990.
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Test
Number
1110
1116
1118
1119
1120
1123
--
Test Pellet Plate Damage
Number Material Mass Diameter Velocity Seperation Thickness Last plate penetrated
(Gram) (cm) (km/sec) (cm) (cm) and remarks
1111 Stl 0.441 0.48 6.44 7.6 0.2 2, small dimple in 3
1117 Stl 1.044 0.63 6.59 7.6 0.2 2, bend w/al spalsh on 3
1121 Ta 1.013. 0.49 6.45 7.6 0.2 2 w/severe bend, small holes
in 3 w/bend and al deposits,
small pocks on 4
Table 4.3
30 Degree Impact Tests Results from the
University of Dayton Research Institute
It is important to point out that these test were performed to study the
possibility of protecting satellites against anti-satellite weapons.
Consequently the shields used were much heavier and offer much more
protection than what would be used on any space system.
Because of the very high velocities and large kinetic energies involved in
collisions with debris, damage caused by even small objects can be
catastrophic to space systems. The damage is caused by a number of
different mechanism including particle impact, impulsive loading,
spalling, and shock. The extent of the damage is a function of the velocity,
impact angle, size and material of the debris. Hypervelocity impact studies
done for anti-satellite weapons tests show the dramatic effect of collisions
with debris.
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5. SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
To understand the United States' space surveillance capabilities to
measure and track space debris, it is necessary to take a close look at the
mission of the Space Surveillance System and the requirements placed
upon it. In addition, US Space Command priorities and how these priorities
affect space debris measurements, and an evaluation of the radars and
optical sensors used to collect the orbital data on the objects critically
determine the capabilities of US Space Command. The value of using the
Satellite Catalog for space debris measurements will be assessed based on
these facts.
5.1 The Space Surveillance System
The United States has established the Space Surveillance System to
track, detect, identify, and catalog space objects. The Space Surveillance
System is operated by the United States Space Command and its three
component commands: Air Force Space Command (which has the main
role), i Navy Space Command and Army Space Command.
The task of the Space Surveillance System is to identify and classify all
detected objects, maintain an accurate and current catalog of them, and
provide relevant information to military and civilian agencies and the
scientific community.2 This information includes orbital characteristics,
radar signature, and nationality of space objects. The Space Surveillance
System consists of the Space Surveillance Network, a group of 29 sensors
1 Air Command and Staff College, AU-18: Space Handbook. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air University Press, January 1985. p. 12-10.
2 Op cit 1.
131
located around the world; the Space Surveillance Center, located inside the
Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs, Colorado; and an
Alternate Space Surveillance Center operated by the US Navy, located in
Dehlgren Virginia.
The Space Surveillance System provides the following information:
* New space launch detection and tracking information,
* Foreign satellite function identification,
* Satellite maneuver identification,
* Collision avoidance information,
* Data on satellite overflights of specific locations,
* Re-entering objects' impact points,
* Advance warning of attack on US space assets,
* Targeting information for the US anti-satellite system,
* Successful and unsuccessful attack verification information.
The primary method of promulgating this information is the United
States Space Command Satellite Catalog. The Satellite Catalog contains
information on the identification, origin, orbital parameters and radar
cross section of all identified space objects that are regularly tracked by
United States Space Command.
An array of US organizations rely on the Space Command Catalog data to
track and operate their satellites, including NASA, NOAA, and the
intelligence community. US allies are also given access to the data, since
none of our European allies maintain a comprehensive space surveillance
network. Instead they rely on our Satellite Catalog to re-establish contact or
locate their satellites in the event of a problem during launch or while in
orbit. 3 While the European Space Agency has called for the development of
such a system for their own use, the cost and complexity has proven
3 Snace Debris: A Renort from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
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prohibitive. 4 The only other country beside the US that maintains a
comprehensive satellite catalog is the Soviet Union.
Space Command believes that the sizes of space objects in its catalog
range from a wrench dropped by an astronaut to satellites weighing several
tons. But the size of space debris that would destroy most space systems in a
collision is on the order of one-half centimeter in diameter, significantly
smaller than the current detections capabilities of the Space Surveillance
System. This is the root cause of the risk created by space debris: it is not
possible to detect all the dangerous objects in orbit around the Earth.
The 29 sensors which form the Space Surveillance Network range from
older, dish-type, mechanically-steered radars to more modern phased
array radars to large telescopes with sensitive, electro-optical detectors.
Data collected by these sensors are transmitted to the Space Surveillance
Center located inside the Cheyenne Mountain Complex just outside
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Here the observations are processed, satellites
are identified, and accurate orbital parameters are determined.
The Space Surveillance Center maintains orbital parameters of all
cataloged objects. This is done by making routine observations of the
satellites' positions and then determining their orbits. Observations are
correlated with cataloged objects and orbital parameters are updated. This
is known as "maintaining the catalog". If a detected object does not
correlate with a previously cataloged object, then additional measurements
are made to make a preliminary orbit characterization and determine if it
4 Space Debris: A Renort from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working Group,
ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
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poses a threat to the United States or any of its assets. It is later analyzed to
determine its precise orbit, its origin, and its nationality before it is
eventually added to the Satellite Catalog. At least this is how the system is
designed to work in principle.
5.2 Missions of the Space Surveillance System
There are several missions of the Space Surveillance System. Some have
very high priority such as Ballistic Missile Early Warning, satellite orbit
prediction, and satellite identification. Others such as space debris
measurements, re-entry predictions and orbital collision warning are
designated as secondary missions.
5.2.1 Satellite Position Prediction
In order to correlate new observations with objects in the Satellite
Catalog, to communicate with satellites or to make observations on
satellites, the orbit and future positions of the satellites must be known in
order to aim antennas and sensors towards any specific satellite. The Space
Command Catalog provides the information required to predict the location
of all cataloged satellites as a function of time. This information is used by a
large number of organizations to download information from satellites and
uplink commands to them.
Satellite prediction routines are hampered by the unpredictable effects of
the atmosphere, which cause errors that continue to propagate. Over time,
these errors will multiply as the satellite's predicted orbit gets farther from
its actual orbit. When the errors in the prediction routine get too large, the
sensors can not find the satellites that they are attempting to observe. If the
satellite is not within a specified range of its predicted position then
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additional effort and time must be spent to locate it. This is the reason the
Space Surveillance System must continue to make observations of satellites
once they have been detected and cataloged in order to keep the catalog
current.
Maintaining the catalog becomes a major problem during periods of
geomagnetic activity or solar storms because the atmospheric model used
by Space Command to predict the positions of satellites does not model
accurately the atmosphere during these periods. Solar or geomagnetic
storms can significantly change the atmosphere in low-Earth orbit,
especially at high latitudes where much of the energy is deposited.
Atmospheric density variations in the polar regions can reach as high as
1000% above normal. The increase in density causes an increase in
atmospheric drag and changes significantly the satellite orbit from its
predicted position. Both in-track (along the line of motion) and cross-track
(perpendicular to the orbital plane) variations can occur. High altitude
wind velocities in the polar regions can exceed several kilometers per
second and can cause significant cross-track errors.
If the Satellite Catalog is not maintained, there can be several
consequences. If an active satellite is not near its predicted position and
communications can not be established, then commands to it can not be
transmitted or data can not be received. Consider a scientific satellite that
needs to download data every 24 hours because of a limited on-orbit storage
system. If communications can not be established, older data will either be
overwritten or data collection must stop. In either case data is lost. The
same may be true of reconnaissance satellites. If operational commands
are not received by the satellite, an overflight and observational opportunity
may be missed and a chance to observe a specific activity or location is lost.
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Maintaining the Satellite Catalog consumes the majority of the Space
Surveillance System's resources. In order to maintain the catalog, each
object, depending on the altitude of its orbit, must be observed and
accurately tracked every 2 to 10 days. Other satellites whose positions must
be known precisely, such as the Global Positioning Satellites, require more
frequent observations. Additional observations are required for all low
Earth orbiting satellites during periods of increased solar or geomagnetic
activities.
5.2.2 Satellite Identification/Early Warning
A primary purpose of the Space Surveillance System is the rapid
identification of objects detected by the US early warning radars and other
sensors. Detected objects are checked against the Satellite Catalog at the
radar sites. If the detected object does not match a known object additional
measurements must be made in order to identify it and determine if it poses
a threat to the United Sates. This allows US Space Command to quickly
identify new versus old space objects and determine if there is a military
threat posed by the new object, requiring rapid reaction.
The threat US Space Command is most concerned with is an
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile attack from the Soviet Union. This is the
main purpose of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).
The Space Surveillance Mission has been inherited by US Space Command
from NORAD, which is responsible for Ballistic Missile Early Warning.
The US Space Command and NORAD have the same commander. The
sensors used to provide information to NORAD are owned and operated
primarily by US Space Command.
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Other types of threats include those posed by anti-satellite weapons. In
the 1980's, the US was very concerned with the operational status of the
Soviet anti-satellite system. At that time the role of the Space Surveillance
System was to provide rapid identification of an unknown satellite and
determine its mission and purpose. If it were an anti-satellite weapon and
was expected to engage a United States satellite, quick response would be
needed to maneuver the targeted satellite out of harm's way. Also, military
and civilian leaders would be notified of a possible attack. This concern has
diminished significantly due to the recent changes in the Soviet Union.
Additional considerations require the rapid identification of new
satellites and their missions. Different actions must be taken if a newly
detected satellite is an intelligence satellite versus a communications
satellite. Space Command provides information to a number of
organizations, informing them of satellite overflights. This tells
organizations when a satellite will be in view of sensors and when they
themselves will be in view of a satellite's sensors. They can then direct their
sensors to observe the satellite or they can conceal secret activities. The
launch of a new intelligence satellite must be quickly identified so that
secret activities can be concealed prior to its overflight. Satellite mission
identification can be accomplished by using radio emissions, optical
imagery, and orbital characteristics.
An example of a Soviet failure to identify a satellite was the KH-11
satellite. This US photographic intelligence satellite transmitted its signals
up to other satellites instead of down to ground stations as other intelligence
satellites typically did. The Soviets thought this was a dead satellite because
it did not emit radio signals that they could detect. Since they thought it was
a dead satellite, they did not take the precautions they would have if they
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knew it was an active intelligence satellite (such as concealing secret
activities during overflight). The satellite's purpose remained a secret until
the manual for the KH-11 satellite was sold to the Soviets by an ex-CIA
operative in 1977.
5.2.3 Re-entry Prediction
Another mission of the Space Surveillance System is to predict when
objects will re-enter the atmosphere and whether they pose a threat to
people or property. The Space Surveillance Center increases the observation
frequency of objects as they re-enter the atmosphere so they can predict
more accurately the time and location of re-entry. While most of these
objects burn-up during re-entry, some survive and impact the Earth's
surface.
Another reason for keeping track of spacecraft re-entering the
atmosphere stems from the 1967 United Nations Space Treaty that makes
each country absolutely responsible for damage done by their returning
spacecraft. Space Command closely monitors any object that is large
enough to possibly survive re-entry and impact the Earth. This reasoning
may some day be extended to include damage to other space systems by
debris. These legal aspects of space debris will be covered in a later section.
5.2.4 Collision Avoidance
The Space Surveillance Center also provides collision avoidance alerts to
high priority systems such as the Space Shuttle and specialized satellites.
These alerts are issued whenever a cataloged object is predicted to pass
within a certain range of the spacecraft. This warning would allow for
orbital maneuvers that could limit the chance of collisions. Examples of
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this occurred in September and November 1991 when the Space Shuttle
made small orbital maneuvers to avoid used Soviet rocket boosters after
being alerted by the Space Surveillance Center. Shuttle launch profiles are
also checked before each mission for possible collision paths. This collision
avoidance mission will become significantly more important as the space
debris environment continues to grow and the frequency of close
approaches increases.
5.3 The Space Surveillance Network
The Space Surveillance Network uses radars, telescopes, cameras and
radio receivers to make 30,000 to 50,000 satellite and debris observations
each day. These observations are correlated with the Satellite Catalog at
each sensor site. Orbital measurement observations of certain satellites and
uncorrelated objects are transmitted to the Space Surveillance Center to
update the Satellite Catalog and to correlate the observations with other
uncataloged objects.
In order to keep track of the 7,000 objects that are currently in the
catalog, Space Command relies on a number of different optical and radar
sensor systems located around the world. The typical ranges and detectable
sizes for radar and optical systems are shown in Figure 5.1. Radars are
typically used for low-Earth orbit satellites and optical systems are typically
used for high-Earth orbit and geostationary orbits. The locations of the
systems used in the Space Surveillance Network are shown in Figure 5.2. A
full listing of these systems is provided in Table 5.1 at the end of this
chapter.
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Figure 5.1
Detection Capability of Space Command Radar and Optical Systems5
5 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, May - June 1991, pp. 347 - 351.
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Figure 5.2
Location of the Sensors in the Space Surveillance Network6
In order to determine the capabilities of the Space Surveillance Network it
is important to analyze the performance of the individual sensors used in it.
5.~1 Radar Systems
US Space Command operates a large number of radar systems, the
majority of which are designed to provide early warning of a ballistic
missile attack on the United States. These radars include modern, phased-
array radars, fixed beam fan radars, and steerable dish antennas. The
6 Air Command and Staff College, AU-18: Space Handbook. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air University Press, January 1985. p. 12-11
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main dedicated sensor for space surveillance is the Naval Space
Surveillance System Fence.
5.3.1.1 Naval Space Surveillance System
The primary radar system in the Space Surveillance System is the Naval
Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR). This system was built in
response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik and became operational in 1959.
Since then the system has been updated, but the operational principle has
changed little. NAVSPASUR consists of three transmitter and six receiver
systems. The three transmitters form a fan or "fence" of energy across the
United States from Georgia to California. When objects cross this fence they
reflect its radio waves. These reflected radio waves are then detected by a
number of receivers. This provides some orbital data on all detected objects
crossing the fence. The data includes the altitude, time and location where
the object crossed the fence and an approximate radar cross section. This
system is not used to make observations of specific objects as most other
radar systems are. Given the radio power, the vast area the fence covers
and the sensitivity of the receiver system, this system is currently limited to
detecting metallic objects on the order of 30 cm or larger. 7 The
NAVSPASUR fence usually provides the first indication of a satellite or
rocket body breakup.
7 "Improving the Fence," Space Tracks, Naval Space Command , January -February
1991.
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5.3.1.2 FPS-85
The FPS-85 radar system is located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida and
is the Air Force's most powerful phased array radar system. This system's
mission is dedicated to the space surveillance mission, the detection of sea
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fired from the Gulf of Mexico, and
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) launched from Cuba. Even
though it is an older phased array radar, beams of this system have the
highest power density. And, although it does not include many of the
modern receiver features of the PAVE PAWS radar system, its high power
output makes it particularly effective in looking for small debris.
5.3.1.3 Early Warning Radars
In addition to the Navy's NAVSPASUR system, the Air Force operates a
large number of missile warning and missile test monitoring radars.
These systems include the older Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS) and the more modern, phased array radar systems such as the
PAVE PAWS. These systems are placed strategically around the United
States and the world to provide advanced detection of Soviet intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) launches. As a result of observations looking for
ICBM launches, these systems see satellites and debris that are reported to
the Space Surveillance Center.
5.3.1.3.1 Perimeter Acquisition and Attack Characterization System
The Perimeter Acquisition and Attack Characterization System (PARCS)
located at Concrete, North Dakota is also one of Space Command's most
powerful radars. As its name implies, it is designed to characterize a
nuclear attack on the United States, but is also able to perform some space
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surveillance functions for the Space Surveillance Network. During
specialized tests this system can detect objects as small as 8 cm or less. 8
5.3.1.3.2 Ballistic Missiles Early Warning Radars (BMEWS)
The BMEWS radars were built in 1960. They have long-range fan type
beam patterns formed by their fixed elongated antennas and are intended to
provide the first indications of a Soviet ICBM attack over the North Pole.
They observe a wide angle of sky, and they can detect many objects
simultaneously.
5.3.1.3.3 COBRA DANE and the AN/FPS-79
COBRA DANE and the AN/FPS-79 radars are employed to monitor Soviet
ICBM tests. They are large phased array radar systems with a range
reported to be 40,000 km.9 But Air Force Space Command reports the
effective range as about 5,500 km.10 Cobra DANE is an L-band radar system
and is located at Shemya Alaska in the Aleutian Islands. AN/FPS-79 is an
ultra-high frequency (UHF) radar system and is located in Pirinclik,
Turkey.
In addition to these sensors there are a number of other radar systems
that can be used to track space objects, if required. These include the
8 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space Missions from Current and
Future Debris, December 1987.
9 Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security, The Brooking Institution, Washington
D.C., 1987
10 Major P. Jackson, "Space Surveillance Satellite Catalog Maintenance," Article
AIAA 90-1339 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
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tracking radars used at the Eastern Test range at Cape Canaveral, Florida,
those used at the Western Test Range at Vandenburg AFB, California, and
those in the Kwajalein Atoll in the South Pacific. Another specialized
system that can be used for debris tracking purposes is the Haystack radar
for deep space operations, which is operated by Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in Massachusetts. Haystack is currently being used by NASA
for observing space debris.
5.3.2 Optical Sensors
In addition to radars that illuminate their targets with electromagnetic
radiation, there are also passive optical systems that rely on reflected
sunlight to illuminate objects. These systems are limited in their hours of
operations due to the requirement that the satellite must be illuminated by
the sun and be in view of the optical sensor while it is in the dark. For low-
Earth orbit objects, this occurs near the dawn or dusk terminator periods.
This limited time restricts the value of all optical systems for debris
characterization. The available time for tracking higher altitude satellites
is significantly longer. Because of this fact, optical systems are currently
used to track high altitude objects--those over 5000 km.1 1 The minimum
detectable size of an object depends heavily on its reflectivity, which can
vary by as much as a factor of 10.12
11 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Soace Missions from Current and
Future Debris., December 1987.
12 Op cit 10.
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5.32.1 Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance Systems
The Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS)
Systems are the primary surveillance systems used by Space Command.
There are currently four operational sites, and a fifth is awaiting
installation. These systems are at various sites around the world in order to
provide regular coverage of most orbits.
A GEODSS system consists of two 40-inch telescopes for deep space
observations and a smaller, wider angle 15-inch telescope for near-earth
applications. These telescopes focus the image on a vidicon television
camera system. The stars are subtracted and the resulting image is
displayed on a video console. Satellites appear as streaks across the
monitor. The electro-optical system allows for rapid processing so position
and identification data can be transmitted to the Space Surveillance Center
in seconds. 1 3
5.3.2.2 Baker-Nunn Cameras
Two large aperture camera systems were used since 1956 to provide deep
space surveillance prior to the development of the GEODSS system. Built in
1956, these sensitive cameras provided satellite tracking out to 80,000 km
altitude. The two sites were located in Canada and Italy provided coverage
for most of the geosynchronous ring. These systems used high speed film
and required hours of processing and interpretation before the information
13 United States Space Command, Directorate of Public Affairs, "Fact Sheet: The U.S.
Space Command Space Surveillance Network," Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, March
1988.
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was sent to the Space Surveillance Center. These deficiencies have been
corrected with the new electro-optical system of the GEODSS telescopes.
5.3.2.3 Other Optical Systems
Another optical system that is utilized for space surveillance and
imaging is the Maui Optical Tracking and Identification Facility (MOTIF)
located on Mt Haleakala, Maui. This system is used to identify the shape
and hence the mission of foreign satellites. It is co-located with the
Advanced Maui Optical Site and a GEODSS site. Another optical system is
the Teal Amber site at Malabar, Florida. Further advances in spacecraft
imaging utilizing adaptive optics have been made by Phillips Laboratory at
the Star Fire Optical Range near Albuquerque, New Mexico. These new
systems have only recently been declassified. 1 4
5.4 Detection Capability of the Space Surveillance System
5.4.1 Radar Detection Levels
Several factors determine the minimum detectable size of objects that
Space Command's radars and optical systems can find. For radar systems,
the primary considerations are the gain of the antenna, the frequency band
the system is operating at, the power output of the transmitter, and the
range to the target. A simplified expression that gives the cross section of
the smallest detectable object is, quite generally, given by Equation 5.1
14 Discussed in open session with Colonel Marchiando, Commander of Air Force
Phillips Laboratory, 16 July 1991.
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=(4x)R 4 • 2L(S/N)kTs
PavgA2 tot Equation 5.1
where:
a = radar cross section of the smallest detectable object (m2 )
R = range to target (m)
X = wavelength of the radar (m)
L = losses
S/N = required signal to noise for detection
k = Boltzmann's constant (J/K)
Ts = system noise temperature (K)
Pavg = average transmitter power (Watts)
Ae = equivalent area of the antenna (m2)
tot = time on target (sec)
The radar cross section of small objects is a function of the radar
wavelength. Figure 5.4 shows the cross-section of spheres of various sizes
at different wavelengths. The oscillating effect on the X and Ku bands is a
result of interference caused by the shape of the sphere and can be
neglected for typical debris.1 5 Because of the rapid decrease in the radar
cross section with a decrease in an object size (as illustrated in Figure 5.3),
L-band and UHF radars are not particularly suitable for detecting debris
15 J. Beusch and I. Kupiec, "NASA Debris Environment Characterization with the
Haystack Radar," Article AIAA-90-1346 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris
Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
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smaller than 3 cm. Newer experimental X-band and Ku-band radars which
can detect smaller debris are being developed, but the high power
transmitters and high gain antennas are significantly more expensive
than traditional L-band radars and will require a significant amount of
money to become operational.
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Figure 5.3
Radar Cross Section of Spheres as a Function of Diameter16
16 J. Beusch and I. Kupiec, "NASA Debris Environment Characterization with the
Haystack Radar," Article AIAA-90-1346 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris
Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
149
5.4.2 Optical Detection Levels
For optical systems the signal level for modern detection systems is given
by equation 5.2.
A QE t FSol Alb oopt
ObjectR 2  Equation 5.2
Where:
Oopt = the optical cross section (m2)
A = the telescope area (m2)
QE = the quantum efficiency of the detector system
, = the signal integration time (sec)
FSol = the solar flux in band of the detector is sensitive (Watts/m2)
F(O) = phase function - fraction of illuminated object visible
Alb = albedo of the object (ratio of the incident light to reflected light)
R = the range to the object (m2)
(S/N) = the signal to noise ratio required to detect the object
The background signal is given by Equation 5.3
Sbackground = A QE t pxlLbkg Equation 5.3
where:
Opxl = the angle viewed by each pixel (deg)
Lbkg = the background light (Watts/m2 deg2)
Since the Signal to noise ration is given by
S/N = SObject
Y Sbackground Equation 5.4
The minimum optical detection level is given by:
Opxl L5kg R2 (S/N). 5
Optmin A. 5(QE).5 t.5 FSol Alb F(O) Equation 5.5
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Note that with optical systems, the signal decreases as a function of the
range squared, not as a function of the range to the fourth power as it does
in the case of radars. This makes optical systems more sensitive at longer
ranges. Another consideration is the angular rate that the object image
crosses the detector. For non-tracking telescopes where the telescope is not
locked on to the object's motion, the image is spread over several pixels,
thus decreasing the available signal for discrimination against the
background level.
5.4.3 Size Determination of Space Objects
To determine the size of a detected object (either through optical or radar
systems) there are several key problems. Both systems rely on the
correlation between size and the radar or optical cross section. This
correlation depends on the shape, size, and the material characteristics of
the object. Radar cross sections from a piece of insulation broken off of a
satellite will appear much smaller than its actual size, while metal cables
will produce much larger signal returns. Tracked objects' radar cross
sections can vary over an order of magnitude or two depending on their
orientation to the radar as they tumble and spin. 17
Many of the same considerations must be taken into account for optical
measurements. The size of the object; the solar angle between the object and
the sensor; and the albedo and the orientation of the object all play a critical
17 Gautam Badhwar and Philip Anz-Meador, "Relationship of Radar Cross Section to
the Geometric Size of Orbital Debris," Article AIAA-90-1347 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD
Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990,
Baltimore, Maryland.
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part in the optical signal received. Other considerations are the
atmospheric conditions and the ability of the detector system to accurately
take optical cross section measurements. NASA analysis indicates that an
average albedo for space debris objects is 0.08 as determined by hundreds of
measurements.18 NASA has run many tests in order to correlate radar
cross sections with optical cross sections and has found that the two do not
correlate well. These were done at simultaneous tests at the Kwajalein
Atoll. 19 From the analysis of these tests indicated that there was a factor of
2 to 4 difference between the size of the object determined by radar and
optical means. The difference may be due to differences in materials with
different albedo and radar reflectivities. Consider for example a large piece
of insulation which may have significantly different optical and radar cross
sections. The insulation may return a large optical signature because it has
a high albedo, but it may have a very small radar cross section because it is
not metallic and does not reflect the radio waves efficiently. The opposite
example is a wire or corner reflector that will reflect radio waves very
efficiently and yet have a small optical crosss section.
The uncertainties in the radar cross sections is another consideration
when trying to compare them with optical cross sections. Radar cross
section measurements are made with the FPS-85 phased array radar
system at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. This system is said to
systematically under-estimate the radar cross section by 2.3 dB due to an
18 Karl G. Henize, "Optical Debris Observations," Briefing at the Optical Debris
Measurement Technical Interchange Meeting Phillips Laboratory, New Mexico, 17
January 1991.
19 Op cit 17.
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erroneous scaling factor. This corresponds to a factor of 1.7 in size.2 0 The
lessons learned from these studies is that any correlation made between
optical and radar cross sections and the size of an object is a rough
approximation and should not be considered an exact measurement.
5.5 Conclusion on Space Surveillance System Capabilities
In conclusion, United States Space Command's Space Surveillance
System is a very effective system for tracking large space objects. It
maintains a large array of sensors and systems that track a wide variety of
objects in space. It performs its early warning functions in a reliable
manner. However, it has significant problems tracking smaller but equally
dangerous debris. The current debris size limit is at least one and possibly
two orders of magnitude larger than those objects considered lethal even to
shielded spacecraft. The limit of size capable of being cataloged, about 10
centimeters, is a result of the available sensors. It is not based on a realistic
assessment of the potential hazardous debris present to active satellites.
Use of the Satellite Catalog for space debris predictions and modelling must
take these considerations into account.
20 Gautam Badhwar and Philip Anz-Meador, "On-Orbit Breakup Characteristics,"
Article AIAA-90-1359 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical
Issues & Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
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Table 5.1
US Ground-Based Space Surveillance Systems
Initial
Sensor Type Operational Primary Range
Name Sites and Designation Capability Mission (km)
Dedicated Sensors
NAVSPASUR
(Naval Space
Surveillance
System)
PACBAR
(Pacific Barrier
Radar)
Baker-Nunn
GEODSS
(Ground Based
Electro-Optical
Deep Space
Surveillance)
MOTIF (Teal Blue)
(Maui Optical Tracking
Identification Facility)
Lake Kickapoo, TX
Gila River, AZ
Jordan Lake, AK
Ft. Stewart, GA
Silver Lake, MS
Red River, AR
Elephant Butte, NM
San Diego, CA
Hawkinsville, GA
(HQ Dahlgren, VA)
San Miguel, Philippines
Saipan
San Vito, Italy
St. Margrets, Canada
Socorro, NM
Haleakala, Maui, HI
Taegu, Rep of Korea
Diego Garcia
Haleakala, Maui, HI
Transmitters
Continuous Wave
Receivers
MSR (GPS-10) C-Band
MSR (GPS-10) C-Band
Optical 40-in
Telescope, Film
Electro-optical
Telescopes (two
40-in; one 15 in.)
Visible
Electro-Optical
Telescopes
Visible, LWIR
Teal Amber Malabar, FL
1959 Satellite
Tracking
8,100
1959
1983
1990
1956
1981
1982
1982
1986
n.a.
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
2,500
2,500
80,000
35,000
35,000
n.a.
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Table 5.1
US Ground-Based Space Surveillance Systems (Cont.)
Initial
Sensor Type Operational Primary Range
Name Sites and Designation Capability Mission (km)
Collateral Sensors
Eglin AFB, FL
BMEWS
(Ballistic Missile
Early Warning
System)
Cobra Dane
PARCS
(Perimeter Attack
Radar Charac-
teriazation System)
Thule AB, Greenland
Fylingdales, U.K.
Clear AK
Shemya Island. AK
Cavalier, ND
LPAR - UHF
MSR (FPS-49A
FPS-50)
MSR (FPS-49;
FPS-50) UHf
MSR (FPS-50;
FPS-92 UHF
LPAR (FPS-108)
L-Band
LPAR - UHF
1975
1960
1960
1960
n.a.
1977
1974
SLBM early
Warning
Missile
Warning
Missile Test
Monitoring
Missile
Warning
Pirinclik, TurkeyAN/FPS-79
Pave Paws
MSR (FPS-79)
UHF
Beale AFB, Beale, CA LPAR (FPS-115) UHF
Otis AFB, Cape Cod, MA LPAR (FPS-115) UHF
Robins AFB, Robins, GA LPAR (FPS-115) UHF
Goodfellow AFB, Elderodo, TX LPAR (FPS-115) UHF
n.a.
1980
1980
1987
1988
Missile Test 4,300
Monitoring
Missile
Warning
5,555
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AN/FPS-85 3,500
4,000
5,555
5,555
5,555
3,200
Table 5.1
US Ground-Based Space Surveillance Systems (Cont.)
Initial
Sensor Type Operational Primary Range
Name Sites and Designation Capability Mission (km)
Contributing Sensors
Eastern Test Range
(ETR)
Western Test Range
(WTR)
Millstone
Haystack
AMOS
(Maui Optical Station)
SITU
MSR =
n.a. =
Antigua Island
Ascension Island
Kwajalein Atoll
Kaena Point, HI
Vandenburg AFB, CA
Milstone Hill, MA
Millstone Hill, MA
Haleakala, Maui, HI
St Margarets, Canada
Mechanically Steered Radar
Not available
LPAR =
LWIR=
MSR (FPQ-14) C-Band
MSR (FPQ-15) C-band
ALCOR C-Band
ALTAIR C-Band
FPS-16
FPS-16
MSR L- Band
X-Band
Electro-Optical
Telescope
Visible. LWIR
Visible
1972
1981
1980
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Large Phased Array
Long Wave Infrared
Sources: Stares, Paul B. Space and National Security. The Brooking Institution, Washington D.C.. 1987
Jackson, Major P. "Space Surveillance Satellite Catalog Maintenance." Article AIAA 90-1339 from
the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues & Future Directions. 16-19
April 1990. Baltimore, Maryland.
Air Command and Staff College. AU-18: Space Handbook. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air
University Press, January 1985.
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n.a.
n.a.
Launch
Support
Launch
Support
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
Satellite
Tracking
2,300
1,600
5,555
40,000
n.a.
n.a.
35,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
Radar
6. SPACE DEBRIS RESEARCH EFFORTS AND MEASUREMENTS
There are several groups doing research in the field of space debris. The
three key agencies in the United States are NASA, Air Force Space
Command, and the Air Force Phillips Laboratory. The current government
space debris research efforts were developed as a response to the
Interagency Group (Space) report in 1989.1 From this the National Security
Council directed both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA to
develop a plan to address the issues raised in the report. The Air Force was
selected as the lead service in this DoD effort. The Phillips Laboratory and
its various directorates, formed to be the focal point for all Air Force space
research, guides the Air Force effort. NASA's Johnson Space Flight Center
was designated the primary NASA center for space debris studies.
Phillips Laboratory and NASA/Johnson Space Flight Center developed a
joint plan of research that avoided excessive duplication of effort. This plan
was approved by the National Space Council in July 1990. Phase I of the
research to be carried out in FY 90-92 consisted of the following activities:
* Assess the orbital debris environment
* Develop Space Station Freedom design criteria
* Document debris minimization practices and procedures
* Provide design concept studies and tool development for
spacecraft survivability
* Support development of standards, national policy, and
international agreements regarding the space debris
environment.
Phase II is to continue research and joint debris minimization activities
and other activities depending on Phase I results.2
1 National Security Council, Report on Orbital Space Debris, Interagency Group (Space),
February 1989.
2 Phillips Laboratory, "Space Debris Research Program Agenda," Briefing presented at
the WS Program Review, June 1991.
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This research raised three peace-time issues for the military. The first
was that ignorance of the current orbital debris environment was due to the
lack of adequate tools to assess the threat to Department of Defense space
operations. The second issue was that there was a very limited or no ability
to predict the long term space debris environment and the consequences
associated with an unstable debris environment. The last issue was that
national policy and international agreements will directly impact DoD
space operations in terms of the design, deployment, and testing of future
space systems.
Although all three organizations involved in space debris measurement
are working together in an attempt to provide a complete understanding of
the space debris environment and solutions to the growing threat of space
debris, each has a different set of requirements they are trying to achieve.
NASA is primarily interested in space debris because of the
International Space Station Freedom and the threat to it posed by space
debris. NASA has produced long term space debris population models and
engineering models. These models have focused on the requirements for
the Space Station.
Phillips Laboratory's goal is to determine the long term space debris
effects on DoD operations and how space debris may affect future weapons
systems such as the Strategic Defense Initiative. Its role focuses on the
current debris environment, the peace time issues associated with the
present debris environment, as well as war time and battle engagement
questions associated with the use of anti-satellite weapons and future anti-
ballistic missile systems. Effects on sensor systems, the viability of
discrimination of targets and debris, and the feasibility of damage
assessment are all part of the Phillips Laboratory research program.
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US Space Command is concerned with the space debris problem for a
number of reasons. Space Command has a basic role to play in all space
debris research: because it is responsible for tracking all space objects, it
must have a clear view of what already exists in space. Its key mission is to
provide early warning of attack on the United States by quickly identifying
unexpected and uncataloged objects in space. Another part of its mission is
to provide warning of an impending collision to critical satellites and space
systems. It must determine methods and requirements to accomplish this
mission for ever smaller debris. In order to accomplish this mission,
significant upgrades in satellite tracking capabilities must be developed.
Space Command has focused on the problems of tracking and cataloging
debris. Space Command prefers to have each object individually identified
and its orbit determined. It has been very reluctant to deal with orbital
debris in a statistical manner.
Space Command has the primary responsibility to provide space
support to US military units around the world. It has taken over a number
of satellite systems from Air Force Systems Command such as the Global
Positioning Satellites. Over time Space Command will assume
responsibility for most Department of Defense space systems. US Space
Command will also have the primary role in any type of space-based
Strategic Defense Initiative systems which space debris would threaten.
Consequently the near-Earth debris environment is very important for this
Air Force Command.
Phillips Laboratory, NASA and United States Space Command all have
measurement programs designed to address their different objectives. To
date, cooperation between the three organizations has been good. Phillips
Laboratory has been working closely with NASA and US Space Command
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and has often acted as the coordinating agency. US Space Command has
provided radar and optical tracking data to NASA. While there have been
several issues between the organizations, these problems have been minor
in nature and have not hampered significantly the flow of information or
cooperation.
6.1 US Space Command Debris Measurement Programs
US Space Command had begun investigating the possibility of several
space debris measurement efforts. These typically involve special
configurations of their existing radar and optical systems. Most efforts are
aimed at determining the completeness of the Satellite Catalog and
identifying steps required to catalog additional objects. Space Command
has indicated that they are not interested in a statistical analysis of the
debris environment but require orbital parameters on each object in order to
correlate them with known objects or to eventually include them in the
Satellite Catalog.
6.1.1 FPS-85 Radar Fence
Space Command's primary debris research program uses the Eglin Air
Force Base FP-85 radar system to form an electronic fence and track debris
as it passes though the radar beam pattern. In order to devote the full
power to the debris measurements, the system would need to be taken off its
normal mission of space track operations and searching for hostile missile
launches from Cuba and submarines. The beam could form a fence fifteen
degrees in width at 70 degrees above the horizon that would detect objects
crossing it. Although the actual radar characteristics are classified,
Eglin's FPS-85 is one of the most powerful phased array radars in the
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United States. Space Command officials familiar with the FPS-85 system
believe that it could observe debris as small as 3 cm at the lowest orbital
altitudes.
Since the FPS-85 is a phased array radar, a part of its beam could be
diverted to track an object detected by the fence to make an initial orbit
determination. The initial orbit determination could then be used to direct
other sensors to make observations of the object and then include it in the
Satellite Catalog. This radar then is ideally suited for the task of enlarging
the catalog with smaller orbital objects.
6.1.2 PAVE PAWS Radars
The Air Force operates several phased array radar systems known as
PAVE PAWS. These radars are not as powerful as the one at Eglin, but
have significant capability for detecting space debris. Their primary
mission is to detect sea-launched ballistic missiles. This mission however
does not require the full power of the radar systems. Space Command
officials estimate that fully 60% of the available radar power could be made
available for space debris measurements without detracting from the
primary mission. These systems could be used to collect additional data on
the larger space debris population. Space Command officials estimate that
these radar systems could detect objects on the order of 5 cm at the lowest
orbital altitudes.
Other considerations may be to have the PAVE PAWS systems conduct
more of the daily Satellite Catalog maintenance missions and have the
more powerful radars concentrate on the more difficult smaller debris.
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6.1.3 GEODSS Site Optical Measurements
Air Force Space Command has been collecting some space debris data
with its GEODSS facilities at Diego Garcia and Hawaii for NASA. These
data indicate that the Space Command Catalog underestimates
significantly the number of particles between 5 and 20 cm. Although Space
Command has shown skepticism in the satellite correlation process used,
this data led to an analytical expression (the HENIZE function) now used in
the models NASA uses for the Space Station design.
GEODSS sites are currently under-utilized due to funding shortfalls,
with several of the GEODSS sites operations being scaled back due to
operational budget cuts. Many sites will be operating only one of their two
telescopes on a routine basis.
Additional capability also exists and is unused. The fifth GEODSS site
meant for Portugal has not been (and does not look like it ever will be)
installed. This equipment is in mothball status at the Lincoln Laboratory
facility at Soccoro, New Mexico. With reasonable funding, and the proper
approvals from Air Force Systems Command, measurements could be
made utilizing its capability with the crews already on contract with the
Phillips Laboratory.
6.2 NASA Space Debris Research Program
NASA's space debris effort has been driven by the requirements of the
International Space Station Freedom. NASA has concentrated its efforts in
developing a number of models to predict the long-term growth of space
debris and engineering models to aid in designing the Space Station to be
protected from space debris.
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6.2.1 NASA Space Debris Modelling Program
NASA's space debris modelling effort is centered at the Johnson Space
Center. NASA's modelling efforts goals have been the characterization the
space debris environment and its long-term growth. Models include the
comprehensive Evolutionary Model (Evolve) and a simpler engineering
model. The Evolve Model includes variables such as the space launch
rates, on-orbit breakups, atmospheric decay and on-orbit collision models.
It also includes measurements from Solar Max, GEODSS, and US Space
Command Satellite Catalog.3 The engineering model interpolates output
from the Evolve code to provide an easy to use model that incorporates the
most significant variables of altitude, inclination, time and date, solar
activity, impacting size, velocity and direction.4
The limiting factor in these models are the small amount of actual space
debris data on which they are based. Uncertainties in some altitude regions
are one to two orders of magnitude. In order to improve these debris models
additional measurements are required. NASA has undertaken a
measurement program that is designed to answer some of the questions
about the environment, particularly in the low inclination low earth orbit
region.
3 Briefing by Donald Kessler,"Orbital Debris Models at JSC Phillips Laboratory,
NASA, and Aerospace," Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting,, 2 - 3 April 1991.
4 D. J. Kessler, R.C. Reynolds, and P.D. Anz-Meador, "Orbital Debris Environment
for Spacecraft Designed to Operate in Low Earth Orbit," NASA TM 100-471, April 1988.
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6.2.2 NASA Measurement Program
In order to better define the space debris environment NASA is utilizing
radar, optical and space based systems to increase the accuracy of their
models. Their main experiments are described below.
6.2.2.1 Radar Measurements
The primary objective of the NASA radar measurement efforts is to define
the orbital debris environment. Other objectives include examining how the
orbital debris environment changes over time and examining new sources
of debris. The primary objective of defining the orbital debris environment
will dictate how many of their experiments are conducted.
6.22.21.1 Multi-Wavelength Experiment
The objective of this program was to measure the radar cross section of
the debris in multiple wavelengths and with optical telescopes
simultaneously in order to determine an accurate correlation of the radar
and the optical cross sections and how they correspond to actual physical
size. This experiment utilized the four tracking radars at the Kwajalein
Atoll Test Range and the Super-RADOT telescope. Calibration was provided
by objects dropped by high altitude balloons that had been previously
calibrated on a radar cross section static test range.5 110 objects were
5 Potter briefing, "NASA Radar Measurements of Orbital Debris," Phillips Laboratory,
NASA, and Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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successfully tracked by the ALCOR, MMW, ALTAIR and TRADEX radars
during mid-October 1990.6
6.2.2.1.2 Haystack Radar Debris Measurements
While many radar-based debris detection experiments are being
proposed, the Haystack radar is the site of the main experiment now
underway. The Haystack Long Range Imaging Radar is a high power X-
Band (3 cm wavelength) radar operated by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Lincoln Laboratory. The data collection effort began in the
summer of 1990 and over 1000 hours of data have already been collected.
The Haystack orbital debris effort will collect 1200 hours of small debris
measurements at up to 500 km altitude and 28 degrees orbital inclination.
The radar is operated in the beam park mode which allows for constant
volume searches, thus allowing for a simple geometry for flux calculations.
Because the Haystack radar is located at Millstone Hill in Massachusetts,
in order to obtain measurements at 500 km altitude and 28 degrees orbital
inclination the radar must be pointed down to just 10 degrees above the
horizon. This increases the slant range to nearly 1700 km at 500 km
altitude. Radar performance models have indicated that such a large
number of 1-2 cm objects will not be detected at that range that the
observations will not be adequate to specify the debris population, so plans
6 E. Garcia, C. Pitts, and N. Young,"Orbital Debris Measurements Using the Haystack
and KREMS Radars," Proceedings of the 1991 Space Surveillance Workshop, Lincoln
Laboratory, 9-11 April 1991.
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are to increase the minimum detectable size at the expense of the limiting
inclination.
The beam width of the Haystack radar is only 0.05 degrees, so objects
pass through the beam in a few hundredths of a second. The narrow beam
width is a result of the high gain antenna that Haystack utilizes which
allows it to detect the smaller debris. The trade-off made for a high gain
antenna with a very narrow beam width is that the search volume is small
and the number of possible detections per hour is limited. These
measurements will be used to determine statistically the debris
environment for the Space Station; accurate determination of individual
orbits is not possible from these measurements.
Early analysis of the data has indicated that the measured debris
environment is close to the environment predicted by the NASA space
debris models.
6.22.2 NASA Optical Measurements
NASA optical debris measurements have centered around three
programs: the GEODSS Data provided by US Space Command, the Small
Debris Telescope designed by NASA and the proposed Liquid Mercury
Mirror Telescope.
6.2.2.2.1 GEODSS DATA
The GEODSS program that utilizes data taken by US Space Command at
Maui and Diego Garcia has been discussed earlier in Chapter 3. No
additional measurements were conducted in 1991 for NASA. Analysis of
the data shows that there were 2-3 times as many objects as those included
in the Satellite Catalog.
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6.2.2.22 CCD Debris Telescope
NASA has developed a small 32 centimeter telescope system specifically
for orbital debris measurements. This system utilizes a time delay
integration (TDI) mode that allows it to simulate a tracking telescope
electronically. This is done by electronically shifting the accumulated
signal across the detector as the same rate the object is moving across the
detector. This results in large increases in sensitivity because the signal is
integrated on only a few pixels and the integration time can be extended.
The drawback of this method is that the rate of detection is significantly
reduced because the instrument is only sensitive to objects traveling in a
particular direction with the assumed velocity. The TDI method will be
discussed in detail in Appendix A. NASA has begun making debris
measurements with this system and results are not currently available.
6.2.2.2.3 Liquid Mercury Mirror
NASA has proposed a new liquid mercury mirror to make space debris
measurements. This large three meter mirror would provide 7 square
meters of collecting surface which would increase its sensitivity to smaller
debris.
NASA's Liquid Mercury Mirror telescope is a large system being
designed around a relatively new concept to build large, inexpensive, fixed-
direction telescopes. A large parabolic shaped dish is spun at a specific rate
in order to maintain a thin film of mercury covering the surface. The
mercury acts as the reflecting surface and provides an extremely smooth
surface.
Since these mirrors are only applicable for vertical observations they
have not been utilized by the astronomical community. Special precautions
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must be taken to ensure that vibrations and air currents are minimized to
limit the effects of ripples and waves in the mercury. Development is
underway and after design, test and checkout, possible sites include one
near the equator, to allow for observations of debris in low inclinations.
Studies have indicated that large 10 meter mirrors are possible utilizing
Mercury. Initial analysis indicates that this may be an inexpensive method
of increasing the collection area of optical measurements. A significant
amount of work has been done on the liquid Mercury mirrors at the
University of Ontario where they plan on utilizing them for laser radar
receivers for atmospheric measurements. 7
6.2a3 Proposed Shuttle Experiments
In order to further charaterize the space debris environment at the Space
Station altitude, NASA has proposed the Debris Collision Warning Sensor
Experiment. The Debris Collision Warning Sensor Experiment (DCWS) is a
shuttle based experiment which is currently in the design stage. The
primary objectives of DCWS are to search for objects greater that 1 mm near
the Space Station's altitude as they cross the DCWS's field of view. The
DCWS will also simulate an on-orbit collision sensor for the Space Station
Freedom. Preliminary designs for the experiment include a 0.6 to 1 meter
telescope with an advanced CCD detector system. Data will be stored on
tapes for post flight analysis. DCWS will observe calibrated objects released
from the shuttle bay during the mission. Other objectives of the experiment
are to observe the geosynchronous ring and satellites passing near the
Shuttle as computed from the Satellite Catalog.
7 Lowe and Turnbull, University of Western Ontario, London Canada.
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6.3 Phillips Laboratory Space Debris Research Program
The Air Force's Phillips Laboratory has undertaken significant research
on space debris. The peace-time program has two main thrusts. The first
is the monitoring, modeling, and data management of debris information
from low-Earth orbit. The second is discovering methods for debris
minimization and spacecraft survivability. Both of these areas of research
require identifying candidate technologies and setting milestones for
accomplishing objectives. The research concerned with debris
measurement and monitoring focuses on the 1 to 10 cm size range of space
debris where data is very sparse.
War fighting and battle engagement issues are also being addressed by
Phillips Laboratory (for example sensor discrimination capability in a
debris environment generated by a kinetic energy weapon hit). Questions
exist about what sensors will detect in a post attack environment and the
effects of debris on damage/kill assessment. Any form of strategic defense
system will require accurate damage assessment capabilities to determine
if an additional weapon is required to kill the target. The effect of debris on
decoys and re-entry vehicles are also undetermined.
In a post attack scenario, surviving re-entry vehicles must be
discriminated against the background of debris in order to make an
accurate damage assessment. Bulk filtering algorithms developed for this
purpose are untested. Sensors must also be able to distinguish between
deception techniques (such as decoy deployment) and actual debris in order
to determine if the target has been destroyed.
Other war-time issues include the effect of either physical or operational
degradation of space-based systems during battle. If a large amount of
debris is created in a specific area, friendly systems may also be destroyed.
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Operational sensors may be overwhelmed with the number of objects and
may affect other aspects of the battle. One must also consider the long term
effects of any type of space-based battle on the near earth environment.
Anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems may need to be designed to
minimize the debris they would create in order to prevent any long term
detrimental effects on the near-Earth environment.
In order to address these issues, Phillips Laboratory has separated the
peace time and war fighting issues, allowing its different divisions to
conduct research in their traditional areas of strength. The Geophysics
Directorate, formerly the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory, is leading the
peace-time environment, measurement and analysis effort along with the
modeling and data management functions. The Geophysics Directorate has
a long history of sensor and computer-based modelling programs.
The engagement issues are largely handled by the Weapons and
Survivability Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico which
evolved from the old Air Force Weapons Laboratory. This group is
analyzing aspects such as spacecraft survivability, debris discrimination
and debris processing. This group also works with the Defense Nuclear
Agency in the area of breakup modelling.
6.3.1 Phillips Laboratory's Optical Measurement Program
The Phillips Laboratory has established an overall program to
characterize the orbital debris environment by using optical systems. This
effort includes a number of sensors, each with different capabilities and
characteristics. The participating/competing sensors systems are:
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* The Geophysics Directorate's Wright Patterson AFB 100"
Collimator
* The Advanced Maui Optical Site (AMOS)
* The Malabar Test Range System in Florida
* The Starfire Optical Range (SOR)
* The Lincoln Laboratory Experimental Test Site (ETS)
Other sites participating in this cooperative effort with Phillips
Laboratory and NASA are the Haystack radar system at Millstone Hill in
Massachusetts and the Liquid Mercury Mirror (LMM) being designed by
NASA.
PARTICIPATING SENSORS
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Figure 6.1
Participating Sensors
The Wright Patterson 100 inch collimator facility was originally built to
produce and test optical components for high altitude photographic systems
and satellites. This facility has a 12 story vacuum chamber which houses
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the collimator. At the lowest level of the facility there is a very high quality,
2.54 meter (100-inch) mirror with a 15.24 meter (600 inch) focal length. The
collimator facility was moth-balled shortly after it was built since more
modern techniques had been developed. In 1988, the system was restored
and used for high altitude laser radar studies of the upper atmosphere by
the Geophysics Laboratory (now the Geophysics Directorate of the Phillips
Laboratory). This system is designed to provide a database of the smaller
objects to evaluate debris models at the smaller end of the spectrum of
detectable objects.
The Advanced Maui Optical Site (AMOS) was originally designed to
obtain high accuracy photometric data and imaging data on satellite
systems. This site is co-located with one of the GEODDS sites high on Mt.
Haleakala, at the top of a mountain on the island of Maui. AMOS
maintains a number of telescope systems with varying diameters and fields
of view.
The Experimental Test Site (ETS) operated by Lincoln Laboratories in
Soccoro, New Mexico was the original development site for the GEODSS
system. ETS has two 60 inch telescope systems located 60 meters apart. This
unique feature allows for a parallax measurement to discriminate against
micro meteor trails as they enter the earth atmosphere.
The Star Fire Optical Range outside Albuquerque, New Mexico is part of
the Phillips Laboratory's atmospheric compensation effort. This system
currently consists of a 1.5 meter telescope. Future construction will provide
a 3.5 meter telescope. Current results of research there have been recently
unclassified and have indicated that the image compensation techniques
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used have allowed for better image quality than those used in the Hubble
Space Telescope.8
The Malabar Test Range has a unique set of sensors and telescopes that
support various Air Force requirements. It has both a visible and a long
wavelength infrared capability. This system provides advanced imaging of
satellite systems for the Air Force. It is located at Palm Bay, Florida.
The main parameters of the capabilities of various sites are the size of
the telescope, the field of view of the telescope, and the darkness of the sky.
Other considerations include the ability of the telescope to scan and the
latitude of the site. A summary of the most important information
concerning orbital debris measurements for the primary sites discussed
here is shown in Table 6.1. The NASA liquid mercury mirror was not
included due to a lack of data at this stage of the design effort. ("Sky" in
Table 6.1 refers to the night sky background in optical magnitude.)
Optical Site Charateristics
Site LAT SKY Diameter FOV SCAN
(deg) (mag) (m) (deg)
AMOS 20.7 22.2 0.56 0.5 Y
ETS 33.8 22.2 0.79 1/0.5 Y
GP/WP 39.0 21.0 2.54 0.2 N
MALABAR 28.2 20.4 0.85 0.5 Y
28.2 20.4 0.69 3.5 Y
SOR 35.0 19.7 1.5 0.72 Y
Table 6.1
Optical Site Characteristics
8 Interview with Col Peter Marshiando, Phillips Laboratory Commander, 16 July 1991.
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To illustrate the efforts required to make optical observations, Appendix
A provides significant details of the Phillips Laboratory optical
measurement program at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. It
describes in detail the various methods for making measurements and the
tradeoffs associated with each. Appendix A also provides very detailed
calculations as to the minimum detectable size for all the Phillips
Laboratory optical measurement sites.
63.2 Other Sources of Radar Data
Other measurements data Phillips Laboratory is evaluating for debris
measurements include radar data at a number of scientific radar sites.
One example is the incoherent scatter radar site at Sondrestrom,
Greenland. This radar is run by SRI International for the National Science
Foundation. Its primary mission is to study the ionosphere in the auroral
oval. However, it also detects space objects approximately 2-3 times an
hour. Due to its large size, high power and extremely sensitive receivers it
should be able to see objects as small as 3 cm. Years of data are stored on
magnetic tape, but the site recently switched to optical discs. Over 1200
hours of radar data are currently available through NSF and SRI.
6.4 Conclusions on Space Debris Research Efforts and Measurements
As shown each organization has undertaken a research effort aimed at
solving their particular problems. While there are some overlaps between
programs, they are minor. Coordination and cooperation are one of the
highlights of the effort. Several technical interchange meeting have been
conducted at Phillips Laboratory and US Space Command. Many
measurements are needed to adequately define all aspects of the space
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debris environment. These measurement program will provide a
significant amount of data and will help define the extent of the space
debris problem.
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7. SPACE DEBRIS EFFECTS MITIGATION
There are many ways to minimize the dangers of collisions with orbital
space debris. They include debris reduction strategies, shielding, on-orbit
maneuvering, and robust space architectures. Each of these mitigation
efforts represents a different approach and method of obtaining the same
objective: ensuring that the use of space for commercial, scientific and
military purposes can be pursued safely and reliably.
7.1 Collision Avoidance of Space Debris
Avoiding collisions with resident space objects would be a very difficult
task without the information provided by the US Space Command and its
Space Surveillance Network. The catalog that US Space Command
maintains currently consists of 7,000 objects and is increasing at an
average annual rate of 6-7% per year.
Potential collisions between critical space systems, such as the shuttle,
and known space objects can be avoided by suitable orbital maneuvers. To
date this is the only active debris avoidance method employed by the United
States. As discussed in earlier chapters, it is possible to predict the orbits of
known debris and spacecraft to determine the possibility of a possible
collision. But this is practiced only for high value systems such as the Space
Shuttle, certain military satellites, and the future Space Station because of
limitations in computer resources and in the accuracy of the predictions
and measurements.
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The standard accuracy with which Space Command determines an orbit
is a few kilometers within a few days of the observation time.1 Ground-
based measurements are limited in their accuracy because the type of
radars used are not meant for metric accuracy, and inherent errors in the
measurements due to the effects of the ionosphere on signal propagation
exacerbate this limitation. If predicted orbits are limited to errors of only 3
km of the actual orbit, then a 10 square meter satellite could receive
2,800,000 collision warnings for each actual collision.2 The accuracy of the
predicted orbits at low altitudes degrades quickly because of the limitations
in predicting the effects of the atmosphere with existing models.
Another limitation in orbital prediction is that the Space Surveillance
Center and the Alternate Space Surveillance Center use general
perturbations, an analytical theory, instead of special perturbations, or
numerical integration. General perturbation theory, as used at the Space
Surveillance Center, is less accurate than the modern special perturbation
theory methods used for accurate orbit prediction. This decision is
determined by the available computer resources because special
perturbation theories require significantly more computer calculations per
satellite. The general perturbation theory, as implemented at Space
Surveillance Center, is presently limited to accuracies of approximately 300
meters. 3 More accurate orbits are possible provided warning time is
1 Stephen H. Knowles, "Orbital Elements Determination for Breakups and Debris,"
AIAA 90-1348 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
2 Based on the area of a circle with a 3 km radius (2.8 x 107 m2) and the 10 m2 area of the
satellite.
3 Op cit 1.
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sufficient to direct additional radars designed to provide more accurate
velocity and position measurements and translate the data into new orbital
parameters. Use of special tracking radars can produce orbital parameters
and measurements to provide orbit predictions to accuracies of a few
meters as is done with the Global Positioning Satellites.
Debris avoidance maneuvers can be accomplished with small
maneuvering jets provided that adequate warning time is available. Small
velocity changes can provide significant changes in positions within an
orbit. Debris avoidance maneuvers would not necessarily waste fuel.
Satellites that require periodic re-boost could plan debris avoidance
maneuvers into their orbit-raising firings that need to be performed in any
event. Engine firings could be planned into orbit raising maneuvers for the
Space Station and other systems. This type of unscheduled engine firings
may cause significant problems with scientific missions on-board the Space
Station, especially for long term zero gravity experiments.
7.1.1 On-Orbit Warning
Space-based procedures to avoid collisions between objects is currently
not a viable alternative. Any warning system that could detect objects on a
collision course with another space object would provide too short a
warning prior to impact. Considering that closure velocities are on the
order of 10 km/sec a maneuvering rocket system that could provide
sufficient acceleration to avoid collision on short notice would dominate the
spacecraft design.
Yet the idea of space-borne warning sensors and quick reaction rockets
for protection has been advanced by some people. This approach requires a
method of detecting debris, either radar or optical, that can see potential
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threatening debris far enough away to maneuver the satellite to avoid
collision. The sensor system would have to accomplish a search pattern
covering the many directions from which debris may approach in both sun
illuminated and eclipsed conditions. After an initial detection the sensor
system would have to discriminate between near approaches and collisions,
determine a method for maneuver and execute a rocket firing in a very
short period of time. This may require autonomous control by the satellite
because the reaction time would be very short.
Since closing rates between objects can be as high as 14 kilometers per
second at low-Earth orbit, if a small space-based sensor system could
reliably detect debris on the size of 1 cm at 140 km, it would provide only ten
seconds warning before a collision. Within the ten seconds from first
detection the sensor must confirm a collision course with a certain level of
confidence, decide that the satellite is capable of maneuvering despite
mission requirements and maneuver the satellite to a safe distance from
the debris path. This safe distance is a function of the accuracy with which
the debris path can be determined.
If it took 5 seconds to determine the course of the debris to the necessary
accuracy and if a minimum of 10 meters separation with the debris were
required, significant propulsion systems would be needed. A satellite that
must maneuver 10 meters in 5 seconds would require an acceleration rate
of approximately 1 meter per second squared. For a 2500 kilogram satellite
this requires a 2.5 kilonewton rocket, which is equivalent to the Orbital
Maneuvering Engine on the Space Shuttle (2,727 newtons) and significantly
larger than any system used for station keeping (1 newton). If a decision
could be made with ten seconds remaining until impact, the satellite would
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require a 500 newton engine, which is nearly twice as large as the shuttle's
primary reaction control system.
To utilize such a maneuvering system satellites would require very
significant redesign to withstand rapid accelerations while solar panels,
booms and antennas deployed. This would result in significant additional
weight and cost. The sensor and engine would have to be made extremely
reliable because any failure may result in its removal from a useful orbit or
a waste of fuel. A major consideration is that maneuvering systems'
failures may cause more satellite losses than potential losses due to debris.
The extra engines and propellent also raise the risk of additional on-orbit
propulsion related explosions and hence additional debris. In any case
such a maneuvering system would dominate most spacecraft and would
not be practical because of the cost of development and the risks of failure
involved. Because of these problems this approach is not promising.
7.2 Passive Protection
Another method for protection against possible collisions with space
debris involves hardening satellites and space systems to survive collisions.
Another is to design systems that can lose a single satellite and still meet
its requirements.
7.2.1 Space Debris Shields
The response to the threat of space debris NASA has chosen for the Space
Station is to use shields to protect the Space Station against possible debris
impacts. These shields are typically light layers of material that cause the
debris to fragment and vaporize. Shields will be used to protect the critical
portions of the Space Station, such as the manned modules and fuel tanks.
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Because of the additional weight required, other systems such as solar
arrays, antennas, and radiators can not be shielded. But protecting critical
components with shields adds significantly to the cost and weight of the
Space Station.
The amount of weight and cost depends largely on the amount of risk
one is willing to take. A space system is much more likely to be hit by a
millimeter sized object then by a 5 cm sized object. By shielding against a 1
millimeter sized object you reduce your risk to those objects but not the risk
due to larger objects. Table 7.1 shows the shield mass per unit area
required to shield against various size debris. Associated with the weight is
the implicit cost of launching the shields.
SHIELD MASS PER UNIT AREA(No perforation of rear wall)
* 3.2 mm Aluminum Projectile (45 mg), Normal Impact, 6.5 km/sec
-- Monolithic Aluminum Plate: 3.53 g/cm2 .
* 3.2 mm Aluminum Projectile (45 mg), Normal Impact, 10 cm Spacing
- Whipple Shield: 0.60 gm/cm2.
-- Nextel MS Shield: 0.29 g/cm2.
-- Mesh Double-Bumper: 0.26 g/cm2.
* 3.2 mm Aluminum Projectile (45 mg), 45 deg Impact, 10 cm Spacing
-- Whipple Shield: 1.22 g/cm2.
-- Nextel MS Shield: 0.31 g/cm 2
-- Mesh Double-Bumper: 0.36 g/cm2.
* 3.2 mm Aluminum Projectile (45 mg), Normal Impact, 5 cm Spacing
-- Whipple Shield: 0.80 g/cm2.
-- Nextel MS Shield: 0.52 g/cm2
-- Mesh Double-Bumper: 0.42 g/cm2.
* 9.5 mm Aluminum Projectile (1.3 g), Normal Impact, 30 cm Spacing
-- Whipple Shield: 1.35 g/cm2.
-- Nextel MS Shield: 0.97 g/cm2
-- Mesh Double-Bumper: 1.08 g/cm2.
* 6.4 mm Aluminum Projectile (0.37 g), Normal Impact, 20 cm Spacing
-- Whipple Shield: 0.96 g/cm2.
-- Mesh Double-Bumper: 0.64 g/cm 2.
Table 7.1
Shield Mass per Unit Area4
4 Chirstensen briefing "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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7.2.2 Whipple Shield
The idea of a shield is to spread the energy of a collision over a large area
instead of a small point. This can be done by placing a thin shield or
bumper in front of a spacecraft's surface. The purpose of this shield is not
to stop an object from passing though, but to break it into smaller fragments
and gasses that will spread over a larger area before reaching the
spacecraft's bulkhead. When a high speed object collides with the bumper,
it fragments and/or vaporizes depending on the velocity of collision and the
material of the projectile. The resulting particles spread before hitting the
next layer of the shield of bulkhead. A single bumper system is commonly
known as a whipple shield and was first considered during the Apollo
missions. Many modifications and adaptations on this concept have evolved
for possible use on the Space Station. The whipple shield is heavy compared
to other shielding concepts.
The whipple shield is included in the initial design of the bulkhead of the
Space Station. This would consist of one or two layers of aluminium plates
spaced a few inches apart covering the exposed portions of the inhabited
modules. This would provide some protection against debris. Figure 7.1
shows the ballistic limit curve (the diameters and velocities that will cause
failure by detached spalling or perforation to the rear bulkhead) for the
whipple shield. The shape of the curves denotes the different velocity
regimes for the projectiles discussed in Chapter 4.
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Figure 7.1
Ballistic Limit Curves for the Space Station protected by Aluminum
Whipple Shields. "Diameter to Fail Structure" is the Diameter in
Centimeters at a Velocity that is Assumed Would Cause the Failure of the
Space Station Structure5
Several other types of shields have been studied and considered for
possible use with the Space Station. These shields include mesh double-
bumper shields and multiple fabric shields. With each of these systems
come significant weight and cost penalties. These systems also provide only
a limited amount of protection against small objects. It is not considered
practical to shield against objects much larger than one centimeter.
5 Chirstensen briefing, "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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7.23 Mesh Double Bumper Shield
The mesh double bumper shield is a modification of the whipple shield.
It consists of two whipple shields stacked together, utilizing an aluminum
mesh to reduce the weight compared to the solid aluminum bumper.
Figure 7.2 shows the proposed configuration.
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Figure 7.2
Mesh Double Bumper 6
6 Chirstensen briefing, "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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Collisions with mesh also result in a greater spread of the debris clouds
formed after collisions. 7 This allows for greater protection with closer
spacing between bumpers. The second bumper is used to deliver a second
shock to remaining large fragments. An intermediate layer of high
strength fabric (either kevlar or a ceramic fabric known as Nextel) is used
to slow the debris cloud and decrease the impulsive load on the bulkhead.
While this shield concept has undergone significant testing, additional
development work on it is still required. Alternative materials such as
steel fabrics must be analyzed and ballistic limit tests must be conducted
before the design of flight hardware can begin.
7.2.4 Multiple Shock Shied
The multiple shock shield uses many fabric shields successively to break
up the high velocity debris before it impacts the bulkhead. Multiple ultra
thin sheets reduce the weight of the shield. The successive shocks from the
shields raise the temperature of the projectile, causing it to vaporize or
fragment. These sheets can be made from flexible or rigid materials. One
of the materials that NASA is considering includes Nextel. This fabric is
versatile and provides many on-orbit shielding options. There is still a
considerable amount of work to be done on optimizing shield materials,
reducing their weight, and assessing alternative shielding options. The
multi-shock shield is shown in Figure 7.3.
7 Chirstensen briefing, "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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Figure 7.4 shows the diameter limit for a multiple shock shield against
aluminum debris at various angles for no penetration or internal spalling
of the bulkhead. The minimum sustainable diameter for this design as
shown is on the order of 0.1 - 0.3 cm.
8 Chirstensen briefing,"Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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Shield deployment mechanisms range from deployable booms pulling
sheets of fabric from window blind type rolls, to advanced air bag
deployment technology. Significant design and cost analysis must be done
before any shielding program is undertaken. The deployable shield concept
based on rolling out fabric similar to a window blind is shown in Figure 7.5.
9 Chirstensen briefing, "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory, NASA, and
Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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These shields would be placed around critical areas of the Space Station to
provide additional protection against debris.
Mast Storage
Canister Attach Points
Allach Points Cover Casselte Cover
Figure 7.5
One Proposed Space Station Freedom Shield Deployment Mechanism Io
10 Chirstensen briefing, "Meteoroid/Debris Shielding," Phillips Laboratory,
NASA, and Aerospace Orbital Debris Technical Interchange Meeting, 2 - 3 April 1991.
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None of these systems as designed for the Space Station are capable of or
envisioned to protect against larger, though still untrackable debris, in the
3 - 10 cm range. Shielding against these larger objects is impractical due to
the cost and the weight involved. If the risk is higher than acceptable
limits, other means of protection are required.
7.3 Robust Systems
Satellites are launched into orbit to accomplish a mission, civilian or
military. A method to ensure that loss of a single satellite does not cripple
the mission which the satellite was meant to carry out is to provide
redundancy. An example of such built-in redundancy is the Global
Positioning System. The failure of a single satellite of the system will not
cause significant loss of mission capability since the system consists of a
constellation of 18 - 24 satellites. Such redundant systems "fail gracefully"
as satellites are taken out of action. For military missions in space this has
been a major consideration since the development of the Soviet anti-satellite
system. Many military space systems such as GPS and AFSATCOM were
designed to continue functioning even after the loss of several satellites.
Another approach is to orbit additional sensors performing a given
mission on different satellites to provide a backup system in the event that a
primary mission satellite fails or collides with debris. An example of this
approach is the nuclear burst detection system that is mounted on the GPS
satellites. This use of redundant system removes most of the immediate
threat of space debris because even if a satellite is destroyed by debris then
the mission can still be accomplished.
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A study titled the "Assured Mission Support Space Architecture" was
performed by United States Space Command. 11 Although aimed at a
wartime scenario, the study explores ways to assure space-based mission
support to military units. Many of the considerations for robust mission
capabilities during wartime would mitigate the possible effects of space
debris.
However, the United States is reported to have several systems that do not
meet the criteria of robust space systems. In the 1980's it was reported that
the United States had a single optical surveillance system in orbit. This
single system put the surveillance capabilities of the United States at risk to
space debris. If the reconnaissance satellite was hit by debris, the results
would be nearly indistinguishable from an anti-satellite weapons attack
from a direct accent or an undetected Soviet ASAT weapon. If such an event
occurred during a time of heightened alert or tension between the US and
USSR, the resulting overreaction could prove disastrous.
It will not always be possible to deploy a robust system. The Space Station
Freedom and the Space Shuttle are examples of non-robust systems. They
do not fail gracefully, as shown by the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
that grounded the shuttle fleet for two and a half years. The reliance on a
single large space station is another example of a non-robust system. If for
some reason the Space Station were put out of commission, all its missions
would collapse.
Mitigating the effects of collisions by avoidance of debris will have only a
limited effect. Space Command can provide warning of a possible close
11 Unites States Space Command, Assured Mission Support Space Architecture, Peterson
Air Force Base, Colorado.
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approach with tracked debris to some high value systems. This only
provides collision warnings for about 10% of the dangerous debris.
Collision warnings from Space Command are not a practical solution for
most satellite systems because of the number of warnings per actual
collision is very high due to uncertainties in the orbit determination and
prediction for objects in space. On orbit warnings are not practical because
of the short warning time available for collision avoidance maneuvers. The
weight and cost of such a propulsion system would dominate the
spacecraft.
Passive protection using shields are heavy and expensive and provide
only a limited amount of protection. Shields designed to protect against
debris larger that a few centimeters are not practical. Robust space systems
provide protection of the mission against space debris by insuring system
operation despite the loss of a single satellite.
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8 LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPACE DEBRIS
There are two main bodies of law and regulations that can apply to space
debris: international treaties and domestic laws and regulations. Neither of
these as presently written or interpreted address directly the growing
problems associated with space debris. Regulatory agencies on both the
national and international level form a patchwork of organizations
covering various aspects of space activity. Treaties covering aspects of
debris are vague and open to interpretation. At present, national laws are
mostly silent on the problem of debris -- they merely require that activities
conform to all international treaties and national interests of the United
States.
8.1 International Treaties
The major international organization that has been involved with the
development of international space law is the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). This committee was
formed in 1958 to report on potential conflicts in international law and
policy. It identified three primary problems that the United Nations needed
to address: free access to outer space, liability for damages, and allocation
of the radio spectrum for objects in orbit.
By 1975, UNCOPUOS negotiated four international treaties associated
with space that form the backbone of international space law: the Outer
Space Treaty (1967), the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of
Astronauts (1968), the Convention on International Liability (1972), and the
Convention on Registration of Objects (1975). These treaties cover numerous
areas, including the peaceful use of space and the possible contamination of
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Earth from space-borne diseases. These four treaties form the basis for the
current international space law.
At the time these treaties were negotiated there were only two space-
faring nations, the US and the USSR. Since then the major conflicts have
been not between the US and USSR, but between these two nations and non-
space-faring nations.1 Agreement on these treaties was by consensus
when no country was opposed to a provision.
Since 1975, the committee has negotiated only one treaty. This fifth
treaty, the Treaty Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (1979) (otherwise known as the Moon Treaty), was negotiated and
signed, but it has been ratified by only seven nations. Neither the United
States, the Soviet Union, nor any other major space power, has ratified the
Moon Treaty.
Other areas of international legal concern with space activities have been
the demilitarization of space, solar power satellite systems, direct broadcast
satellites and the definition of outer space. The major conflicts are once
again between space-faring and non-space-faring nations.
The remaining part of this chapter discusses each of these five treaties
and their possible application to the problems of space debris.
8.1.1 The Outer Space Treaty
"The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies" or the "Outer Space Treaty" was ratified in October of 1967
1 Nathan Goldman, American Space Law, Ames Iowa: Iowa State University Press,
1988, p. 29
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and signed by almost 100 nations. It is the broadest of all treaties dealing
with outer space and is the one that comes closest to addressing the
problems of space debris. The Treaty has seventeen articles which address
issues such as the rights and duties of space-faring nations, military
activities in space, the status of astronauts, and environmental protection.
The first article outlines the general principles of use of outer space.
Article I
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the providence of all mankind.
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
free for the exploration and use by all States without discrimination
of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space.
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall
facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such
investigations.
It could be argued that the creation of space debris runs counter to the
language "for the benefit and in the interest of all countries". While it is
true space debris does not benefit countries, the primary mission of space
operations usually does. Space missions are performed to aid people on
Earth through providing communication, experiments, imaging, not to
pollute outer space. In any case the language is too vague to be applied to
specific problems with space debris.
194
Article I continues by making it clear that all nations can use and
explore space on the basis of equality without interference. Nations with
developing space programs may argue that they should be allowed to
produce the same amount of debris that the advanced space powers did as
they developed their space programs. Anything else, they would argue, is
discrimination against those who entered space at a later date and is not
allowed under Article I.
The last sentence of Article I further erodes its use as a basis for space
debris mitigation. "There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in
outer space" indicates that countries are allowed to undertake scientific
investigations without interference from others. Strict debris mitigation
practices could limit the experiments a country is allowed to conduct which
would limit the freedom of scientific investigation.
Article III of the treaty limits a nation's right to explore space to
activities that conform to international law and are in the interest of
international peace and security.
Article III
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace
and security and oromoting international cooneration and
understanding.
While it could be argued that creation of space debris does not help
maintain international peace and security, this is a weak argument and
could not be a basis for space debris mitigation regulations. The Treaty was
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concerned with payloads launched into orbit and not debris. It is difficult to
define the creation of a small amount of debris from a single launch as a
threat to international peace and security.
Article V covers the status of astronauts.
Article V (third sentence only)
States Party to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States
Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or
health of astronauts.
The first two sentences cover the duties of nations to aid astronauts in
distress. The last sentence of this article creates the duty to inform another
nation of any phenomena that could constitute a danger to life or health of
astronauts. Since collision with space debris could be considered an event
threatening the life of an astronaut, this could be used to require nations
with space surveillance equipment to warn other countries of potential
collisions between space objects, as the US already does for its manned
space flights. This could also require the United States and other countries
to provide information about the extent of the space debris problem to the
United Nations.
Article VI holds nations responsible for the actions of any of their
citizens or corporations in outer space.
Article VI
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space. including the moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by government
agencies or by non-governmental entities. and for assurine that
national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions
set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental
entities in outer space. including the Moon and other celestial bodies.
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shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an
international organization, responsibility for compliance with this
Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by
the State Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
This article makes the state the responsible party for monitoring the
activities of its citizens to ensure they comply with international law. This
provides clear authority to the governments to control the space activities of
its nationals in as far as international law can authorize governments to
take actions on a national level. This authority would aid the enforcement of
any space debris policies that were drawn from the treaty by holding the
nations accountable.
Article VII simply extends potential liability to countries buying space
systems or launches from other countries.
Article VII
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and on
the celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons
by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in the air space or
in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
This in effect widens the responsibilities and liabilities to include non-
space-faring nations who procure space systems from other countries. This
eliminates some potential problems of countries using a flag of convenience
country to avoid liability and potential debris mitigation programs.
Article VIII covers ownership of objects in space. It states explicitly that
ownership, jurisdiction and control over an object launched into space is
not effected by its presence in space.
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Article VIII
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such
object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space,
including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and the
their component parts, is not effected by their presence in outer space
or on a celestial body or by their return to Earth. Such objects or
component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that
State Party, which shall upon request, furnish identifying data prior
to their return.
This was really meant to prevent nations from acquiring other countries'
property, but it could be used to keep a nation from disassociating itself
from debris and the potential liability associated with it.
Article IX is designed to protect the environment and comes the closest to
addressing the problems of space debris. It deals with environmental
protection of earth, outer space and other celestial bodies.
Article IX
In the exploration and use of outer space. including the moon and
other celestial bodies. States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by
the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall
conduct all their activities in outer space. including the moon and
other celestial bodies. with due regard to the corresponding interests
of all other States Parties to the Treaty. State Parties to the Treaty
shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of
extraterrestrial matter, and where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty
has reason to believe that an activity or exoeriment planned by it or
its nationals in outer space. including the moon and other celestial
bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities
of other State Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
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space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding
with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by
another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request
consultation concerning the activity or experiment.
Article IX states that in the exploration and use of outer space, states
should be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and
that they should conduct their activities with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other nations. It goes on to say that nations
shall pursue studies of outer space and celestial bodies and conduct
explorations of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination, and where
necessary adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. This could be
construed as applying to space debris; however, the main concern at the
time of passage was the introduction of extraterrestrial diseases into the
Earth's environment. The secondary concern was to protect the Moon and
other planets from pollution that would negate future experiments.
There was significant discussion during the negotiation of the Treaty
regarding the extent and meaning of Article IX. Earlier proposals had
general terms relating to the protection of the space environment such as
the requirement not to allow measures that "might in any way hinder the
exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes by other
countries...." 2 The earlier proposed language was linked to a provision
allowing the exploration activities of outer space only after prior
2 Carl Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, Elmsford, New York:
Peramon Press Inc., 1982, p.137.
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discussions and agreement was reached between all parties concerned.
This language was dropped and does not appear in the final treaty which
indicates that a more narrow interpretation is appropriate.
Since this treaty is binding on the nations as they interpreted it at the
time of passage, it is important to look at statements made by the United
States at that time. The US Ambassador Arthur Goldberg stated that
Article IX "includes a specific obligation to avoid harmful contamination of
outer space or of celestial bodies and also to avoid adverse changes in the
terrestrial environment."3 It is unclear if his reference to contamination
would include debris. To date it has not created an obligation on the part of
the United States to mitigate the amount of debris that they produce. If this
section were re-interpreted to clearly apply to space debris, it would provide
an easy way to create an international obligation to control the increase of
space debris. This could then be used to allow US laws, which will be
discussed latter, to clearly apply to debris mitigation.
In the Outer Space Treaty there are no direct provisions for international
regulation to limit the development of space debris. While some articles
could possibly be interpreted to apply to space debris, (such as the ones
dealing with harmful contamination and interfering with other nations
rights to explore and use space), in fact they do not apply as presently
interpreted.
3 Christol, Carl, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, Elmsford, New York:
Peramon Press Inc., 1982, p.137.
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8.1.2 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts,
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
The Agreement of the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts,
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space does not deal directly
or indirectly with the problems of space debris. Its sole purpose is to ensure
aid to astronauts in distress and protect them from exploitation if they land
in a foreign country. The part dealing with the return of space objects was
included to ensure that spacecraft that landed in a foreign nation would be
returned to the original owner and not held by the country in which it
landed. This treaty is not applicable to space debris.
8.1.3 Convention on International Liahility for Damage Caused by Space
Objects
The second treaty that could apply to the problems associated with space
debris is the Convection on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects. This treaty clarifies who is liable for space activities. Two
forms of liability were created depending on where the damage due to a
space object occurs. Since the treaty was primarily concerned with the
damage done on the Earth from either an attempted launch or from
returning spacecraft, liability for damages to people or property on the
Earth or to aircraft caused by space activities is absolute. This means that a
country that causes damage to the assets of another country as a result of
its space activity is liable for this damage, regardless of fault or negligence.
The two articles that could apply to space debris are Article II and Article
III.
Article II
A Launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damages caused by its space objects on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight.
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Article II makes the launching nation absolutely liable for damage on
the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight caused by its space
activities. There is no fault required by the launching country for
compensation to be mandated. This was similar to other laws covering
"ultra-hazardous activities" where responsibility rests solely on the parties
carrying out such activities. Launching nations have the duty to protect
people and property on the Earth.
Article III sets out the law for damages done to space-based objects.
Article III
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of
the Earth to a space object of one Launching State or to persons or
property on board such a space object by a space object of another
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to
its fault or fault of the persons for whom it is responsible.
Here liability is not absolute but requires fault on the part of the country or
the operator.
It is questionable if a collision between an uncontrolled piece of debris
and an operational satellite could be considered the fault of the original
owner of the debris piece. One may be able to convince a court that
irresponsible acts such as the Westford Needles Experiment when
thousands of debris where placed in orbit might constitute fault, but to
convince someone that a collision of a satellite with a discarded object or
used rocket booster would constitute fault is definitely not assured.
Legitimate cases could be made for either side. For example, would a
collision between an uncontrolled expended booster and an active controlled
satellite be the fault of the launching nation of the booster or of the satellite?
The nation owning the satellite is the only nation that could have avoided
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the collision by maneuvering the satellite and therefore may be considered
liable.
One approach that has been advanced to solve this issue is to hold
nations absolutely liable for damage caused by all objects they place in
space. Under this scenario if two satellites collided, each nation would be
responsible for the replacement cost of the satellite of the other nation. This
would have serious negative effects on the development of outer space due to
the very large potential liability for any objects placed in space. The launch
of a single satellite could make a nation liable for billions of dollars if that
satellite collided with an expensive system such as the United States Space
Station or Space Shuttle. The United States would be liable for only the
replacement cost of the satellite lost. In the event that the satellite was non-
functioning this sum would be zero.
In any event before fault or negligence can be determined the country
that owned or produced the debris must be identified. As pointed out earlier
there is less than a one in ten chance of a collision occurring with a tracked
space object versus an untracked space object object. This makes the
possibility of identifying the country of origin a small probability event.
One possible method of assessing the liability of debris of unknown origin
may be to assess it in proportion to the amount of debris created by each
country4. In the State of California there is legal precedent for this type of
action in the Sindell vs Abbott Laboratories Case. In this case, product
liability was assigned according to market share to the major producers of
4 Glenn Reynolds and Robert Merges, Outer Space. Problems of Law and Policy,
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989, p. 177.
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a drug that caused birth defects. This however is a state precedent and to
date does not apply to federal cases. To apply this reasoning to space debris
on an international basis would require significant re-interpretation of the
treaty and international law. The Sindell vs Abbott case would provide a
basis for someone who has lost a satellite to debris to sue the United States
and the Soviet Union since they are the major producers of debris.
However, there is no court that has sufficient jurisdiction over the United
States and the Soviet Union to preside over such a case. The possibility of a
case at least trying to use this argument in US courts is high given the
potential multimillion dollar payoff of damages for a replacement satellite.
The United States and the USSR would oppose any change in the
interpretation of this section because if they did agree to a more strict
liability for debris, they would be primarily responsible for any damages
caused by debris already in orbit. The potential liability to the US and USSR
under this type of scenario is very large when future spacecraft fail due to
space debris impacts.
Another serious question about the application of this treaty to the space
debris problem is the fact that it refers to damage done by a space object.
The term space object is not adequately defined. Article 1(d) states "the term
'space object' includes component parts of a space object as well as its
launch vehicle and parts thereof." Questions as to whether space debris
constitutes space objects were never addressed during negotiation of the
treaty. 5 During the negotiations several countries suggested that an
appropriate definition of a space object would include "articles on board the
5 Howard A. Baker, "Liability for Damage Caused in Outer Space by Space Refuse,"
Annals of Air And Space Law. Vol. XIII, 1988, p. 206.
space object and articles detached, thrown or launched, whether
intentional or unintentional." 6 The final agreement does not reflect this
language and reflects a more narrow interpretation. 7 Because of the lack of
specificity, it is unclear as to what types of debris can be considered space
objects and are subject to the liabilities outlined in the treaty.
Many of these details are usually determined through application of the
law and its clarification through case law. To date the treaty has only been
invoked once for damages caused by the re-entry of parts from a Soviet
nuclear powered satellite.
As it stands this treaty does not provide an adequate means of controlling
the production of space debris nor the liability of damage caused by debris in
orbit. Many approaches have been proposed to solve problems with liability
caused by debris, but they have not been accepted by the international
community and therefore are not enforceable.
&1.4 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
The third treaty which may address the legal aspects of space debris is
the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. This
convention mandates that all countries keep accurate records of what they
places into orbit so that liability can be assessed if some harm occurs as a
result. Unfortunately this is only required at the time of launch and the
records are not required to be updated if the satellite breaks into numerous
pieces. There has been no requirement for nations to list absolutely every
6 Howard A. Baker, "Liability for Damage Caused in Outer Space by Space Refuse,"
Annals of Air And Space Law. Vol. XIII, 1988, p. 206.
7 Op cit 6.
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item that it places in space. Operational debris and other small objects that
are too small to detect are not reported. Even so the United States attempts
to keep track of all objects larger than 10 centimeters, including data on the
country of origin.
The pertinent parts of the treaty that could apply to space debris are
reproduced below.
Article II
1) When a space object is launched into Earth orbit or beyond, the
launching state shall register the space object by means of an entry
in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each launching
state shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
establishment of such a registry.
Article III
1) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall maintain a
Registry in which the information furnished in accordance with
Article IV shall be recorded.
2) There shall be full and open access to the information in this
register.
Article IV
Each State of registry shall furnish to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, as soon as practical, the following information
concerning each space object on its registry:
(a) Name of the launching State or States;
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its
registration number;
(c) Date and territory or location of launch;
(d) Basic orbital parameters, including:
(i) Nodal Period
(ii) Inclination,
(iii) Apogee,
(iv) Perigee
(e) General purpose of the space object.
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Article VI
Where the application of the provisions of this Convention has not
enabled a State Party to identify a space object which has caused
damage to it or to any of its natural or judicial persons, or which may
be hazardous or deleterious nature, other State Parties, including in
particular States possessing space monitoring and tracking
facilities, shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request by
a state party, or transmitted though the Secretary-General on its
behalf, for assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions in
the identification of the object. A State Party making such a request
shall, to the greatest extent feasible, submit information as to the
time, nature and circumstances of the events giving rise to the
request. Arrangement under which such assistance shall be
rendered shall be subject to agreement between the two parties
concerned.
While the idea of registration makes sense for large spacecraft, it does
not work practically with small debris. Satellites and large debris objects
are routinely tracked by the United States and the USSR and all objects in
the US catalog are matched to their launching states. Therefore it is
relatively easy to determine a particular cataloged spacecraft's origin, but if
the object can not be matched to an originating state it is not included in the
catalog.
Cataloging debris is not an easy task. When a booster explodes it can
create hundreds of trackable debris and thousands of objects which can not
be tracked. Even though these smaller objects can cause significant
damage to spacecraft, since they are not trackable it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to trace them back to a particular event or to the country of
origin. This severely limits an injured party's ability to collect damages
from another country.
Also the indications that a satellite has collided with debris may not be
apparent. The first symptoms of a collision would be the failure of some or
all of the spacecraft systems. Such failures would be hard to distinguish
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from failures due to other problems. In addition it would be extremely
difficult to determine the orbital parameters of the piece of debris that
caused the damage, the minimum information required to allow one to
trace the object back to a particular owner.
Article IV provides a basis for a country that has suffered damage to
request help from countries, such as the United States or the Soviet Union
who have space tracking equipment, to identify space objects that can not be
identified otherwise. While this part of the treaty was really meant to
provide assistance in determining what country is responsible for damage
on the surface of the Earth, it can be applied to the problems associated with
space debris. Again this will be of limited use because less than one tenth of
the dangerous objects in orbit are tracked.
8.1.5 The Moon Treaty
The Treaty Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (The Moon Treaty) was agreed to in 1979. This treaty
represents many of the problems that have developed in the years since the
early 1970s with achieving consensus on space policies. Pressure from the
UN General Assembly to come to an agreement resulted in eventual
agreement on the treaty, but the nations then failed to ratify and enact the
treaty. To date only seven nations have ratified the treaty, none of which are
space-faring nations. The United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty in
1980 and has not discussed the treaty since.8 For practical purposes, this
treaty does not constitute a legitimate part of international space law. At
8 Nathan Goldman, American Space Law, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press,
1988, p. 91
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any rate the Moon Treaty does not address space debris directly or
indirectly.
8.2 Other International Organizations
In addition to UNCOPOUS, there is one other international organization
that has authority over aspects of space that may apply to the problems of
space debris -- the International Telecommunications Union. One of the
oldest international organizations, the International Telecommunications
Union has authority over the radio frequencies used by satellites and the
geosynchronous positions assigned to various countries. Its current
authority comes from the 1982 International Telecommunications
Convention. The ITU organizes administrative conferences either on a
global or regional basis to assign radio frequencies and geosynchronous
orbit slots. The regulations adopted at these administrative conferences are
annexed to the International Telecommunications Convention and have the
force of treaties at the international level.9 The ITU is designed to maintain
and extend the international cooperation to improve the use of
telecommunications.
The major activities of the Union are to effect allocation of the radio
spectrum, coordinate efforts to reduce interference, foster international
cooperation, coordinate space telecommunications, and promote safety
through communications. The last broadly defined activity of the ITU is to
"undertake studies, make regulations, adopt resolutions, formulate
recommendations and opinions, and collect and publish information
9 United Nations, Space Activities of the United Nations and International
Organizations. New York: United Nations, 1986, p. 75.
concerning telecommunication matters."10 This could be interpreted as
giving ITU a limited role on space debris since space debris is a general
threat to the satellite telecommunications industry. However this is a very
broad statement and could not be used to enforce space debris mitigation
regulations.
To date the ITU has not directly addressed the issues of space debris or
the removal of satellites from the geosynchronous ring at the end of their
useful lives. This however could be a proper forum to discuss the subject at
least as it applies to the geosynchronous ring.
8.3 Domestic Space Law
In the United States there is no judicial or regulatory authority on space
issues. This results in the existence of a number of different organizations
that have partial regulatory powers over space and space-based resources.
The main agencies involved in the regulation of space include: NASA, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Federal
Communications Commission. Other organizations that could become
involved in the space debris issue are the International Trade Commissions
and the Environmental Protection Agency.
10 United Nations, Space Activities of the United Nations and International
Organizations. New York: United Nations, 1986, p. 75.
210
8.3.1 NASA and DOD
The main role of NASA and the Department of Defense in space debris
mitigation is to regulate their own activities. Other organizations such as
the Department of Transportation and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration do not have regulatory authority over NASA
or the Department of Defense. In the United States most commercial
launch operations are conducted either by NASA or the Department of
Defense from their launch sites and require significant support from both
organizations. If these organizations refused to support launch activities of
missions that would create an unacceptable amount of debris, they could do
SO.
NASA and Department of Defense both have the authority to require
debris mitigation practices on any satellite or launch vehicle that they
purchase. This can be done though requirements specified during the
proposal or contract negotiations stage. Debris mitigation within the
Department of Defense and NASA is a matter of policy and not a matter of
law or regulations.
8.3.2 Department of Transportation
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 authorized the creation of the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation and gave it broad authority to
license all commercial space launches from the United States or by any US
citizen or company from within the United States. Section 6 of the
Commercial Space Launch Act clearly states that any launch from the US
or by any US person or organization from anywhere except in a foreign
country is controlled by this Act and requires a license to launch or operate.
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Commercial Space Launch Act
Section 6 (a)(1) No person shall launch a launch vehicle or operate a
launch site within the United States, unless authorized by a license
or transfered under this Act.
Sec 6 (a)(2) No United States citizen...shall launch a launch vehicle
or operate a launch site outside the United States, unless authorized
by a license issued or transfered under this Act.
Sec 6 (a)(3) No United States Citizen...shall launch a launch vehicle
or operate a launch site at any place which is outside the United
States and outside the territory of any foreign nation, unless
authorized by a license issued or transferred under this Act. The
preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to a launch or
operation of a launch site if there is an agreement in force between
the United States and the foreign nation which provides that such
foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over such launch or
operation.
Sec 6 (b)(i) .... this Act shall not apply to the launch of a launch
vehicle or the operation of a launch site in the territory of a foreign
nation by a United States citizen...
Section 6 also gives the Department of Transportation authority to stop a
launch because of its payload even after a license has been issued.
Sec 6 (b)(1) The holder of the launch license under this Act shall not
launch a payload unless that payload complies with all requirements
of the Federal law that relates to the launch of of a payload.
Sec 6 (b)(2) If no payload license, authorization, or permit is required
by any Federal law, the secretary may take action under this Act as
the Secretary deems necessary to prevent the launch of a payload by
the holder of a launch license under this Act if the Secretary
determines that the launch of such a payload would jeopardize the
public health and safety, safety of property, or the national security
interest or foreign policy interest of the United States.
Section 6, paragraph B, sentence 2 clearly states that launches can be
halted for the safety of property. This could be interpreted to include the
property potentially damaged by a large amount of space debris. Any
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actions of this type are subject to judicial review as outlined in Section 12,
paragraph b.
Sec 12 (b) Any final action of the secretary under this Act to issue,
transfer, deny the issuance or transfer of, suspend, revoke, or modify
or to terminate, prohibit, or suspend any launch or operation of a
launch site shall be subject to judicial review provided in chapter 7 of
title 5, United States Code.
A major limitation in the power of this act for space debris mitigation
purposes exists in section 21, paragraph C which states that the act does
not apply to space launches or operations carried out by the United States
for the United States, which include all NASA, Department of Defense,
NOAA, and intelligence organizations' satellites. These excluded launches
are the vast majority of space launches by the United States.
Sec 21 (c) Nothing in this Act shall apply to -
(1) Any-
(A) launch or operation of a launch vehicle,
(B) operation of a launch site, or
(C) other space activity, carried out by the United States
on behalf of the United States...
Associated regulations were promulgated and published in the Federal
Register on February 26, 1986. The regulations require a safety review and a
mission review prior to issuing a license. The safety review focuses on the
applicant's safety operations, including launch site, procedures, personnel,
and equipment. The mission review is the procedure that identifies issues
affecting the national interests and international obligations that are
associated with a space launch. Section 415.25 of the regulation lists the
required information for a mission review. Section 415.25 (b) specifically
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lists debris issues as part of the requirement for passing the mission
review.
415.25 (b) The applicant must submit a flight plan and staging data
sufficient for evaluating such factors as the potential for land
overflight, impact of spent stages, and debris issues.
Another part of the mission review is the payload determination which is
made by the Director. This is required when the payload is not licensed,
authorized or issued a permit required by another Federal agency to be
launched.
415.27 Payload Determinations.
The Director must determine whether to prevent the launch of a
payload for which no license, authorization or permit is required by
Federal law because to launch such a payload would jeopardize
public health and safety, the safety of property, or the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
These regulations provide the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation with relatively broad powers to regulate what industry
places in orbit. However any ruling must be justifiable in court in the event
of an appeal of the determination. Without a clearly stated policy or strong
evidence of the seriousness of the orbital debris problem, it will be difficult to
convince a judge that a few additional objects in orbit will cause significant
increase in the risk to property or national security and would justify
halting a multimillion dollar space program that a commercial venture
has proposed. This would be especially hard if the United States were not
enforcing debris reduction policies on its own Department of Defense or
NASA satellites.
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The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 allows for a mechanism to
regulate debris-producing commercial launches through the review
process that it has established prior to licensing. Yet its power to refuse to
grant a license because of the generation of a small amount of debris is
questionable because no formal policies or standards for space launch have
been adopted. Any determination against a launch company would be
subject to judicial review. Because of the lack of set guidelines and because
of the actions of other federal agencies, any such refusal would in all
probability be found arbitrary and could be overturned by the courts.
8.3.3 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Under the Land Remote-sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for
licensing all remote sensing satellites prior to launch. The Act states in the
section findings that "certain government oversight must be maintained to
assure that private sector activities are in the national interest and that the
international commitments and policies of the United States are
honored."11 This authorizes NOAA to refuse licenses to remote-sensing
systems that are "not in the national interest". It could be argued that
debris-producing satellites are not in the national interest. However, it
would be difficult to justify not launching a new satellite because of a small
amount of additional debris when considering the benefits achieved by
advanced remote sensing satellites. NOAA would have to start denying
potential debris producing satellites as a matter of policy before additional
11 Land Remote-sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 Section 101 (14).
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satellites are designed and built that would conform to a policy of debris
minimization. To date NOAA has not done so.
In July 1987, NOAA promulgated regulations titled Licensing of Private
Remote-sensing Space Systems. These regulations are designed to promote
the development of commercial remote sensing space systems while
preserving the national security interests and meeting the international
treaty obligations of the United States. One part of the information required
by the application procedure is the proposed method of disposition of any
remote sensing satellites owned or operated by the applicant. This could be
expanded to include any debris created during its launch or operations.
The Remote Sensing Act and its associated regulations allows the
Secretary of Defense to undertake a national security review and the
Secretary of State to undertake an international obligation review prior to
licensing. In addition, the regulations allow for any other agency to object to
the license if it finds that the application does not comply with any law or
regulation in its area. The national defense review is meant to screen the
missions to make sure that they do not provide information to an adversary
about the US or its allies that could be harmful to national security. Nothing
is said about space debris dangers. The review for international obligations
as shown earlier does not impose any strict debris mitigation practices. As
a consequence the Remote-sensing Act and its associated regulations do not
provide an adequate means of controlling debris. Once again it only applies
to a small percentage of the space launches and does not apply to United
States government missions that make up a vast majority of the US remote
sensing missions.
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8.3.4 Federal Communications Commission
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for the
licensing and regulation of commercial communication satellites as
outlined in the Communications Act of 1934 as amended. 12 The Federal
Communications Commission is responsible for the assignment of radio
communication frequencies and it controls US slots in geosynchronous
orbit. Satellites fall under the FCC regulations because they are the
modem-day radio stations that the FCC was designated to regulate.
The commission has the authority to establish the rules of and condition
for licensing a new communication satellite. It also has the authority to
designate where a satellite in geosynchronous orbit may reside and has the
authority to direct the satellite to be moved with a 30-day notice. 13 This
authority derives mainly from considerations of the electrical interference
the FCC is designed to regulate and could not legitimately be used to
authorize debris reduction regulations.
Any basis the FCC may have to regulate the creation of debris or
disposition of old satellites is based on the possibility that these objects may
interfere or collide with other operational satellites that the Commission is
assigned to regulate and secure. 14 Since the deployment of a single
communications satellite creates a small amount of debris, the possibility of
12 Pamela Meredith, "Legal Implications of Orbital Debris Mitigation Practices: A
Survey of Options and Approaches," American University Journal of International Law
and Policy, vol 6, Winter '91, p. 205.
13 Op cit 12.
14 Op cit 12.
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one of these objects colliding with an FCC-regulated satellite is very small.
Therefore such an eventuality could not be used to justify a broad-based
debris mitigation policy on the part of the FCC without significant re-
interpretation and expansion of the law. Additionally the FCC would only
be authorized to monitor and license US communications satellites which
constitute only a small part of the overall number of satellites launched
each year. With changes in the Communications Act and FCC
regulations, the FCC could effectively regulate debris created by aggressive
(and potentially large space debris producing) ideas such as the Iridium
mobile communications program 15 and other satellite communications
programs. However the prospects for change in the laws governing the
FCC are small. Efforts to update the half-century old Communications Act
to reflect the current situation in the telecommunications industry have
been stalled in Congress since 1980.
8.3.5 Other Domestic Organizations
8.3.5.1 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) gives the EPA
authority to act when activities effect the domestic airspace. Activities such
as launches that pollute the air or possible back contamination of the Earth
from space would fall under the EPA's mandate. It is unclear or doubtful
whether EPA's authority continues into space, and could address the issue
of space debris.
15 Iridium Mobile Communications program is a constellation of 77 satellites designed
to provide world-wide cellular telephone communications. It has been proposed by the
Motorola Corporation. "Iridium-like Constellations Abound," Orbital Debris Monitor, 1
July 1991, p. 11.
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8.3.5.2 International Trade Commission (ITC)
The ITC has no direct authority on space debris. However, if the United
States were to impose high cost debris mitigation requirements on domestic
satellites and launch services, the ITC could be asked to intervene if other
countries did not institute such policies and stole significant market share
from the US companies. But the effectiveness of this type of intervention is
questionable because a large number of launch services are procured by
foreign countries. The US could impose restrictions on sales of US made
satellites to nations refusing to institute debris mitigation practices.
However this could result in other countries receiving contracts to make the
satellites.
8.6 State Law
States can regulate activities within their borders provided the regulation
does not counteract national laws. Florida has also used its state laws to
halt some space activities. One example is the case of the Celestis Group
that wanted to launch the remains of 10,000 people into earth orbit for a
cosmic burial. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation had already
issued the group a launch permit. The State of Florida used a law requiring
that a cemetery have 15 acres and access to a paved road to halt the
development of the operation.16 I do not believe this case was the true
purpose of the law, and I do not think it will apply in other potential space
debris cases.
16 Nathan Goldman, American Space Law, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press,
1988, p. 123.
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&4 Contract Law
There are avenues open in private law to enforce debris mitigation
practices. For instance, the space insurance industry assumes the risk of
losses due to space debris. If the insurance industry wanted to insist as part
of insuring a satellite that it conforms to a debris mitigation program, it
could do so. However, the space insurance industry is not that farsighted.
One of the concerns of the industry is to exercise influence only over the
sector of space activities that it insures. Government space launches would
not be covered under any insurance mandated restrictions. Also, the cost of
space insurance is presently very high, and placing additional restrictions
may force other companies to self-insure as Intelsat has in the past.
8.5 Conclusion
Existing international and domestic laws do not adequately address the
problems of space debris. Treaties are vague when describing duties to
protect the space environment. Domestic regulations are designed to foster
commercialization of space and not to address the problems of space debris.
The patchwork responsibilities of agencies both nationally and
internationally make any interpretations of existing laws and treaties apply
to only a section of the space industry. In general the existing laws are
inadequate to regulate and control the problems associated with space
debris.
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9. POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
There have been several ideas of how to reduce the space debris problem.
Any attempted solution will require an understanding of the problem and a
consensus of what to do about it. This chapter will look at the possibilities of:
active debris removal from orbit; improvements in the Space Surveillance
System; effects of anti-satellites weapons on the Space Surveillance
Systems; debris mitigation practices; and the domestic and international
policy aspects of the debris problem.
9.1 Active Debris Removal Options
A possible solution to the space debris problem is to collect the debris
though some means and return it to Earth. Many such removal options
have been suggested, however this is not a viable alternative at this time or
in the near future. The debris is scattered in a vast number of different
orbits. Any system intended to collect these objects would have to carry a
very large amount of fuel to accomplish the changes in velocity required to
intercept the debris.
One such concept that has been advanced calls for the Space Shuttle or
some type of Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle to chase down and collect debris.
This, while noble in conception, is also not practical for debris in low-Earth
orbit. The changes in velocity required to match the velocities of a variety of
orbiting objects are so large that they are not within the realm of current or
future engineering programs or funding projections. The cost of a highly
maneuverable system would far outweigh the replacement cost of any
satellite that may be saved by the removal of the debris by the system. The
cost of such a system is not justified by the slight reduction in the threat of
orbital debris at low altitude that would be accomplished.
Active removal mechanisms for the geosynchronous orbit are more
feasible. Active debris removal may be possible in this case by the use of a
system similar to the recently cancelled Orbital Maneuver Vehicle (OMV).
The geosynchronous orbit is unique since the relative velocities between
objects on it is small. One such OMV could collect a number of satellites
and move them to a higher altitude with a relatively small amount of fuel.
This could be used to remove inactive satellites or rocket boosters from the
geosynchronous ring if they could not be removed by other methods. This
would be practical only with large objects having relatively well-known
orbital parameters. A higher number of smaller objects, such as those
generated by a satellite fragmentation, will be spread over a large area and
the time and fuel required to collect hundreds of objects will be impractical.
This indicates that remedial action would have to occur before any satellite
breakup.
Debris sweepers have been proposed, and a few have even been
patented. Concepts such as large balloons filled with foam that sweep out
unwanted debris, large paddle wheels with absorbing material that collect
debris as they travel, or large conducting tethers to attach to debris and
sling it back towards Earth have all been advanced. These ideas, while
intriguing, are not practical or even possible at the present time. The size of
the object that would be required to collect a significant amount of debris to
make a difference in the debris population is on the order of 30 kilometers in
diameter. Even if such a satellite were possible, the chance of having an
operational satellite hit this object would be greater than that of the
operational satellite hitting the debris that the absorbing body is intended to
collect. To conclude, removal of debris from low Earth orbit appears both
impractical and not cost-effective at least in the foreseeable future.
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9.2 Improving the Performance of the Space Surveillance Network for
Debris Avoidance
Another way to decrease the possibility of orbital collisions is to improve
the performance of the Space Surveillance network that would allow it to
provide accurate warning of collisions. For a comprehensive collision
avoidance system based on the Satellite Catalog to be effective, the catalog
must include the vast majority of the dangerous objects in orbit. Anything
else would involve incalculable risk if it generated a false sense of security
in near-Earth space.
A quick method to evaluate the performance of the Space Surveillance
Network is to look at the Satellite Catalog as a function of time. By
comparing the time of known break-ups with the appearance of related
objects in the Satellite Catalog, it is possible to gain a sense for the time
required to find different-size objects. Figure 9.1 shows the number of
objects cataloged as a function of time since the 1961 Omicron breakup
discussed earlier. The large increase at the beginning of the graph reflect
the fact that most large objects were quickly identified. The gradual rise
over time reflects the improved performance of sensors. But the latest
increase after 1986 is due to improvements in tracking technology, changes
in operations, and to the orbital decay of the objects. 1 Objects from the
Omicron breakup are still being identified 30 years later. The objects
currently being identified are on the order of 10 centimeters in diameter.
Cataloging smaller debris is not currently attempted due to inherent
1 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1990.
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limitations of the radars and bureaucratic aspects of the Satellite Catalog.
Breakups today are cataloged much more quickly than they were in the
past, but further improvements in sensor technology will undoubtedly show
a continued increase in the number of cataloged objects from the Omicron
breakup.
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Figure 9.1
Cataloged Transit 4A Debris Over Time2
As shown in Chapter 5 the Space Surveillance System is limited in its
detection ability by its radar and optical sensors; however, the system's
detection capability is not the only limit on object size included in the
Satellite Catalog. Certain bureaucratic problems further limit the
cataloging of debris for inclusion in the Satellite Catalog.
2 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem--Background Paper. OTA-BP-ISC-72. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
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Government Printing Office, September 1990, p. 22.
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9.2.1 Bureaucratic Aspects of the Satellite Catalog
Not every object that is capable of being detected or is even detected by the
Space Surveillance Network is included in the Satellite Catalog. For an
object to be included in the Satellite Catalog, it has to pass certain
"operational" criteria. These criteria include the ability to be easily tracked
by the Space Surveillance Network, to have a relatively long life in orbit, and
to be identifiable with a known launch from a specific country. 3 Objects that
do not fulfill these three criteria are not included in the catalog. In April
1990 there were 354 objects in orbit that did not meet these criteria but were
included in the analyst's catalog (the official Satellite Catalog plus objects
that are tracked but not included in the Satellite Catalog).4 The problems in
identifying a large number of uncorrelated objects are due to limits of
manpower and computer resources. In order to evaluate these problems it
is essential to look at the method used to process detections.
9.2.1.1 Processing Detections
The manner in which the Space Surveillance Center processes the
information is as important a factor in the detection and tracking of small
space objects as the detection capabilities of the tracking equipment of the
Space Surveillance Network. When an observation is made by a sensor and
sent to the Space Surveillance Center, it is first correlated with the known
objects in the catalog. If it does not correlate with any object in it, it is placed
3 Stephen H. Knowles, "Orbital Elements Determination for Breakups and Debris,"
AIAA 90-1348 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
4 Op cit 3.
in a separate data file. As a measure of the volume of these uncorrelated
observations, in two weeks (1 -14 August 1989), US Space Command made
1495 uncorrelated observations of space objects. 5 Human operators then try
to determine what objects are multiple detections of the same object. If they
can identify what seems to be the same object, they can form an initial orbit
determination, which is required to direct other sensors to make additional
measurements and thus achieve a final orbit determination which is
required for inclusion in the Satellite Catalog.
This slow and manpower-intensive process constitutes a log-jam in the
complicated system of space debris tracking. If too many uncorrelated
detections are reported, then trying to match multiple observations with a
single object becomes too difficult. When this occurs the database of
uncorrelated targets is typically deleted and the process is started over with
only new observations. 6 According to Space Command officials this is a
recognized problem, but few are willing to devote the required resources to
solve it. It is estimated that at any one time 50 additional space objects could
be cataloged. 7 Figure 9.2 shows differences in the calculated flux per
square meter of tracked objects included in the official Satellite Catalog and
the Analyst Set. These are derived from the normal Space Command
Satellite Catalog and from an analyst's data which includes additional
objects that do not meet all the criteria for the official Satellite Catalog.
5 Personal notes from Space Debris Meeting at AFSPACECOM, 2 February 1991.
6 Told in private conversation with space command officials, 28 May 1991.
7 Personal interview with John Clark, Air Force Space Command, 28 May 1991.
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Figure 9.2
Comparison of Flux Arising from the Population of the Analyst Set
and the Satellite Catalog Compared to the Satellite Catalog Alone 8
8 Donald J. Kessler, "Orbital Debris Environment for Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,"
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, May - June 1991, p. 347.
9.2.12 Observation Time Required for Uncorrelated Objects
In order to determine the orbit of an uncorrelated object in a single
observation, a reasonable amount of the orbit must be observed. This
reduces the errors due to range and Doppler uncertainties caused by the
passage of radars waves through the ionosphere. Space Command's rule of
thumb is that 5.5% of the orbit must be observed to get a reasonable orbit
determination. During such an observation the mechanically steered
radars and the optical sensor are not able to pursue other missions. Phased
array radars can simultaneously track these objects and accomplish their
other missions by dedicating only a small portion of the available radar
power to tracking the object.
This initial orbit determination is adequate to permit re-acquisition of an
object over the next several orbits. After several orbits, the position errors
from the initial orbit determination become too large and the object is too far
from the predicted position for sensors to re-acquire them using the orbit
prediction. Additional observations from other sensors provide information
at other parts of the orbit, allowing error analysis programs to determine
more accurately the orbital element sets prior to including the object in the
Satellite Catalog. 9 Table 9.1 shows the approximate track length as a
function of orbital period required to build a preliminary orbit from a single
observation.
9 Major P. Jackson, "Space Surveillance Satellite Catalog Maintenance," Article
AIAA 90-1339 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
Minimum
Altitude Object Period Duration of Observation
(Kilometers) (Minutes) (Minutes)
300 90 5
500 95 5.2
1,000 105 5.8
5,000 200 11
10,000 347 19
20,000 710 39
Table 9.1
Minimum Duration Observation Required for Initial
Orbit Determination as a Function of Orbital Period 10
9.2.1.3 Effects of a Large Number of Uncorrelated Targets
Due to this limited ability to handle large numbers of uncorrelated
targets, another practice occurs that runs counter to the requirement of
identifying and tracking all space objects. According to Space Command
officials, the detection threshold on several of the radar systems in the
Space Surveillance Network is purposely degraded to avoid detecting objects
that cannot be identified. 11 The sensitivity of the receiver systems is
purposely turned down. This allows operators to report only returns from
the larger space objects, totally ignoring returns from smaller objects. This
is done in an attempt to limit the number of uncorrelated returns which
10 Major P. Jackson, "Space Surveillance Satellite Catalog Maintenance," Article
AIAA 90-1339 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
11 Personal interview with John Clark, Air Force Space Command, 28 May 1991.
would otherwise overload the cataloging process. This is such a systematic
practice that in the case of one of the main space surveillance systems, the
FPS-85 radar at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the transmitted power is
purposely reduced because the radar does not have adequate gain
adjustments on the receiver end to limit the number of small objects
detected.12
If a systematic approach were used to catalog these marginal objects, the
number of uncorrelated returns could be reduced. According to Space
Command officials, a program has begun there to develop a graphic
representation of these uncorrelated objects that hopefully will reduce the
time required for correlation and orbit determination. However, this
program is more than a few years away from being operationally capable.
Even that, however, will not end the problem: there is a non-technical issue
that also needs to be addressed.
9.2.1.4 Method of Evaluation of Space Surveillance System
There is another reason why Space Command is reluctant to catalog
small objects. The problem can be traced in part to the manner in which
officers inside Space Command are rated and how the performance of their
organizations is measured. The number of lost objects is presented to the
commander of Air Force Space Command as a gauge of how well the Space
Surveillance Network is functioning. The units responsible for maintaining
current orbital parameters on objects in the catalog are down-rated and
judged poorly in proportion to how many objects they "lose" in a particular
12 Personal interview with John Clark, Air Force Space Command, 28 May 1991.
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week. To lose an object means that expected observations of that object have
not occurred in over 48 hours. This routinely occurs during periods of high
geomagnetic activity and solar storms, when atmospheric drag
significantly alters the object's expected course. During a severe storm in
1988, Space Command "lost" 1500 objects in orbit. Although many of the
weaknesses of the system have been identified and fixed, the memory of that
period has commanders concerned about the numbers of unaccounted
objects. 13
Since smaller objects are harder to detect, and therefore easier to lose,
Space Command is very reluctant to include these objects in their official
catalog. This results in even more uncataloged objects. This explains why
at any one time there are at least 50 objects that have been detected that
could be cataloged, but to date have not been. A group inside Space
Command is trying to start an additional type of catalog to keep track of
these smaller objects, but they are having a difficult time convincing
superiors that it should be done in this period of limited personnel and
declining defense resources.
9.2.1.5 Priority of Space Debris Measurements
Priority of requirements is an important factor in the allocation of radars
and optical sites to various tasks. Since small debris is more difficult to
detect, they require longer observation times. But at the present time since
debris measurements are a very low priority mission compared to other
Space Command tasks, the amount of radar and sensor time required to
13 Personnel interview with John Clark, Air Force Space Command, 28 May 1991.
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keep accurate orbital parameters of debris is not allocated to this task.
Since Space Command does not have atmospheric models that can
accurately account for increased drag caused by geomagnetic or solar
storms, they allocate additional observation time for higher priority
satellites when such storms occur. During such periods space debris
measurements and tracking take a secondary role. By the time space
surveillance operations return to the normal level of activity and the
sensors are again able to dedicate time to tracking the smaller debris, some
of these may be so far from their predicted orbits that they can not be found
by sensors searching areas near their earlier orbits. These objects would
then be lost and would need to be re-acquired through the same method as
an uncorrelated object.
These problems are compounded by the fact that the observation time of
operational sensors such as the GEODSS sites is being reduced due to the
overall Department of Defense budget cuts and reduction in force
requirements being mandated by the Defense Management Review. It is no
wonder that the commanders are reluctant to expand their catalog and
consequently responsibilities.
9.2.2 Upgrades in Computer Capability
Correlating observations of uncataloged objects with any of the tracked
objects and continually updating orbital parameters of 7000 objects is an
intensive computational process. The current Space Command computer
systems process up to 40,000 observations each day. The expected upgrades
of these systems will not provide significant additional support for catalog
maintenance, but later upgrades are expected to increase the capability to
approximately 150,000 observations each day, nearly 4 times the present
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capability.14 But considering the estimated number of small objects in orbit
as seen by GEODSS and other optical means, this upgrade in computational
capability may still be inadequate to catalog every object that pose a threat to
satellites. Increasing the capability of the computer system by a factor of 4
will still not allow the cataloging of dangerous debris larger than 1 cm
which is estimated to be a factor of ten larger than the cataloged population.
9.2.3 Limits in Communication Paths
In addition to the limits on computer resources, there is another limiting
factor that will preclude significant increases of the size of the Satellite
Catalog to include smaller debris. The communication links between the
Space Surveillance Center and its remote sensors are usually operating
near their capacity. Doubling the size of the catalog will require data
transmission rates that may overload the communications links. This
could occur during times of increased loads, during solar storms for
example when activity is at its peak. Space Command believes it can double
the size of the catalog without major upgrades to their communications
systems, but any increases beyond that would require a large investment in
communication links and computer systems to handle the increased
load. 15
14 Major P. Jackson, "Space Surveillance Satellite Catalog Maintenance," Article
AIAA 90-1339 from the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues &
Future Directions, 16-19 April 1990, Baltimore, Maryland.
15 Op cit 14.
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9.2.4 Conclusion on Satellite Catalog and Debris Measurements
What would alleviate the danger presented by space debris is a firm
commitment from Space Command to track all detectable objects in orbit
and dedicate the resources and funds necessary to accomplish this
mission. It also must look at the manner in which it evaluates the
performance of the various tracking facilities. If commanders are going to
be judged on the number of objects lost, they will continue to refuse to add
ever smaller objects to their responsibilities. However, if they were
evaluated on the basis of how many new objects they found and cataloged or
on how many objects they did observe, a mechanism of encouraging a more
complete cataloging of space objects would be established. A result of these
organizational difficulties is that the Space Command Catalog fails to
include between 8-35% of the detectable objects in orbit as established by
results of specialized tests with the PARCS radar system that could detect
objects only as small as 8 cm.16 Further, optical systems such as GEODSS
and some specialized systems that can track objects with sizes of the order
of 1 cm in low-Earth orbit, have detected 8 times as many objects as
included in the official catalog. 1 7
Because of the difficulties and the limitations of the Space Command
Satellite Catalog, combined with the limitations associated with detection
capabilities and orbital prediction routines described in Chapter 5, the
Space Surveillance System does not provide an adequate method for
16 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space Missions from Current and
Future Debris. December 1987.
17 Op cit 16.
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collision avoidance. Sole reliance on the existing system to provide adequate
collision warning to critical space systems is inviting disaster.
9.3 Studies on Anti-Satellite Weapons Effects on the Space Surveillance
System
Two studies have been completed which examined the effects of anti-
satellite weapons engagement on the Space Surveillance System. One
study, done by MIT's Lincoln Laboratories, looked at the effect of ASAT
debris generation on the Space Surveillance Network.18 The other study
was conducted for the General Officer Steering Group and looked at similar
areas but focused on the command and control aspects of anti-satellite
engagements.1 9 Both of these studies identified similar problems with the
observation and processing capability of the Space Surveillance Center. The
Lincoln Laboratory study used six ASAT engagement scenarios in which
only 906 debris fragments were produced, corresponding to an increase in
the activity of the Space Surveillance Network by a factor of five.20 This test
used very optimistic debris assumptions -- judging from the fact that many
on-orbit breakups have created more than 500 pieces of debris each.
Hypervelocity collisions such as those that would occur in an anti-satellite
engagement are expected to produce many more objects, and spread them
more widely.
18 L.P. Cox, W.F. Burnham, J.K. Pololck and W. P. Seniw, "ASAT Debris
Generation: Effect on Space Surveillance Network," Proceedings of the 1991 Space
Surveillance Workshop, Lincoln Laboratory, 9-11 April 1991.
19 Space Surveillance/Command and Control Evaluation Study in Support of the OSD
Anti-satellite (ASAT) General Officer Steering Group (GOSG), 24 May 1989.
20 Op cit 18.
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During computer runs to simulate a space war and its effect on the
Space Surveillance System a data processing problem emerged. With just
two anti-satellite weapon intercepts, the Space Surveillance Network
became overloaded and was unable to process the high number of
uncorrelated objects. Planned upgrades of the computer systems at the
Space Surveillance Center, while providing more capabilities, are not
significantly better at this type of task. It would certainly not be an order of
magnitude more capable than the current system, the improvement
required to track the debris from ASAT engagements. 21
During the Command and Control Evaluation Study, two anti-satellite
engagements (with 128 post attack debris objects each) "taxed the system so
severely that the system was not able to update the number of required
target trajectories during the study period of two hours."22 The study also
found that the stress on the system due to uncorrelated targets grows
linearly with time as additional sensors report uncorrelated returns.
Analysts attempted to correlate the debris particles with the original parent
satellite and to treat the entire debris cloud as a single entity in an attempt
to streamline the processing of the incoming data.
The ASAT scenario is very close to what occurs just after an on-orbit
breakup. The typical procedure is to allow the uncorrelated debris from a
breakup to spread for several revolutions prior to even attempting to identify
and catalog individual pieces. ASAT testing and use will cause a
21 Personnel notes from Space Debris Meeting at AFSPACECOM, 22 February 1991.
22 L.P. Cox, W.F. Burnham, J.K. Pololck and W. P. Seniw, "ASAT Debris
Generation: Effect on Space Surveillance Network," Proceeding of the 1991 Space
Surveillance Workshop, Lincoln Laboratory, 9-11 April 1991.
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significant amount of debris production. This could have very serious
consequences on the debris population and probably cause the onset of the
Kessler Effect. In response to these concerns, the United States has made
space debris reduction a major focus of its anti-satellite weapons program.
It is not obvious however that an anti-satellite weapon can be designed that
can destroy its target without making a large amount of debris.
9.4 Long Term Solution: Mitigation of Debris
The best way to minimize the possibility of collisions is to limit the future
growth of orbital debris. Debris can be controlled by a number of procedures
including booster venting, de-orbiting satellites, and clearing
geosynchronous orbits. A vast amount of the orbital debris has been created
by intentional or unintentional satellite or rocket body breakups. This type of
fragmentation debris makes up 50% of the 7,000 trackable objects. Used
rocket bodies contain residual fuel at the completion of their mission.
Explosion of this fuel creates thousands of fragments of all sizes with added
velocity in addition to the original spacecraft velocity.
Three possible approaches are suggested as the first steps to adopting
debris mitigation policies. The first and foremost is to increase awareness
of the orbital debris problem. The second is to perform an economic analysis
to determine if a market-based solution can be adopted. And the third is to
consider seriously the possibility of government regulation to control
further proliferation of debris in space.
9.4.1 Awareness of the Problem of Space Debris
By increasing the awareness on the dangers of space debris it is possible
to change the behavior of commercial and government launching practices.
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Peace groups, armed with knowledge about space debris, were able to make
forceful arguments against the US anti-satellite weapon system for
example.
There are additional approaches once a country becomes concerned
about the effects of space debris. One such avenue is the Outer Space Treaty
under which any nation can protest space experiments that may harm the
common use of space. An example of such an experiment that most likely
would not be allowed to happen was the ill-conceived Westford Needles
Experiment. This experiment occurred early in the space program and
showed little regard for its long-term effects on the space environment. In
this experiment scientists dispersed thousands of 2-inch needles in orbit in
order to form an artificial ionosphere for a communication experiment.
These needles were released at 4,000 km and will remain in orbit for several
thousand years. With the recent publicity and concern of the space debris
environment, political pressure could be brought to bear on countries
attempting such experiments, urging them not to carry them out.
Other recent actions that have shown little regard for their effects on the
space environment are the intentional destruction of satellites during
several US and USSR anti-satellite tests. These tests have created
thousands of debris particles that could easily have been avoided. Of the 530
tracked objects (greater than 10 cm) in orbit following the US ASAT test
against the Solar Wind satellite, 251 are still in orbit. It is estimated that
several thousand hazardous untrackable pieces of debris between 0.1 and 10
cm that were generated by the test are still in orbit.
Significant pressure has been brought to bear on the two countries as
their goals and concerns for their ASAT programs have changed
significantly. Currently, a major concern for the US anti-satellite weapons
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program office is the production of space debris. Significant efforts are
being undertaken to minimize the creation of long-term space debris by
anti-satellite tests or the use of such weapons. Systems are being studied
with offset aim points to avoid debris producing direct collisions. Systems
containing mylar sheets with embedded pellets to avoid a large number of
free flying debris in a post attack environment are being considered. This is
in direct response to the pressure exerted by groups opposed to the anti-
satellite weapon which base their opposition at least partly on its effects on
the space environment.
Fortunately the problem of debris is now becoming apparent to space-
faring nations. The United States, the USSR, and the European Space
Agency (the three main space users) have all begun programs to quantify
conditions of the debris environment and to study the deleterious effects of
space debris. These groups have begun to recognize the long term effects of
space debris. Unfortunately they are not the only relevant actors. Other
nations are rapidly developing launch capabilities and have begun placing
payloads, and debris, in Earth orbit. Countries that have launched satellites
include China, Japan, India, Israel, Brazil and Iraq. These countries and
others that are developing the technology represent a significant challenge
to an international regulatory environment that is not designed to control
the population of space debris.
There are other problems within countries that have multiple launching
groups. For instance, in the US there are three users of space: the
Department of Defense, NASA, and the commercial space launch industry.
A clear consensus on the effects of space debris and the necessary steps
required to control it has not emerged as yet among the three. NASA and
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DOD have formed a joint working group to study the problem and develop a
future policy, but the industry is not participating.
The concerns of the Department of Defense are different than those of
NASA. Department of Defense is developing a number of systems that may
significantly increase the hazard of space debris if used or deployed. Two
such systems are the ASAT and SDI. While some concerns about space
debris have influenced the latest designs of the ASAT weapon system, it is
difficult to believe that it will not create large number of debris during
operation or tests. SDI as envisioned by some will significantly increase the
total mass and the number of objects in orbit, which will result in more
collisions with existing or additional debris and increase the possibilities of
the onslaught of the Kessler Effect.
NASA's concerns center around the Space Station and the Space
Shuttle. Both are high priority systems and their vulnerability to space
debris is a major concern, due to the presence of people in them. The Space
Station is particularly vulnerable to space debris because of its large size
and long mission duration.
A number of international meetings of scientists have tried to sort out
the problems and define the salient issues. Problems they identified include
the lack of data on debris between 0.1 cm and 10 cm, absence of practices to
mitigate debris producing events, and the lack of legal controls to enforce
space debris mitigation policies.
9.4.2 Debris Mitigation Practices
Debris mitigation is by far the most cost effective method of eventually
reducing the long term effects of space debris. As with toxic wastes, it is
much easier and cheaper to control adverse effects of space debris before
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they are released into the environment. As shown in Chapter 3, most of the
debris has been generated by old satellites, operational launch debris and
fragmentation of rocket boosters and inoperative satellites.
9.4.2.1 Operational Debris
Older satellites such as the Defense Meteorological Satellites produced a
relatively large amount of operational debris while modern geosynchronous
satellites rarely produce any. Mitigation of operational debris can be
designed into satellites if it is the policy to do so. For instance, retaining
bands, pins and cutaway cables can be replaced with contained
mechanisms that do not produce debris. One problem with this mitigation
method is getting the very conservative space industry to change their
methods of operation. The industry is loathe to change methods and
approaches that have already been repeatedly flight proven in the past.
The cost of the actual design changes and hardware is small; however,
new methods require extensive testing and flight qualifications which
increase the cost of a system significantly. The price of a potential failure of
a simple debris mitigation item is the cost of the entire satellite. Satellite
insurance companies are very sensitive to new technologies and
techniques; their sensitivity indirectly increases the cost of testing new
debris-mitigation processes and hardware.
As a result, industry is not likely to change previously designed satellites
to lessen the effects on space debris. The presence of space debris does not
impact the industry's profitability. If a satellite is destroyed by space debris,
the industry will likely be asked to provide a replacement satellite and
launch services, which would earn additional revenues for it. But in the
long run the loss of several satellites by the communication industry may
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drive the costs of satellite-based systems higher, making ground-based fiber
optic lines more attractive to many customers, and thus indirectly can put
pressure on the aerospace industry to introduce debris reduction measures.
9.4.2 Rocket Bodies
Rocket bodies make up 16 percent of the tracked objects in space. These
are released after they deploy satellites to their proper orbits. Some satellites
have internal motors that circularize the orbit and then retain the
additional fuel for station-keeping purposes. This eliminates the
requirement for an additional booster for final orbit insertion. In addition
boosters for transfer to geosynchronous orbit could be placed in a low
perigee orbit that would cause them to re-enter the atmosphere in a few
years as opposed to a few hundred years. Small changes in velocity could be
accomplished using residual fuel which would cause the booster to re-enter
quickly, provided the engineering and guidance was done prior to the
launch. But changes in rocket systems require extensive testing. Again, as
with operational debris, much of the cost is not with the design as with the
risk of failure. If a rocket system fails because of the debris mitigation
efforts of a launch service, the result for the satellite company is the same:
loss of a significant amount of money.
The major impediment to these types of changes is the launch industry.
Major changes in operation are not going to be made unless they are
decisively encouraged by profit motive or regulation.
9.4.2.3 Inactive Payloads
Inactive payloads make up 21 percent of the tracked debris in orbit.
Many of these payloads have simply outlived their useful lives and depleted
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their fuel supplies. If placed in orbits with lifetimes approximating their
expected lifetimes, these systems could re-enter the atmosphere relatively
soon after completing their missions and not contribute to the long-term
space debris problem. This is not practical for many missions, but for
missions that are not altitude sensitive it would be feasible. An example of
how system design consideration could be changed is the DMSP weather
satellite. It is in a 1000 kilometer Sun-synchronous orbit which allows it to
view the entire globe every twelve hours. With a lower altitude it would
require a wider field of view to gain overlapping coverage for the entire
world. A different mission scenario is to launch two satellites in lower orbit
to allow for over-lapping coverage and provide a backup satellite in case one
fails. Other possible options include providing fuel to de-orbit the satellite at
the completion of the mission or to lower the perigee height, decreasing the
orbital lifetime.
9.4.2.4 Fragmentation Avoidance
Explosions of expended rocket boosters have caused a significant amount
of debris. The United States experienced a number of Delta II
fragmentations prior to redesigning the booster to vent the fuel after placing
its payload in orbit. This experience is being re-learned by each nation as
they enter the launch business. The European Space Agency learned this
after the loss of a Spot satellite. The Chinese learned it after the explosion of
a Long March rocket booster in a high altitude Sun-synchronous orbit. The
United States has taken aggressive action to help countries mitigate these
problems. However the actions they can take in helping other countries
with rocket technologies are limited because of the technology transfer
restrictions to most countries.
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9.4.2.5 De-orbiting
Many methods have been devised to de-orbit used spacecraft and rocket
bodies. These have included using unexpended rocket fuel to lower the
perigee altitude or using drag enhancement devices to hasten the de-
orbiting process caused by atmospheric drag. An example of a type of drag
enhancement device may be a large Echo 1 type balloon which can be
inflated, increasing the effective area of the satellite. A large balloon could
easily increase the drag by a factor of ten and significantly increase the rate
of orbital decay. Any such drag enhancement system adds weight and
hence cost to a spacecraft. For most satellites the amount of weight is
limited by the launch vehicle. Any additional weight required for debris
reduction programs comes at the expense of payload or fuel.
Rocket-based de-orbiting requires a reserve amount of fuel at the end of a
mission to accomplish a burn that will cause a lowering of the perigee
altitude and cause the satellite to descend into the Earth's atmosphere. This
again implies the additional weight of the fuel needed for de-orbiting is to be
added to the spacecraft, replacing payload or mission fuel. De-orbiting an
object from a 2000 km circular orbit to an elliptical orbit with a 2000 km x
100 km orbit requires a change of velocity equal to 455.8 meters per second.
For a 2500 kilogram satellite, this requires 500 kilograms of hydrazine, the
amount of fuel it takes to keep a geosynchronous satellite in its proper orbit
for ten years, clearly a large weight penalty.
9.4.6 Re-orbiting
Re-orbiting applies mainly to satellites in geosynchronous orbits. There
are two methods for reducing the chances of collision with other spacecraft:
the first is to place it near the stable points which would keep the satellites
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from drifting around the geostationary ring and the second is to boost the
satellite slightly above the geosynchronous ring. The first proposed re-
orbiting option is to place satellites in the stable points at 75 degrees East
and 255 degrees East longitude. Any object in geostationary orbit will move
around the geostationary ring, oscillating about the geopotential stable
points unless controlled by east-west station-keeping. Placing inoperative
satellites near these locations dampens the oscillations that as a
consequence remain small. In the absence of any perturbations, such
discarded objects would remain fixed over Panama and Malaysia without
the requirement for East-West station-keeping. Satellites could be moved to
these locations at the end of their useful lives or when they are near fuel
depletion.
Objects so stationed will, however, be effected by perturbations from
lunar and solar gravity and solar radiation pressure. Small velocity
changes of the order of a fraction of a meter per second can cause large
oscillations around the stable point. 23 Velocity changes of only 0.6 meters
per second can cause oscillations of 25 degrees in longitude about the stable
point. This oscillation would pose a threat to other satellites in the
geostationary ring.
Placement of a large number of objects about the stable point would
increase the chances of collisions between such discarded objects. Any
collision would impart additional velocities to the resulting debris that
would then spread over the geosynchronous ring, posing additional threats
23 V.A. Chobotov, "Disposal of Spacecraft at End-of-Life in Geosynchronous Orbit,"
Paper AAS 89-378 from the AAS/AIAA Astrodynamics Specialist Conference, 7 - 10 August
1989, Stowe, Vermont.
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to satellites. This method would also render a number of the already
crowded positions near the stationary points more hazardous and possibly
unusable for other satellites.
Because of the extreme velocity and position accuracies required and the
potential for collision between discarded objects, the stationary disposal
option is not considered to be a satisfactory long-term storage solution for
old satellites and boosters.
Another way to avoid collisions in the geosynchronous orbit is to boost a
satellite from the geosynchronous orbit to an orbit slightly above the
geosynchronous ring. This would significantly reduce the chances of it
colliding with other objects. The spatial density at the geosynchronous ring
is several orders of magnitude higher than on orbits only a hundred
kilometers higher or lower as shown in Figure 9.3. Velocity change
requirements for a change in altitude of 200 kilometers is approximately 6
meters per second or approximately 3 kilograms of hydrazine per 1000
kilograms of satellite. This maneuver can easily be accomplished with
existing thrusters.
Figure 9.4 shows a simulation of the perigee height of a satellite in a near
circular orbit (eccentricity 0.001) 150 kilometers above geosynchronous orbit.
The satellite is affected by solar and lunar gravity perturbations and solar
radiation pressure. The perigee height shows a 24 kilometer per year
variation with a longer-term 20 kilometer baseline change. This indicates
that super-synchronous orbits are relatively stable and provide a long-term
solution for geosynchronous debris.
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The major problem with boosting satellites from geosynchronous orbits
is the uncertainly as to when to accomplish the maneuver. Uncertainties
about a satellite's lifetime are large. Satellites expected to last five years
often last seven or eight. The main limitation to accurate predictions is the
uncertainty about the remaining available fuel.
The main problem inherent in super-synchronous orbit disposal is the
fact that the amount of fuel remaining on-board a satellite is uncertain.
Fuel gauges and metering systems are limited in their accuracy. To ensure
25 V.A. Chobotov, "Disposal of Spacecraft at End-of-Life in Geosynchronous Orbit,"
Paper AAS 89-378 from the AAS/AIAA Astrodynamics Specialist Conference, 7 - 10 August
1989, Stowe, Vermont.
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enough fuel exists for the re-orbiting maneuver, a satellite company would
have to use conservative estimates of fuel remaining and may remove the
satellite from orbit several months or even a year prior to exhausting the
remaining fuel. The fuel required is only on the order of 0.1 to 0.5 percent of
fuel available. This requirement for fuel gauging in a zero gravity
environment is an area of concern to the engineering community.
There are two primary methods for fuel gauging: measuring mass
remaining in the fuel tank and integration of the amount of fuel used.
Measuring mass or volume remaining in the fuel tank is an uncertain
technique because of the uncertain distribution of fuel in a zero gravity
environment. Volume or mass methods are limited to approximately 5%
accuracies. Integration techniques are difficult for high accuracy
measurements because of the accuracy required for flow and pressure
readings as well as mixing ratios during burns. Integration techniques
have been limited to approximately 3% accuracies. Newer fuel gauging
techniques such as ultrasonic detection and super-critical storage radio
frequency coupling show improvements over older methods but do not
appear to reach the accuracies required for assuring altitude-raising
maneuvers and depletion of all available fuel.
A possible method to allow for satellite operation until fuel depletion and
to clear the geosynchronous orbit is to provide a second small tank with the
required fuel for the desired increase in altitude. At depletion of the
primary tank the satellite would have enough fuel to clear the
geosynchronous orbit. The additional weight with this method would be
small -- only the weight of the tank and fuel.
Any orbit raising maneuver should be carried out as a three or more
burn maneuver to ensure that if fuel is expended before the maneuver is
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completed that the satellite does not cross the geosynchronous altitude. If a
Holmann 2 6 transfer was attempted and fuel was depleted during the first
burn, the satellite would cross large areas of the geosynchronous ring at a
relatively high velocity, significantly increasing its chances of colliding
with other space objects.
Several countries and corporations have begun to remove satellites from
the geosynchronous ring in order to create space for newer satellites.
INTELSAT, the large international satellite communications firm, raised
early satellites (Intelsat I, II and III) approximately 50 km above the
geosynchronous altitude. Six of the seven INTELSAT IV satellites and two
of the five INTELSAT IV-A satellites have been boosted out of
geosynchronous orbit. NASA, NOAA, Telesat, RCA, ISRO, IMERSAT and
EUTELSAT have all agreed to boost satellites at the end of their useful
lives.2 7
Political question exists as to the will to accomplish mission-ending
maneuvers. Would a country or company remove a "critical" satellite from
geostationary orbit if it were running low on fuel and did not have a
replacement satellite in orbit? This may be the case with the sole remaining
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's GOES weather
satellite which has exceeded its expected lifetime by several years. What
policies or regulations would encourage a company to boost a profitable
26 Holmann transfer is a two-impulse maneuver between two circular, coplaner orbits.
It is the minimum energy transfer and uses the least amount of fuel for a given increase in
altitude.
27 Soace Debris: A Report from the European Space Agency Space Debris Working
Groun, ESA SP-1109, France: European Space Agency, November 1988.
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communications satellite from orbit knowing that once it does it will loose
the associated revenues?
Another problem with plans to remove satellites from geosynchronous
orbit is that the survival rate of satellites over a ten year lifetime is only 85%.
If a satellite is not functioning properly it may be impossible to command it
to maneuver out of geosynchronous orbit. Catastrophic failure of satellites
while on-orbit generates additional objects in the geosynchronous orbit each
year even with the most stringent of debris mitigation programs.
9.4.3 Economic Analysis of Debris Mitigation
Debris mitigation practices do not add value to a satellite being delivered
to orbit. At the present time, the odds are still good that a satellite will not be
destroyed by space debris during its useful life. The threat to a particular
satellite caused by a few extra objects in orbit from a single launch is
negligible. The results of debris mitigation practices during a few launches
will not make a significant difference. Since there is no financial benefit or
marginal gain, there is no financial incentive to undertake any mitigation
action. As mentioned earlier the space industry is a very conservative
industry that does not change rapidly. This is evident in the fact that they
are still using Titan missiles and Delta rockets designed in the 1950's to
launch spacecraft. Change is made at a slow and careful pace. The cost of
failure is significant, ranging from a replacement launch, to lost business
because of reliability concerns, to higher insurance premiums. The extra
cost of introducing new practices and hardware to reduce debris generation
provides little or no additional benefits to the launch company.
Many of the debris reduction strategies would include significant
changes in the operation and design of spacecraft and rocket systems.
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These changes do not come without cost and risk, and as a consequence
they are avoided by the commercial sector.
9.4.3.1 Space as a Common Property Resource
Space is a common resource. No country or company has to pay for the
use of space or for leaving objects in space. Because no one has to pay for the
use of space, some externalities exist that are not taken into account when
determining the true cost of the use of space. But cluttering space with
debris has a social cost that is not being accounted for in the individual
economic decision-making processes that undergird decisions to use space.
As with any resource, companies and countries will utilize space until the
marginal cost equals the marginal rate of return. At this point the usage
will exceed the efficient usage for society because they are not including the
net cost to society of their actions.
Each launch contributes to the debris problem and the more systems
people launch into orbit, the worse the situation will get. This mandates
that satellite designers in the future will be required to take extra
precautions in order to mitigate the problem of space debris in orbit. This
will cost additional money and increase costs for all. On the other hand, if
debris continues to accumulate at an unchecked rate, it eventually will
cause destruction of satellites and force expensive shielding measures,
increased insurance premiums or debris removal mechanisms to be
undertaken so that space could continue to be used. It is against these
future cost of debris pollution that the costs of current mitigation efforts
must be compared.
The legal entities that must be regulated are countries, corporations and
international agencies. These entities are all driven by different motives,
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not all necessarily focused on profit. Factors such as prestige and scientific
accomplishment may further erode any market-based solution to the space
debris problem.
There are two methods for controlling a common resource. The first is to
let one entity control the resource and set prices so as to ensure the most
efficient use thereof. The price for the use of space could depend on the
amount of debris left at the end of the mission since that is what is reducing
the value of the resource for everyone else. An agreed upon price would be
difficult to reach. Some countries would argue that they had not caused the
original problem because they were not space-faring nations and should be
allowed to pollute as much as other nations before they are charged. This is
in line with arguments between third world and developed nations in areas
such as greenhouse warming and Chlorofluorocarbon reductions. In any
case it is not possible to have a single corporation control space and set
prices because nations would not agree to it and there could be no
enforcement mechanisms.
The other solution for controlling a common resource is to have some
form of governmental regulation that regulates the use of space in order to
preserve it for future use. It is not clear that a single government or world
body could be entrusted with control of space. The United States and the
European Space Agency are unlikely to accept expensive debris mitigation
policies on launch services if the nations with developing commercial space
launch services such as China, the USSR, or Japan do not accept these
additional expenses in an already extremely competitive launch industry.
The nation or company that accepted expensive debris mitigation practices
unilaterally may be pushed out of the launch business by pricing
themselves out of the market. Because of this, any action must be taken on a
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global basis. There are only a relatively few (approximately 15) space-faring
nations which would have to agree.
While compliance with debris mitigation could be monitored by US Space
Command using their Space Surveillance Network and by the
corresponding Soviet space surveillance network, enforcement prior to
launch may be difficult. Countries such as the United States and the USSR
may are allow inspection of secret payloads. However they may not have to
since other enforcement techniques are possible. Inspection of design plans
would be one. Detection of delinquent behavior could result in considerable
international pressure to bring the culprit state in line. Threats or actions
such as restricting access to advanced technologies and other space-related
goods may be enough to keep them from breaking any agreements.
Regulation within the United States can be accomplished by the same
inspection and design reviews prior to construction and by the issuance of a
launch permit or export license for satellites to be launched on foreign
launch vehicles. Laws exist that if re-interpreted could encompass debris
mitigation requirements. This is not currently possible on the international
level because as described in Chapter 8, the existing treaties that form
international law do not adequately address the problems of space debris.
9.5 Domestic Policy Considerations
The United States is now the dominant space power and a prime
producer of space debris. A major impediment to implementing any debris
mitigation program in this country is that the United States does not have a
single focal point for space activities. Instead the National Space Council,
NASA, The Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation's
Commercial Space Transportation office, the National Oceanic and
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Atmospheric Administrations, and the Federal Communication
Commission, to name a few, are all involved with space utilization. This
structure has made it difficult to come to a consensus on the problems of
space debris. Even within each organization agreement on what to do has
not been reached. Within NASA, the people working on the Space Station
are very concerned with space debris and are urging actions to limit its
production. At the same time other groups in NASA are launching
satellites such as the Combined Radiation and Release Experiment Satellite
(CRRES) that released 24 five to ten pound canisters into long-lived orbits.
This internal conflict and lack of co-ordination exists in other
organizations as well.
This fragmentation of the American space organizations has resulted in
a confusing regulatory framework within which to initiate debris
mitigation programs once a consensus is reached. Any policy that is
instituted must cover all aspects of space activity, including DOD, NASA,
and commercial activities. The possible cost of debris mitigation programs
is an important issue. Re-design of spacecraft and rocket boosters,
including associated testing and qualifications, requires significant
amounts of money. Currently the United States faces a huge federal budget
deficit and defense spending is being sharply reduced. Unless forced to, the
Department of Defense is unlikely to allocate a larger share of money to the
problems of space debris during periods of significant reductions in
manpower and force structure. NASA is also undergoing a reduction of
some of its operations and projects. The re-design and shrinking of the
Space Station, and a reduction of 5,000 people in the Space Shuttle
operations imply that NASA would likely opt to expend funds to lessen the
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impact of reductions on these high priority programs rather than address
the space debris problem.
Commercial ventures such as the Iridium Mobile Satellite
communications system are unlikely to initiate expensive debris mitigation
programs on their own without regulation or guidelines. Any amount of
money spent on debris mitigation would come directly off their profits. The
mere probability of losing a satellite to debris will not in itself induce them
to take voluntary space debris mitigation efforts.
The United States is currently trying to develop a private commercial
launch industry to compete with the European Space Agency's Ariane
rocket. The space industry is under intense competition from other foreign
start ups such as the heavily subsidized Soviet and Chinese launches. Any
expensive debris mitigation program that raises the cost of American
launch services will force contracts to be awarded to foreign competitors
who do not institute them. Consequently it is unrealistic to burden an
industry which is considered an important aspect of American global
leadership with uncompetitive burdens.
Like most environmental problems, space debris is not immediately
apparent to most people. As a result the problem will continue to receive
only minor support from the existing establishment, until some dramatic
event occurs, such as the loss of a Space Shuttle or the Space Station, that
would attract the attention of the American public and raise demands for
action. But it may be already too late.
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9.6 International Policy Concerns
Space debris is an international problem. It effects every nation's present
and future ability to use space. Continued production of space debris will
threaten certain orbits that are now used for weather prediction,
intelligence gathering, remote sensing, communications, and scientific
experiments. Loss of the use of these capabilities in space would have a
dramatic effect on the world. Yet there are currently no international
treaties or agreements that can be applied to the problem of space debris.
Existing treaties are vague and open to interpretation. They do not provide
any authority to anyone to enforce debris reducing regulation. A major
concern is the development of space systems by developing countries such
as China, and Brazil. Without specific international treaties or regulation,
controlling the production of space debris by these countries will be difficult.
The United States should and does provide assistance to these countries to
aid in controlling on-orbit breakups of rocket boosters and satellites by
transferring technology necessary to implement debris reduction
measures.
International agreement must be reached to define what steps are
required of all space launching countries to protect the near-Earth space.
Without international agreement, countries trying to break into the
commercial launch industry will have no reason or incentive to raise the
cost of their launch services, which are heavily subsidized by their
governments anyway, to avoid the production of space debris.
Negotiating a treaty to enforce debris mitigation will be difficult. As with
the Montreal protocol dealing with Ozone depleting Chlorofluorocarbons,
developing nations will want an opportunity to build their industry under
the same rules that the developed world promoted their space launch
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industry. Third world nations may argue that any treaty would keep
developing countries from building space launch systems because of the
higher cost of debris reduction strategies. This would not be a strong
argument because debris reduction policies would cost very little compared
to the cost of developing a launch system.
The possibility of negotiating a treaty through the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPOUS) is small.
UNCOPOUS has been deadlocked on a number of treaties involving direct
broadcast satellites, solar power satellites, nuclear power satellites, and
remote sensing. The conflicts are not occurring among technologically
advanced nations but between space powers and developing nations.
A space debris treaty does not necessarily have to be approved by all
nations, since nations with space launch capabilities would produce space
debris. Limiting the treaty negotiations to this group could restrict the
number of potential demands on the treaty process from third world
nations that are unlikely to develop a space launch capability in the near
future.
The United States is in the best position to promote such a treaty. As the
sole remaining superpower and now as the premier space power, this
nation should take the lead and push for an international treaty that calls
for tight controls on the production of space debris. The United States has
the resources to monitor compliance with such a treaty through its Space
Surveillance Network. The United States has the most to gain from a space
debris treaty and the most to lose if one is not adopted, because of its large
space infrastructure. Only under the terms of such a treaty that imposed
common debris mitigation requirements on all launches could individual
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nations enforce compliance with these requirements on their various
government agencies and industry that utilize space.
In conclusion, Space Debris is a serious environmental problem with
large economic, military, technical and diplomatic components. Actions
need to be taken now in order to:
* determine the full extent of the orbital debris problem.
* accurately predict the future evolution of the debris population.
* decide the extent of the debris mitigation procedures required.
* implement these policies on a global basis via an international
treaty.
Action must be initiated now, before the ominous onset of the Kessler Effect
or the loss of critical space systems such as the Space Shuttle or the Space
Station.
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Appendix A
A. Techniques for Optical Debris Measurements
There are a number of different techniques for making optical
measurements of small debris. Some involve just staring vertically into the
sky, waiting for objects to pass overhead. Others, in an attempt to increase
sensitivity, direct the telescope along a predicted orbit to allow time
integration of the signal of any objects that may be in that particular orbit.
The staring and the tracking modes are discussed below.
A.1 Staring Mode
In a staring mode the telescope's field of view remains fixed or is moved
slowly at the sidereal rate. Image data is read from the Charged Coupled
Device (CCD) or vidicon detector at the focal plane of the instrument and is
recorded on video tape. Data is typically recorded at TV rates of 30 frames
per second. At this rate the stars do not move in a given frame. Because of
their angular velocities orbital objects will appear as streaks. Any object
that crosses the field of view will be recorded on a number of frames,
depending upon the angular velocity of the object and the field of view of the
telescope. Elimination of stars and background can be done by subtracting
sequential frames, leaving only the streaks of the moving objects.
Digital recording of this data is not currently possible. Instead, the data
on the CCD is converted to a video signal and recorded on high quality S-
VHS video tape. Later, this raw video data can be digitized to allow for
computer based analysis.
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The sensitivity of this method depends upon the angular velocity of the
debris because the signal is spread over a number of pixels per frame. This
method is independent of the direction of motion of the object and is as
sensitive in detecting an object in a retrograde orbit as one in a polar orbit.
The size of the detected object is determined by the optical signature, which
is determined by assuming a value for an albedo and an atmospheric
extinction. Calibrations of the instrument are made by looking at known
star fields with calibration stars of known optical magnitude.
A.2 Tracking Modes
The primary concept of tracking an object is to keep its image stationary
on the focal plane, allowing the signal to be integrated over time, thus
allowing it to be more easily detected against the background noise.
Significant increases in sensitivity are possible with tracking methods.
Mechanical or electronic tracking techniques can scan the sky at a fixed
angular rate that is equal to the angular velocity of an object in a specific
orbit. Any object with that velocity will remain fixed at a point on the focal
plane since light from such an object will concentrate on only a few pixels,
thus allowing for detections of fainter signals because the background noise
is increasing only as the square root of the background signal. (The
background signal is subtracted from each pixel. The statistical noise in
each pixel is the square root of the background signal)
There are a number of methods to accomplish the tracking mode of
operation. One is to mechanically drive the telescope at the desired angular
velocity. A disadvantage of this mode is that once a volume of the field of
view has been searched for only a fraction of a second, the chances of
detecting additional objects in that same space are close to zero. The
261
telescope must then change velocity to look at a different volume of space
moving in that same orbit and then return to the matching velocity of the
orbit of interest. This method of operation limits the amount of time spent
making observations versus the amount of time maneuvering the telescope.
Another method is to use a movable mirror as a secondary mirror. This
mirror scans the field of view of the telescope over a region without
requiring the entire telescope to move. This allows for more accurate
tracking and shorter delays between observations. It also reduces the
vibrations caused by rapid changes in velocities of the telescope and
eliminates the stresses placed on the mounts.
A third method of tracking is done electronically and is known as the
time delay integration or TDI method. In this mode, the telescope is in a
staring mode but the image is electronically shifted across the focal plane
as the object crosses the field of view. Modern CCD cameras have the
capability of shifting the signals from rows of pixels over time. The speed
that the rows are shifted equates to a specific velocity, allowing the signal to
be integrated on a single pixel. The direction of the object is determined by
the orientation of the CCD detector with respect to the telescope. The signal
is collected until it reaches the last row of the CCD. It is then read off the
chip and transfered to tape for later analysis.
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Rows of frames are electronically shifted at a constant rate.
The image of an object with the assumed velocity will be
integrated in single (though moving) pixel
Figure A.1
TDI Method of Tracking on the Charge Coupled Device (CCD)
In the TDI mode, the rate at which the rows are swept is determined by
the angular velocity of the assumed orbit. This method, as opposed to the
other two tracking methods, allows for continuous, uninterrupted
measurements of objects in a particular orbit. Also, by using this method,
significant reductions in the amount of data transfered are possible,
allowing for real time analysis.
A.3 Trade-Offs of Tracking Methods
While the tracking mode offers significant increases in sensitivity, there
are significant trade-offs to be made when using this mode instead of the
staring mode. In the tracking mode, objects travelling at velocities other
than the assumed velocity will require significantly greater signals in order
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to be seen since the signal is spread over a larger number of pixels than
they would have been in the staring mode. Because of this negative effect on
sensitivity for objects other than those in the particular orbit being
searched, the "volume" of space searched by this method is significantly
reduced. The volume of space searched inadequately defines the amount of
debris that an experiment could observe. What is required is a method of
characterizing the amount of volume and orbits that are searched. I will
call this "phase space".
"Phase space" is an eight dimensional space. In this particular case
these dimensions are the six orbital parameters (semi-major axis,
inclination, eccentricity, longitude of ascending node, argument of
periapsis, and the true anomaly), the size of the detectable objects and the
time of the measurement. This phase space defines the orbits, debris sizes
and times that have been searched by a particular measurement. Different
experiments will search different volumes of this space.
An example of this phase space is seen in the differences in the amount
of phase space observed in the staring and tracking modes. The staring
mode of optical detection is equally sensitive to all objects regardless of
direction of motion which then covers all semi-major axis, inclination,
eccentricity, longitude of ascending node, argument of periapsis, and the
true anomaly that pass through the field of view of the sensor. Tracking
methods are very sensitive to objects travelling in the assumed direction;
however, they are relatively insensitive to objects travelling in other
directions. The tracking methods have viewed only those objects that have
passed through the field of view that fall within a narrow band of altitudes,
inclinations, right ascension, and eccentricities that correspond to the
angular velocity that the telescope has scanned.
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Both systems are limited to objects that cross their field of view during
the observation period. Figure A.2 compares the magnitude and direction
of angular velocity, inclination and size covered by the tracking and staring
methods. The magnitude of the angular velocity is a function of the orbital
parameters semi-major axis, eccentricity and true anomaly. The direction
of the angular velocity is a function of the inclination, right ascension and
true anomaly. For circular orbits angular velocity corresponds directly to
the altitude of the objects.
Although the two measurements view the same volume of space for the
same amount of time, they do not search the same amount of "phase
space". The staring mode has observed a larger amount of phase space and
a variety of orbits while the tracking method observes a small fraction of the
objects that cross its field of view. Only by characterizing the phase space
searched by each observation method can relative comparisons be made.
Because of the limited phase space which tracking systems can observe,
tracking searches concentrate on orbits where large amounts of debris are
known to exist. This significantly increases the likelihood of detecting
objects. For example, since very few objects reside in retrograde orbits, it
would not be prudent to start searching those orbits with tracking systems
while neglecting the large number of debris that reside in polar or sun-
synchronous orbits. In order to accurately interpret data from tracking
observations, full consideration of the observed phase space must also be
taken into account.
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Relative Amount of Angular Velocity, Size and Inclination
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A.4 Other requirements for Phillips Laboratory
Phillips Laboratory was asked by Space Command officials to develop
methods that could track objects in order to form preliminary orbits on
debris in an effort to identify them with a particular breakup and to develop
methods to study recent breakups in order to specify the number of
fragments and the characteristics of orbital breakup of satellites. Two
methods to accomplish these objectives are the stare and track method and
the TDI and track method.
A.4.1 Stare and Track
The concept of the stare and track method is to have one telescope
stare vertically to observe debris, and when an object is detected the
direction of motion is determined and a secondary telescope is moved to re-
acquire the object. Secondary telescopes are available at many of the
participating sites. The secondary telescope re-acquires the debris and
tracks it in order to acquire accurate orbital and photometric data on debris.
The advantage of this approach is that it is sensitive to all inclinations
and altitude debris. The staring mode has the highest probability of
detection of larger random debris because of the larger phase space
observed. The data from this mode of operation is also available for the post
processing and data enhancement discussed earlier. Real time detection
levels can be set near the noise level because false alarms can be verified
quickly by the secondary telescope.
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The disadvantage of this system is that it requires real-time streak
detection at video rates. This, while not impossible, will require
development.
For the other requirement to search for fragments from a recent
breakup, the Time Delay Integration method with a tracking telescope
would work well. Objects from a single recent breakup will be in roughly
the same orbit. This allows the scanning modes to search the approximate
orbit for smaller sizes.
A.4.2 TDI and Track
The concept of TDI and Track is to make very sensitive measurements
using the Time Delay Integration method of scanning and utilize a second
telescope to make additional observations of detected objects to form
accurate orbital parameters and collect photometric data. Scanning system
can match the expected orbital velocity. Time Delay Integration moves the
pixels on the chip instead of moving the telescope.
This system requires two telescopes, which are available at both the
AMOS and the ETS sites. The advantages of this system over other
scanning modes is that it provides continuous coverage of orbits of interest
without requiring position changes or velocity changes with the telescope.
Because of this there isn't dead time while the telescope is repositioned.
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Appendix B
B. An In-depth Look at an Optical Debris Detection System
As an example of the techniques and problems involved with optical
measurements the optical debris detection with the Wright Patterson 100-
inch Collimator is described in this section. A detailed look at the Wright
Patterson effort will provide an in-depth understanding of the issues and
equipment involved with optical measurements. This effort is currently
underway and is led by the Geophysics Directorate of the Phillips
Laboratory at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts with KEO
Consultants as an in-house contractor supporting the effort. Data
collection will continue for the next 3 to 4 years.
The objectives of the Wright Patterson debris measurement program are
to demonstrate the capability to gather data on debris down to 0.5 cm, to
implement sensor and processing techniques that enhance detection
sensitivity, and to provide modelling programs based on the new data. The
Wright Patterson effort uses a passive optical sensor that relies on solar
illumination of the debris. In order to make the optical measurements, the
atmosphere above the collimator must be in the Earth's shadow while the
debris is still illuminated. This limits the time available for debris
measurement to short periods just after dusk and just prior to dawn.
Because of the nature of the measurement, both the size and the altitude
must be inferred with several assumptions. The altitude is computed from
the angular velocity, with the assumption that the objects are in a circular
orbit. This assumption is appropriate for all but the higher eccentricity
orbits. Size is determined from the optical signal intensity with the
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assumptions of an albedo or reflectivity of 0.08 and the object's altitude as
determined from the angular velocity.
The core of the Wright Patterson equipment is an existing 100 inch (2.54
meter) diameter optical collimator developed for testing and producing
large optical components for airborne or space-based imaging systems. The
collimator is shown in Figure B.1. The mirror focal length to diameter
ratio is 6, providing a relatively fast optical system and a wider field of view
than most astronomical telescopes (but smaller than other participating
sites in the measurement effort). The large mirror, although it was unused
for nearly 20 years, remains of outstanding optical quality.
This mirror is housed in a 12 story vacuum chamber in an isothermally
temperature controlled building. Inside the 14 foot vacuum chamber is a 10
foot invar tube which limits the effects of any temperature variations. The
top of the vacuum chamber is removable, allowing the collimator facility to
be used as a large fixed telescope. Removable doors on the roof of the
building were installed for the laser radar experiments done by the
Geophysics Directorate and Wright Laboratories in 1989. The receiver is
mounted at the F/6 port. A large turning mirror bends the image 90 degrees
and out a port in the side of the vacuum chamber.
The core of the receiver system is an Imaged-intensified Charge Coupled
Device (ICCD). The image is focused and reduced through a number of
lenses onto the image intensifier. The image is then relayed to a CCD
camera system. The output of the CCD is viewed on a video monitor and is
stored on a S-VHS video tape. The receiver system schematic is shown in
Figure B.2.
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Figure B.1
Wright Patterson 100-inch Collimator to be Used for Space Debris Detection.The Detector is Mounted at the Focal Plane Located at the f/6 Port
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The first three lenses, two achromat lenses and a Cannon camera lens,
reduce the image of the search volume from 54 mm to 25 mm at the image
intensifier. The first lens is placed at the focal point of the collimator. The
image intensifier is a 22 mm second generation inverted type. It has a gain
of 55,000 with a visible gain of 20,000. The resolution is 36 pixels per
millimeter.
The output image from the intensifier is then focused onto the CCD
camera using a compound non-vignetting lens. This system does not cause
a reduction in the image intensity as the edge of the field of view is reached.
To accomplish this, a Rodenstock 100 mm/F1.5 and a Fujinon 25 mm/FO.85
relay optics are used. The Fujinon lens is used at F1.4 to reduce vignetting.
The image size of the search volume at the CCD is 6.2 mm.
The CCD camera system is a commercially acquired Cohu type 6510. It's
format is 6.4x4.8 mm with 739 horizontal and 484 vertical pixels. The
resolution of the system is 560 horizontal and 350 vertical TV lines. The
sensitivity of the system in is 0.01 lux. For full video, a 0.4 lux is required.
While the 6.2 mm image will be centered on the CCD, some of the image
will be lost on the shorter 4.8 mm sides.
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CCD Size = 6.4 X 4.8 mm
Figure B.3
Placement of 0.2 Degree Field of
View onto Charge Coupled Device
The image of the debris moves across the CCD and produces a streak.
The length of the streak determines the angular velocity and hence the
altitude of the object. The intensity of the streak is used to determine the size
of the object. The direction of the streak is directly related to the inclination
of the object. The faster the image of the object, the larger number of pixels
the signal will be spread over and hence the less signal per pixel. The
background signal will not change with the speed of the object. For an object
moving at 500 km, an approximate angular velocity is .87 deg per second.
With a 0.2 degree field of view, this means the debris will be in the field of
view for only 0.2 seconds. At TV rates of 30 frames per second, 0.2 seconds
is only six frames. Objects at a higher altitude will remain in view for a
longer period of time.
The effect of spreading the signal over many pixels with a nominal level
of background in each will be to decrease the detection capability of the
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setup. This problem can be overcome by using one of two methods: the first
is to steer the telescope at the expected angular velocity of the debris and the
second is to electronically shift the pixels on the CCD to create a Time Delay
Integration (TDI). Either of these methods limits the detectable objects to
those that match the velocity with which the system is driven. However, it
allows for concentration of the entire signal on a few pixels instead of
spreading it over many pixels, thus allowing for significant gains in
minimum detectable size. Mechanical scanning of the 12 story Wright
Patterson collimator is not possible. Development of the TDI mode for
Wright Patterson facility is currently underway and the modification to the
receiver systems will include changing the camera controller and possibly
the CCD.
The output of the CCD is read by the camera controller unit by frame
transfer method at TV rates of 30 frames per second. The video output is
monitored on a waveform monitor and recorded on a S-VHS format video
recorder. This type of commercially available recorder has a resolution of at
least 400 TV lines and a signal to noise ratio of 46 or more db. This will
provide adequate data storage for post digitizing and processing.
For real-time data monitoring, a high resolution black and white
monitor will be be used to give the operator a quick look at the data. A quick
manual look at the data will spot larger objects passing through the field of
view. For further analysis the data will be digitized and analyzed using
computer automated streak detection and image enhancement techniques
to be discussed later in this section. All electronic equipment will be
installed in an air-transportable, shock-mounted electronics rack to allow
for debris measurements at other sites with only minor modifications to the
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receiver optics. See Figure B.4 for a diagram of the electronics rack.
B.1 provides a summary of the specifications for the detector system.
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Debris Detection - Electronic Rack Layout
Figure B.4
Electronics Rack Layout
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Space Debris Video Detector
System Parameters
1. Telescope: Diameter
Focal Length
F Number
2.54 meter
15 meter
F6.0
Primary Image Size
2. Reimaging: Achromat Field Lens
Achromat Close-up Lans
Canon Camera Lens
Field Curvature Correction
Image Size at intensifier
5B0mMn (F6.0)
f = 250mm
f = 300mm
f = 100mm, F2.0
S= -xx mm (TBD)
24.5rmor (F2.5)
3. Intensifier: 25mm Gen II Inverted Type
Gain 55,000 (2854 source)
Visible Gain 20,000
Resolution
Photocathode
Phosphor
4. Relay Lens:
36 + Ip/mm
S20R
P20 (10% falitime = 1 msec)
Non-vignetting lens combination
Rodenstock 100mmJ/F.5 +
Fujinon 25mmlF0.85 (used at FI.4)
(can be used at FO.85 with some vignetting)
Image Size at CCD ~,2om
S. Camera:
5. Recording:
Cohu CCD
Type 6510
Resolution
Sensitivity
S/N
S-VHS Format
Resolution
SIN
frame transfer
1/2" format, 6.4 x 4.8mm
Pixels 739 (H) x 484 (V)
H 560 tv lines
V 350 tv lines
Full video 0.4 lux (0db gain)
Useable 0.01 lux (20db gain)
56db
400 + tv lines
46+db
Table B.1
Specifications for the Phillips Laboratory
Wright Patterson 100 inch Detector System
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B.1 Data Reduction
To date, data reduction has been a tedious process of manually viewing
recorded video tapes. The star background moves very slowly and can be
removed by subtracting one successive frame from another. This leaves
only the objects that move from frame to frame. Debris and satellites are
seen as streaks that cross the screen and are detected by carefully viewing
the monitor. The sensitivity and consistency of this method is variable. In
order to advance the data reduction process, computer-based algorithms
are being developed by both the Phillips Laboratory and Lincoln
Laboratories to automate the data reduction process and enhance the
sensitivity of the data already obtained. These data enhancement
techniques will be discussed later in this section.
All future data collected by the sensors participating in the Phillips
Laboratory data collection campaign will be analyzed at the Geophysics
Laboratory. The processing of this data will occur on either a Sun Sparc
Station or a Silicon Graphics Work Station. The stored video data will
grabbed by a frame grabber and digitized to allow for the digital processing
of the data. Some degradation is expected in the recording, storing and
retrieval of the data from the video tapes, but analysis of the errors indicates
that with the image intensified CCD, the background noise due to the sky
background will exceed any noise due to CCD read errors, shot noise, tape
storage, and the digital to analog or the analog to digital conversion
processes.
The digital processing of the data will allow for significant enhancement
of the data over the human based visual method used to date. Methods of
shifting and adding sequential frames allows for increases in sensitivity.
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Computer based data reduction will also provide a systematic approach that
will produce the same results each time irrespective of the operator or
observer.
B.2 Signal Detection Techniques
The type of video data that is collected during an optical debris search
can be enhanced by processing the video signals in different ways. The
minimum detectable size for a given receiver system depends on the type of
data collected and the method used for analyzing the data. There are
essentially three different methods of detecting debris which need to be
considered: single pixel detection, assumed velocity filtering, and pseudo-
tracking. Two of these, single pixel detection and assumed velocity,
filtering are done during the post-processing of data collected during a
staring mode operation of the telescope. Tracking and pseudo-tracking
makes assumptions about the orbit of the debris and increases the
sensitivity to any debris that may be in that particular orbit.
Single Pixel Detection- This is the basic method of detection. A possible
detection is identified by the signal level in a single pixel that is above the
background noise level. The threshold can be set near the background level
because any false detections can be checked by looking at adjacent pixels or
additional frames. This method is equally sensitive to all velocities and
directions.
Assumed Velocity Filter - This is a post processing technique to enhance
the signal levels of objects spread over several pixels or frames. In this
method pixels and/or the frames are shifted and added together. The
amount and direction that the pixels or the sequential frames are shifted is
dependent upon the velocity that is being analyzed. This allows for the
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signal from an object on many pixels and many frames to be added
together. The noise due to the background signal threshold raises at a
slower rate than the signal. Since this is done in post-processing and not
during data collection, any and all velocities and directions can be
searched, not limiting the number of objects detected to a single assumed
velocity. This method is potentially equally sensitive to all velocities and
directions, provided that the computer time and power is available to search
all velocities.
MIT's Lincoln Laboratories has been developing algorithms for use with
its space debris and space based surveillance systems. Output from these
algorithms indicate that large increases in sensitivity are practical. Figure
B.5 shows the output from raw video data. Inside the box is a streak from a
space object. Figure B.6 is made after subtracting the background and
shifting and adding 50 frames by the amount that the object moves during
each frame. Note that the object appears significantly brighter and is
easier to detect. Figures B.7 - B.11 show results from shifting and adding
the video signal and the potential gains in sensitivity.
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Figure B.5
Raw Video Signal of Debris Streak - Single Frame
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Figure B.6
50 Shifted and Added Video Frames After
Background Subtraction of the Same Object as in Figure B.5
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Figure B.7
Optical Signal Measured Across a Single Video Frame in
the Row that the Object was Seen
Debris signal between column 200 and 300
283
20
0.0C
Single frame Row 411
200 220 240 260 280 300
column
Figure B.8
Expanded Optical Signal Measured Across
the Frame in the Row that the object is seen.
Debris signal is circled and very hard to
distinguish from the background
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Figure B.9
Optical Signal after subtracting the background and
applying the assumed velocity filter to fifty frames.
Debris signal stands out clearly above background noise.
Measured across the video frame
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Figure B.10
Optical Signal in Column of Debris
Optical signal from column of debris after subtracting the background
and applying the assumed velocity filter to fifty frames.
Debris signal stands out clearly above background noise.
(Wider peak is a result of movement of the image during each frame.)
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Figure B.11
Maximum Optical Signal Obtained for the Debris as a
Result of Adding Frames at Different Angles and Velocities.
(Contour Value in Digital Number)
Pseudo-Tracking - This method of detection requires a different
operation of the receiver/telescope during data collection. Here the signal is
concentrated on a single or small number of pixels by scanning the
telescope either mechanically by steering the telescope or electronically
using Time Delay Integration techniques at an assumed velocity. While the
assumed velocity one chooses significantly reduces the number of objects to
be seen the increase in sensitivity increases significantly. The sensitivity to
objects with the assumed velocity is increased while the sensitivity of objects
with other velocities is reduced.
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Tracking - This requires a telescope that can be driven mechanically or
can use a turning mirror to move the field of view at a certain velocity to
mechanically maintain the image of the particle on a single pixel as it
moves across the sky. The longer the image is tracked the more sensitive
the measurement becomes because the signal is integrated during the
tracking. This method is not possible for the Wright Patterson effort but is
included for demonstration purposes and will be analyzed with the
participating sensors.
Each of these different methods has its tradeoff. The single pixel detection
method is easily implemented. The assumed velocity filter requires a
significant amount of computer resources and time. The pseudo tracking
and tracking methods trade the volume of phase space searched for
sensitivity and detection capability of smaller objects at the cost of not
detecting objects moving in other directions. In order to determine which
methods are desirable an analysis of the detection capabilities is in order.
B3 Minimum Detectable Object Brightness
The minimum detectable size for space debris is a function of many
variables. Some variables are location dependent, some are due to
atmospheric conditions and some are due to the optical system used to
make the detections. In order to determine the minimum detectable size we
will first determine the faintest detectable object. In order to accomplish
this we must determine what the signal and the background noise levels
are for the various detection methods.
The derivations of minimum detectable size will use optical magnitudes.
Optical magnitudes are a measure of relative brightness of objects started
in ancient Greece. Because the originator Hipparchus used a scale of one
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to six to classify the visible stars which represent approximately a range of
100 in optical signal, each optical magnitude represents a factor of the fifth
root of 100 or 2.512.
Visual Magnitude Definitions
By definition, the integrated flux of(my = 0) star is
f Flux (my --0) d = 2.5 x 10- erg cm-2 S-1
Where:
my = visual magnitude
I = wavelength
In the visible region the approximation
Flux (m, =0) = 3.7 x 10-9 erg cm- 2 s-1A-1
holds. For wavelengths near 550 nm with the photon energy near 3.7 x 1012
ergs, one is left with a remarkably easy relationship:
Flux (my =0) = 1000 photons cm-2 s-1A-1
To convert from (my = 0 ) to another (my * 0 ) use:
Flux (my = 0 ) = 2.512-mv x Flux (mv = 0 )
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Photon fluxes received by a telescope and optical brightness are related by:
Sframe= 10 0 0 -2. 5 1 2-OB. Ate1'et-BW-ed*'
Sframe= 7.853X10 6 -2.512-OB. D't2eetB W "ed"'
where:
S = Signal from the debris in number of photons
OB = Object Brightness in optical magnitudes
Atel = Collection area of the telescope in cm2
D = Diameter of the telescope in meters
et = Efficiency of the telescope and detector optics
BW = Bandwidth that the detector is sensitive in angstroms
ed = Efficiency of the detector over the bandwidth
t = integration time per frame in seconds
The factor of 7,853 that appears in the second equation is a conversion factor
from area in square centimeters to diameter in square meters. The results
of the minimum detectable object brightness calculations will be given in
optical magnitude.
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B.3.1 Single Pixel Detection
Single Pixel Detection relies on the signal contained in a single pixel and
the average background signal. In order to be detected the signal divided by
the background noise must be larger than the minimum signal to noise
ratio.
B.3.1.1 Debris Optical Signal Strength
The optical signal per frame from debris is given by the equation
Sframe= 7.853X106-2.512 O B . Dtelet-B W "ed" t
where the variables are the same as above.
Because the object is moving at a relatively high angular velocity the
image will be spread over a number of pixels in each frame. The number of
pixels per frame the object signal is spread across is found by
AV.T
Npixels/frame= FOV Nacross detector
where:
AV = Angular velocity in degrees per second
FOV = Full field of view in degrees
t = integration time per frame in seconds
N = Number of pixels across the detector
B.3.1.2 Angular Velocity from the Observing Site
For a circular orbit, the angular velocity with respect to the receiver site
is found by using the mean motion of a satellite.
Figure B.12
Diagram of Angular Velocity With Respect to the Observing Site
n = mean motion of the satellite
The mean motion of angular velocity from the center of the Earth of a
satellite is found for an object as shown in Figure B.12 by:
where
n = mean motion of a satellite in radians per second
r = Height above the Earth's surface in kilometers,
Re = Radius of the Earth = 6,378 km
9 = Gravitation constant x mass of the Earth = 3.98 x 105 km3/sec 2
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The apparent angular velocity as seen from the observation site for angles
near vertical can be approximated by:
r.5(r+Re) - j .5
AV = 1 .arctan (r+Reý /r r
where:
AV = Apparent angular velocity in degrees per second
The number of pixels included in the streak is important for two
reasons. First, because it determines the number of pixels that the signal
from the debris will be spread over and second, it determines the number of
pixels from which the background will be included. At Wright Patterson
the relationship between angular velocity and the streak length in pixels is
defined by the time per frame, the field of view, the image size at the
detector and the pixel size as shown below.
Number of Pixels =AV deg /sec X 0.033 sec / 0.2 deg X 600 pixels per side
Table B.2 shows the number of pixels per frame for different altitudes for
the Wright Patterson configuration.
293
Range Angular Number
(k m) Velocity of Pixels
200 2.225 220.2
300 1.471 145.6
400 1.094 108.3
500 0.868 85.9
600 0.718 71.0
700 0.610 60.4
800 0.530 52.4
900 0.467 46.2
1000 0.417 41.3
1500 0.268 26.5
2000 0.193 19.1
2500 0.149 14.8
3000 0.120 11.9
4000 0.085 8.4
5000 0.064 6.3
6000 0.050 5.0
7000 0.041 4.0
8000 0.034 3.3
10000 0.024 2.4
12000 0.018 1.8
14000 0.014 1.4
16000 0.011 1.1
18000 0.009 0.9
20000 0.007 0.7
Table B.2
Number of Pixels per Frame for Different Altitudes at Wright Patterson
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Figure B.13
Angular Velocity and Number of Pixels per Frame
vs Altitude for Wright Patterson
At Wright Patterson a signal from an object at 500 km will be spread
across approximately 85 pixels per frame. The object will only be in a
certain pixel for 0.00039 seconds (frame time/number of pixels) and the
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background will be integrating in all pixels for the duration of the frame
time.
Dividing the signal per frame by the number of pixels to find the signal
per pixel, we find that:
Sframe _ 7.853X10 6.2.512OB. Det-erB W -ed-'T
Six Npixels/frame AV.DNpixelfrNacross 
detector
FOV
SPixel=  Srame- 7.853X10 6 -2.512 -OB. D5eectBWed-F O V
Npixels/frame AV'Nacross detector
The background signal per frame is a function of the brightness of the
sky, the area of the telescope, the efficiency of the system and the
integration time per frame.
NS Bframe= 1000-2.512-NSB . Atel-et-B Wed-'tFOVarcsec2
NSBframe= 7.853X10 6-2.512-NsB" Dter-et-BW-ed-T-1.296x10 7FO V d2eg
NSBframe= 1.0178X1014-2.5 12-NsB. D2r1 et-B W ed-.r.FOV 2eg
Where in addition to those terms previously explained:
NSB = Night sky background in optical magnitudes
FOVarsec2 = Field of view in arcseconds
FOV Degrees = Field of view in degrees from edge to edge
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The factor of 7,853 is again due to converting from area in square
centimeters to telescope diameter in meters. The factor of 1.296 x 107,
which is 3600 squared, is a result of converting field of view from the
arcseconds squared to degrees.
The background signal per pixel is found by dividing the the amount of
background signal by the number of pixels:
NSBframe 1.0178X1014-2.512-NSB. D2elet BW.ed.-TFOV 2eg
NSBpi_ deNSBpixeNPixels in detector NPixels in detector
where N pixels in detector is equal to the number of pixels in the detector.
This is assumed to be the square of the number of pixels across the detector
because of the uncertainty of the orientation of the detector to the debris
streak.
The Background Statistical Noise per pixel is the square root of the
background signal because of Poisons statistics of counting events (photon
arrivals) with a random time of occurrence. The background noise per
pixel is found by:
1.0089X107-2.512 2 Dtel-eiS.BW.5 e. r 5 FOVdeg
SNoise=YSBpixV'-=  
.J 5
ixels in detector
In order to make a detection based on a single pixel the signal to noise
ratio must be above a detectable threshold.
SPixel >SNR
SNoise
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7.853X106-2.512- OB. D2elect-B W-ed-F O V
SPixel AVNacross detector > SNR
SNoise NSBSNSe 1.0089X10 7
-2.512 - Dtelrei5.B W'5-e5.¢ .5-FOVdeg
Npixels in detector
By rearranging and simplifying we find that
SPixel 0.7784. Dtel ei5.B W.5-e.2.512 2>SNRdpixel0 -8S4NR
SNoise 2.512OB..5.-A V
2.512o0. 7 78 4- Dtel-e 5.B W.5 e
5 
-2.512 2
Ts.5 AVS NR
Taking log(2.512) we arrive at a simple expression for the minimum
detectable optical brightness of an object using the single pixel detection
method:
OB= -.2720 + NSB +2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(et + 1.25-LOG(BW)
+ 1.25-LOG(ed) - 1.25-LOG(r) - 2.5-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR)
For the optical brightness of an object at the surface of the Earth, an
atmospheric extinction coefficient (e) and an appropriate measure of the air
mass (X) needs to be included to account for atmospheric losses. The
equation for minimum detectable size including these terms is:
OB= -0.2720 + B + 2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(et) + 1.25-LOG(BW)2
+ 1.25-LOG(ed) - 1.25-LOG(c) - 2.5-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR) - eX
B.3.2 Assumed Velocity Filtering (frames only)
By shifting and adding sequential frames a specified number of pixels
and direction which corresponds with an assumed velocity, it is possible to
significantly enhance the signal per pixel at a rate faster than the noise
signal. The signal per pixel per frame is the same as in the single pixel
detection.
SPixelf, Sframe - 7.853X10 62.512-OB. D el-et-BW.ed-FOV
Npixels/frame AV.Nacross detector
By shifting and adding it is possible to add all the streaks in different
frames together to detect the object. The number of frames required to do
this is determined by the angular velocity of the object, the field of view of
the telescope and the time per frame:
SPixel = SPixel, .'Nframes 7.853X1062.5"1 2 -oB" Dtelet'BW ed'F O V FOV
AV'Nacross detector AV. 1
Hence the amount of signal available per pixel is
7.853X10 6 .2.5 12 -OB. D2el-et-B W.ed-FOV 2SPixel-
AV 2 "Nacross detector'
By shifting and adding the frames you also increase the background
noise. The background signal per pixel per frame is the same as before:
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NSBframe t
NSBpixelf NPixels in detector
1.0178X1014-2.512-NSB. D2elet.BW.ed•-tFOV 2eg
Npixels in detector
The background signal is increased by the the number of frames added together.
NSBpixeF=NSBpixelf,'Nframes-
1.0178X10 14 -2.512 -NSB. D2eret.BW*ed-.TFOVd2eg
NPixels in detector
FOV
AV.T
Simplifying, we see that
NSBpixel=
1.0178X1014.2. 5 12"NsB. Dter-et.B W.ed-FOVd3eg
NPixels in detector'A V
Once again, the background noise is the square root of the background
signal
SNoise=Y NS Bpixe=
1.0089X10 7-2.512 2 D te5.B W.5-e.5 FOV 1.5
e tetre AV "d "' deg
NPixelsin detectorAV 5V
Again setting the required signal divided by the noise to the required signal
to noise ratio equates to
7.853X10 6-2.5 12-OB. D2el*et*B W.ed-FOV 2
SPixel _ AV 2"Nacross detector"f
SNoise NSBoise 1.0089X107-2.512 -" Dter-e5.B W5 -e.5 FOVt.5
ils in detector AV 5 deg
NPixels in detector* AV.
>SNR
which simplifies to
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-
NSB
SPi9el 0.7 78 4 .Dtele i5 BW.5 ed .2.512 >.FOV5 SNR
SNoise 2.512oB.t.AV1.5
NSB
2.5120.7784 Dte-e 5-B W.5-e.2.512 -FOV -5
'-AV 1.5.SNR
Again by taking the log base 2.512 we arrive at a simple equation for the
minimum detectable optical brightness for an assumed velocity filter that
shifts only the frames.
OB= -0.2720 + 2SB + 2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(et) + 1.25-LOG(BW)2
+ 1.25-LOG(ed)+1.25-log(FOV) - 2.5-LOG(t) - 3.75-LOG(AV) - 2.5- OG(SNR)
By including the atmospheric extinction term described earlier we arrive at
OB= -0.2720 + NSB + 2.5LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(eo + 1.25-LOG(BW)2
+ 1.25-LOG(ed)+1.25-log(FOV) - 2.5-LOG(t) - 3.75-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR) - eX
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B.3.3 Assumed Velocity Filtering (single frame)
Another method for utilizing the idea of the assumed velocity filtering is
to shift and add the pixels in a specific frame in certain directions
corresponding with an assumed velocity. The signal available by this
method is the sum of all pixels with signals, which is simply the signal per
frame found earlier:
Sframe= 7.853X10 6-2.512-OB. D2eret'B W *ed. '
The background signal per pixel is also the same as we previously found:
NSBframe
NPNSBpixe ixels in detector
1.0178X1014-2.512 -NSB. D2etetB W ed.t*FOV2eg
NPixels in detector
The background signal after adding the pixels in a certain direction is
just the total background signals in the summed pixels:
NSBstreak,.=NS Bpixel,. 'Npixels in streak
1.0178X10 14 -2.5 12 -NSB" D2elet-BW-ed-t-FOVdg AV'Nacross detector
NSBstreak- deg Npixels in detector FOVdNPixels in detector FOV
1.0178X10 14-2.5 12-NSB. D2 eet.B Wed.12.FOVdeg-A V
Nacross detector
The background noise is again found by taking the square root of the NSB
above:
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NSB
1.0089X10 7Nross detector 2.512 2 detector Dtee 5 B W.5e 5 .r.FOV d 5 AV- 5
SNise= .5
Nacross detector
Again, setting the signal over the noise equal to the required signal to noise
ratio we get:
Spixel 7.853X106-2.512-OB. Dtel'et'B W 2ed-1 >SNR
SNoise 1.0089X10 7-2.512 2" Dtel.ei 55BW.5 edt- FO Vd gAV.5
across detector
This simplifies to
SPixel 0.77842.512 2 Dele W.5e Nacoss detector>SNRSNoise 2.512OB.FOV.eg• A V.5
2.5 1 20B0.7 7 8 4 . DteleB W5-ed2.512 2 Nacross detector
AV-5-FOV.5.SNR
This gives us simple equation for the minimum detectable object
utilizing an assumed velocity filter on a single frame:
OB= -0.2720 + NB + 2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25.LOG(et) + 1.25-LOG(BW)+1.25-log(Nacrss detector)
+ 1.25-LOG(ed)-1.25-log(FOV) - 1.25-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR)
By including the atmospheric extinction term described earlier we get:
OB= -0.2720 + NB + 2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(et) + 1.25-LOG(BW)+1.25-log(Nacross detector)
+ 1.25-LOG(ed)-1.25-log(FOV) - 1.25-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR) - eX
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B.3.4 Assumed Velocity Filter (streak compression and multiple frames)
By combining both the signal in the streak within a frame and the
signal contained in multiple frames it is possible to maximize the signal
used to detect the object while utilizing the staring mode of operation.
Here the signal included in the streak in each frame is
Sframe= 7.853X10 6-2.512-OB. Dtelet-B W ed"
Multiplying this by the number of frames in which the streak will appear
gives the total available signal:
Stotal = Sframe'Nframes = 7.853X106-2.512-oB" D2l-etB W ed' z • FoV
AV-,
7.853X10 6.2.512-OB. Dtelet.B W.ed-F O V
Stotal AVAV
The background is also increased by the background signal per pixel times
the total number of pixels summed.
NSBpixel=NSBpixelf,, Nframes'Npixels.,a
1 .0178X10 14 -2.5 1 2 -NSB" D2 el e t'BWed' 'FOVd2eg FOV AV'Nacross detector
NPixels in detector AV*T FOV
1.0178X1014-2.512-NsB. Dtel-etB W. ed- FOV 2
NSBpixe across detector
The background noise is
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NSB
1.0089X10 7-2.512 2 - Dtel.ei5.B W .5-ed ..5-5FOVdeg
SNoise- = .5
N-across detector
Dividing the signal by the noise gives
7.853X10 6.2.512-B. Dt2eletB W.ed-F O V
Spixel AV
SNoise 1.0089X10 7-2.512N• Dtel.ei5.BW .5.e 5.5.FOVdeg
N'across detector
which simplifies to
NSB .5
SPixel 0.7784-2.512 2 - Dtelei B W.5e. ,-N .5S pi el 
"=d across detector>SNR
SNoise 2.512 0 B.AV.r.5
Solving for OB gives
NSB
2.5 12 oB =0.7 7 84 -2.512 -. Dtel.eis.B W.5-ea.5N detector.52.51 0 = "d " across detector
T.5-AV-SNR
which results in a simple equation for the minimum detectable size using
the assumed velocity filter with streak compression and multiple frames.
OB= -0.2720 + NSB + 2.5-LOG(DTel) +1.25-LOG(et + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+ 1.25 log(Nacross detector)-1.25-log(t) - 2.5-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR)
Including the atmospheric losses this becomes
OB= -0.2720 + 2SB + 2.5-LOG(DTeL) +1.25-LOG(et) + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+1.25-log(Nacross detector1. 2 5-log(t) - 2.5-LOG(AV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR) - eX
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B.3.5 Pseudo-Tracldng TDI Mode
In the pseudo-tracking mode the signal is concentrated in a single pixel
and is integrated the entire time the object is within the field of view. The
time the object stays in the field of view is found by dividing the field of view
of the telescope by the angular velocity of the object.
T = Time -FOVAV
The available signal is then given by
7.853X10 6-2.512-oB. D 2e-et-B WedF O V
S total =  AV
In the pseudo-tracking mode where the signal is integrated in a single
pixel, the background signal is only due to the signal collected in that pixel
and not a sum of many pixels. The background signal per second per pixel
is
NSBTime 1.0178X1014-2.512-NSB. D 21 et'B W edFO Vd2egB Nper time = t =-
NPixels in detector NPixels in detector
The background signal of interest is then given by
1.0178X1O142lNSB D OV 2
NSBinterest = NSBper time'T= 1.0178X10142.512NS Del-et-BWed-FOVdeg FQ
NPixels in detector AV
which simplifies to
1.0178X1014.2.512 -NsB . D2eret.B W2ed.FOVd3e
NSBinterest = NSBper timeT= 12 Weg
AV • NPixels in detector
The noise signal is then given by
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NSB
1.0089X107.2.512 2 . DteI.ei.BW 5 .5.e5.FOVg 5
SNoiser = d degAV "5 Nacross detector
The signal to noise ratio is then found by
7.853X10 6.2.512-OB. D 2elet-B W.ed-F O V
Stotal AV
SNoise 1.0089X107 2.512 - Dtel-ei5 *.BW.5-e5 -FOVdgl
AV '5 Nacross detector
which simplifies to
NSB
SPixel 0.7784-2.5127. Dee 5.B W. 5 e 5 Nacross detector>SNR
SNoise 2.512oB.AV.5-FOV.5
Solving for OB gives
2.5 12 OB 0 .7 7 8 4 -2 . 5 1 2 2 - Dtel-ei 5 B W 5-ed
5
-Nacross detector
AV.5-FOV.5.SNR
which arrives at a simple equation for the minimum detectable optical
brightness for the pseudo-tracking mode of operation:
OB= -0.2720 + NSB + 2.5-LOG(DTeo +1.25-LOG(et + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+2.5-log(Nacross detector) - 1.25LOG(AV)- 1.25-log(FOV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR)
By including the atmospheric loss terms we get:
OB= -0.2720 + 2SB + 2.5-LOG(DTeL) +1.25-LOG(et + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+2.5.log(Nacross detector) - 1.25*LOG(AV)-1.254Iog(FOV) - 2.5*LOG(SNR) - eX
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B.3.6 Tracking
In the tracking mode the signal is integrated so long as the telescope
tracks at that given velocity. Therefore the signal is given by
Stotal = 7.853X10 6 -2.5 12-OB" Dt2eletB W -ed' T tracking
The background signal is also found by multiplying the signal per time
by the amount of time tracking:
NSBNSBTme 1.0178X1014-2.512-NSB. D2 eet'BW edFOVdeg
NSBper time-- 
d
NPixels in detector NPixels in detector
1.0178X1014.2.512-NSB. D21 etB W ed.FOV Ttrakng
NSBinterest = NSBper timeT= in detectTtrackingNPixels in detector
The background noise is given by
NSB
ie1.0089X10 7 2.512 2 - Dtel-ei5.BW5 e.5e FOVdeg-Ttracking
SNise across detector
Stotal 7.853X10 6 "2.512"oB D eret'B W edT tracking
SNoise 1.0089X10 7.2.512-2 Dtele 5 .B W5 .ed -.FOVdeg.Ttr5cking
across detector
Spixel0 7 7 8 4 2 51 2 2 - Dtel-e 5 B W 5-ed 5 Nacross detector'Ttracking> S N R
SNoise 2.512oB.FOV
Solving for OB,
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NSB
2.5120 0.77842.512W.eNacross detector tracking
FOV-SNR
Which simplifies to an equation for the minimum optical brightness for the
tracking mode
OB= -0.2720 + SB + 2.5-LOG(DTeI) +1.25-LOG(e) + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+2.5-log(Nacross detector)+ 1.2 5 -log(Ttacking) -2.5-log(FOV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR)
Including atmospheric losses we get
OB= -0.2720 + NB + 2.5-LOG(DTeo) +1.25-LOG(eo + 1.25-LOG(BW)+ 1.25-LOG(ed)2
+2.5-log(Nacross detector)+ 1 .2 5-lo g(Ttrac king) -2.5-log(FOV) - 2.5-LOG(SNR) - eX
These equations provide the faintest optical magnitudes that can be detected
against the night sky background for the different detection methods. Some
of these equations do not give valid answers if the object does not cross
several pixels per frame.
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B.4 , Minimum Detectable Optical Brightness at Various Sites
The available information on the characteristics at various sites is
shown in the table below.
Field
of Frame
Site NSB eX Diam et BW ed View Rate
WPAFB 21 0.3 2.54 0.89 6200 0.072 0.2 0.033
ETS 22.23 0.25 0.79 0.89 6200 0.072 1 0.033
ETS 22.23 0.25 0.79 0.89 6200 0.072 0.5 0.033
AMOS 22.23 0.2 0.56 0.6 6200 0.142 0.5 0.033
Malabar 20.4 0.35 1.2 0.85 3500 0.142 0.5 0.033
Malabar 20.4 0.35 0.5 0.69 5400 0.083 3.5 0.033
WFOV
SOR 19.7 0.25 1.5 0.85 6200 0.142 0.72 0.033
SOR 2 19.7 0.25 3.5 0.85 6200 0.142 0.31 0.033
Table B.3
Available Information on Participating Optical Sites
Using the equations derived in the previous sections, the faintest detectable
optical brightness for the different sites are given in the table below
AVF Track
Range Single AVF Pixels AVF PS Track 1 0
Site (kim) SNR Pixel Frames only Both Track 1 sec sec
WPAFB 500 5 14.82 15.87 17.23 18.29 20.71 21.5* 22.7*
ETS 500 5 13.84 15.77 15.39 17.32 18.86 18.78 20.03
ETS 500 5 13.84 15.40 15.76 17.32 19.24 19.54 20.79
AMOS 500 5 13.67 15.23 15.60 17.15 19.07 19.37 20.62
Malabar 500 5 13.32 14.87 15.24 16.79 18.71 19.01 20.26
Malabar 500 5 12.20 14.81 13.06 15.67 16.53 15.78 17.03
WFOV
SOR 500 5 13.62 15.37 15.34 17.09 18.81 18.92 20.17
SOR 2 500 5 14.54 15.83 16.72 18.01 20.19 20.75 22.00
(*) not available at Wright Patterson.
Table B.4
Visual Magnitudes of the Faintest Detectable Object
for Participating Sites and Various Methods
at 500 km and Signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
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Faintest Optical Magnitudes for Various Sites and Methods
20.00
15.00
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Figure B.14
Faintest Detectable Object Brightness for Participating Sites and
Various Methods at 500 km and with a Signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
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The results of the methods used to detect and enhance the data are
dependent on the angular velocity of the debris. The minimum detectable
object brightness for Wright Patterson at various altitudes and a signal to
noise ratio of 5 is given below.
AVF Track Track
Range Angular Single AVF Pixels AVF PS 1 sec 10 sec
(km) Velocity SNR Pixel Frames only Both Track (*) (*)
200 2.225 5 13.43 13.97 16.35 16.90 19.83 21.13 22.38
300 1.471 5 13.87 14.64 16.58 17.35 20.05 21.13 22.38
400 1.094 5 14.20 15.13 16.74 17.67 20.21 21.13 22.38
500 0.868 5 14.45 15.50 16.86 17.92 20.34 21.13 22.38
600 0.718 5 14.65 15.81 16.97 18.13 20.44 21.13 22.38
700 0.610 5 14.83 16.08 17.06 18.30 20.53 21.13 22.38
800 0.530 5 14.98 16.31 17.13 18.46 20.61 21.13 22.38
900 0.467 5 15.12 16.51 17.20 18.59 20.67 21.13 22.38
1000 0.417 5 15.24 16.70 17.26 18.72 20.74 21.13 22.38
1500 0.268 5 15.72 17.42 17.50 19.20 20.98 21.13 22.38
2000 0.193 5 16.08 17.95 17.68 19.55 21.15 21.13 22.3.8
2500 0.149 5 16.36 18.37 17.82 19.83 21.29 21.13 22.38
3000 0.120 5 16.59 18.72 17.94 20.07 21.41 21.13 22.38
4000 0.085 5 16.97 19.29 18.13 20.45 21.60 21.13 22.38
5000 0.064 5 17.28 19.76 18.28 20.76 21.76 21.13 22.38
6000 0.050 5 17.55 20.15 18.41 21.02 21.89 21.13 22.38
7000 0.041 5 17.77 20.49 18.53 21.25 22.00 21.13 22.38
8000 0.034 5 17.98 20.80 18.63 21.45 22.10 21.13 22.38
10000 0.024 5 18.34 21.34 18.81 21.81 22.28 21.13 22.38
(*) not available at Wright Patterson.
Table B.5
Faintest detectable Object Brightness for the Wright Patterson Debris
Detection System at Various Altitudes and a Signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
The equations used are not accurate beyond an altitude of 16000 km for
Wright Patterson because the debris does not necessarily change pixels
between frames. Other sites will have different altitudes where this occurs.
It is a function of the field of view, the number of pixels and the frame time.
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Faintest Detectable Optical Brightness for Wright Patterson
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Figure B.15
Faintest Detectable Object Brightness for the Wright Patterson Debris
Detection System at Various Altitudes and a Signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
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B5 Optical Brightness of Debris to Size
The magnitude of the brightness of a piece of space debris is given by
Mobj = -MSun- 2.5 log (Ab +AobjF(O) eX
where:
Mdeb = Optical magnitude of debris (optical mag)
Msun = Sun's apparent in-band magnitude (optical mag)
Alb = Albedo of the debris
A = Visible area of the object (m2)
F(0) = Phase function
r = Range to debris (m)
eX = Degradation due to atmospheric extinction.
At Wright Patterson the S-20 type photocathode used in the second
generation image intensifiers is sensitive between 3000 Angstroms and 9200
Angstroms for a bandwidth of 6200 Angstroms. The optical magnitude of
the solar radiation at the wavelengths that a S-20 image intensifier is
sensitive is -26.77.
The second term of the equation involving the albedo, the area, and
the phase function includes the reflected light from the debris. The range
squared loss is due to the spreading of the reflected light. The average
albedo of debris is found by Dr. Karl Henize's GEODSS Data to be 0.08. The
phase function is assumed to be a Lambertain Scatterer. Analysis by Carl
Henize of NASA indicates that the Lambertian approximation is within the
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expected error bars for debris measurements. 1 The phase function for a
Lambertain Scatterer is
F(O) = -2(-) cos 0 + sin 0]
37C2
where 0 is the angle between the sun and the telescope. For the geometry
required for optical measurements (dusk or dawn terminator, near vertical
staring) the sun is approximately 18 degrees below the horizon
(astronomical twilight) and hence the phase angle is approximately 72
degrees, this gives us F(72) = 0.1036.
The last term defines the loss of light through the atmosphere, which
is calculated by the optical depth of the atmosphere times the extinction
coefficient. At zenith and depending on atmospheric conditions the
extinction of the signal is decreased by 20% to 35%. For very hazy or muggy
nights this can be decreased significantly more. For the Lincoln
Laboratories ETS site this product is calculated from measurements to be
0.25. An estimate for Wright Patterson extinction is 0.30.
Imputing these values for Wright Patterson into equation 6.7 we get
0.08 .Aobj -0.1036
Mdeb = -26.77 - 2.5 log08 + 0.30
-2
1 Henize, Karl G. "Optical Debris Observations." Briefing at the Optical Debris
Measurement Technical Interchange Meeting Phillips Laboratory, New Mexico. 17
January 1991.
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where:
Mdeb = Optical magnitude of debris
A = Area of the debris
r = Range in compatible units.
For r in kilometers and debris area in square centimeters this becomes
Mdeb = -26.77 - 2.5 log (0.08 Abj 010 + 0.30
rkm2 . 1010
For the case of a 1 cm object at 500 km this equates to
0.08 - 0.79 - 0.1036
Mdeb = -26.77 - 2.5 log 2.5 X 10 + 0.30
Which equals
Mdeb 1 cm = 17.48
In order to calculate the debris size from the optical signature we must
invert this equation. Rearranging to find the apparent size in terms of
optical magnitude
Mdeb + 26.77 - 0.30 = - 2.5 log 29 X 103Abrkm
This reduces to
-0.2 Mdeb + 0.7992 = log d cm - log r km
which results in a simple equation defining optical brightness with
apparent size:
Dem= rkm* 10(0.2 Mdeb+ 0.7992)
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Applying this to the faintest optical magnitude detected, the smallest
detectable object can be determined. Listed below is the smallest detectable
objects for the various sites using the various methods.
AVF Track
Single AVF Pixels AVF PS Track 1 0
Site Pixel Frames only both Track 1 sec sec
WPAFB 3.43 2.11 1.13 0.69 0.23 0.16 0.09
ETS 5.36 2.21 2.63 1.08 0.53 0.55 0.31
ETS Zoom 5.36 2.62 2.21 1.08 0.45 0.39 0.22
AMOS 5.79 2.83 2.39 1.17 0.48 0.42 0.24
Malabar 6.83 3.34 2.82 1.38 0.57 0.50 0.28
Malabar 11.45 3.44 7.69 2.31 1.55 2.20 1.24
WFOV
SOR 5.95 2.66 2.69 1.20 0.54 0.52 0.29
SOR 2 3.89 2.15 1.43 0.79 0.29 0.22 0.13
Table B.6
Minimum Detectable Size for Participating Sites and
Various Methods at 500 km and signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
317
AVF
single AVF pixels AVF PS Tracking Tracking
Altitude pixel frames only both track 1 sec 10 sec
200 2.60 2.02 0.67 0.53 0.14 0.07 0.04
300 3.17 2.23 0.91 0.64 0.18 0.11 0.06
400 3.65 2.38 1.13 0.74 0.23 0.15 0.08
500 4.06 2.50 1.33 0.82 0.27 0.19 0.10
600 4.43 2.60 1.53 0.90 0.31 0.22 0.13
700 4.77 2.68 1.71 0.96 0.35 0.26 0.15
800 5.07 2.76 1.89 1.03 0.38 0.30 0.17
900 5.36 2.82 2.06 1.08 0.42 0.34 0.19
1000 5.63 2.88 2.22 1.14 0.45 0.37 0.21
1500 6.76 3.10 2.98 1.37 0.60 0.56 0.31
2000 7.67 3.24 3.66 1.55 0.74 0.75 0.42
2500 8.42 3.34 4.29 1.70 0.87 0.93 0.52
3000 9.07 3.41 4.88 1.83 0.99 1.12 0.63
4000 10.14 3.49 5.96 2.05 1.20 1.49 0.84
5000 11.00 3.52 6.94 2.22 1.40 1.87 1.05
6000 11.70 3.53 7.84 2.36 1.58 2.24 1.26
7000 12.28 3.51 8.68 2.48 1.75 2.61 1.47
8000 12.77 3.48 9.46 2.58 1.91 2.99 1.68
10000 13.53 3.40 10.89 2.73 2.20 3.73 2.10
12000 14.06 3.29 12.16 2.84 2.46 4.48 2.52
14000 14.40 3.15 13.29 2.91 2.69 5.23 2.94
16000 14.59 3.01 14.30 2.95 2.89 5.97 3.36
Table B.7
Minimum Detectable Size for Wright Patterson at Various
Altitudes and Various Methods (Noise Ratio of 5).
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Minimum Detectable Size for Various Sites
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Figure B.16
Minimum Detectable Size for Participating Sites and
Various Methods at 500 km and Signal to Noise Ratio of 5.
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Minimum Detectable Debris Sizes for Wright Patterson
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Figure B.17
Minimum Detectable Size for Wright Patterson at Various
Altitudes and Various Methods (Signal to Noise Ratio of 5).
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